ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS AND DISPLACEMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT
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Executive summary

This report was stimulated by a conference on armed non-state actors (ANSAs) and the protection of internally displaced people organized in 2011 jointly by Geneva Call and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. The conference itself followed on from a special edition of Forced Migration Review magazine on ‘Armed non-state actors and displacement’.

ANSAs have many different modes of interaction with displaced people, ranging from being the causes deliberately or otherwise — of the displacement through to actively taking protective action towards displaced people. People may choose to displace themselves or not partly dependent on the link they have with ANSAs. That relationship is not fixed but will change over time and as a result of factors internal or external to that relationship.

There exists a well-established legal and normative framework applicable to displacement contexts (international humanitarian law, human rights law, international criminal law, refugee law, and internal displacement norms), which however leaves gaps and unclear areas in relation to ANSAs. There are both challenges and opportunities for strengthening ANSAs’ compliance with those laws and norms.

ANSAs operate within a broader environment, locally and internationally, of those who would protect or assist displaced people and who would have opportunities to engage with ANSAs. Again, there are both limitations to the engagement with ANSAs by humanitarian organizations and opportunities in the various approaches taken on displacement-related issues both by these other stakeholders and by ANSAs.

A set of summarized key findings emerge from the examples offered in the analysis. These address how ANSAs operate in relation to displaced people and how the institutional, social, and political contexts must be understood in order to make engagement with ANSAs both feasible and positive for the sake of displaced people.

From these findings a set of recommendations is offered for States, the diaspora, the United Nations, a range of international and local civil society organizations and humanitarian and human rights actors, and research institutions.

Background and methodology

This study on armed non-state actors (ANSAs) and displacement in armed conflict was commissioned by Geneva Call with funding from the Human Security Division of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA).

The research builds on a two-day conference on ANSAs and the protection of internally displaced people (IDPs) organized in 2011 jointly by Geneva Call and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). The conference provided an opportunity for academics and practitioners to present their work, including articles written for a special edition of Forced Migration Review (FMR) on ‘Armed non-state actors and displacement’. Selected members (active and former) of ANSAs as well as representatives of donor governments were invited to share their perspectives and experiences with other participants. The event recognized the important role, both positive and negative, that ANSAs play in relation to displacement, and highlighted the need for further research on the dynamics at play in order to develop or refine strategies for engagement with ANSAs, with the ultimate goal of ensuring better protection and assistance to affected populations.

Despite the significance of the subject matter, there is limited existing research within the field of forced migration that specifically addresses the role of ANSAs. Research on ANSAs equally fails to engage in any depth with displacement. Besides the above mentioned conference and the special issue of FMR, exceptions include a 2005 article on ‘Engaging ANSAs on IDPs protection’, which gave an analysis of the character, motivations and actions of ANSAs and provided some policy suggestions to engage ANSAs on IDP rights. A 2012 book on ‘Armed Conflict and Displacement’ offers a review of the existing legal framework for the protection of refugees and displaced persons under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and covers the legal and normative framework applicable to ANSAs. This study builds on the above endeavours; it seeks to deepen our understanding of the interplay between ANSAs and displacement, both internal and cross-border, through an analysis of secondary interdisciplinary literature. The research also draws upon geographically diverse case studies based on past and current armed conflicts, and makes suggestions on ways forward to further improve the protection of displaced people.

Some 70 key informants (mainly researchers, policymakers, United Nations (UN) staff and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with diverse geographical and thematic expertise) were interviewed during the research and six experts reviewed the final draft, in addition to Geneva Call staff. A ten-day field trip to the Thai-Burma border offered an opportunity to test some of the hypotheses developed through the research. Interviews were conducted with senior members of four ANSAs, the Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Pa-Dh National Liberation Organization (PNLO), displaced people living in Mae La refugee camp, analysts, donors, as well as staff of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international NGOs and civil society organizations.

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WHAT IS AN ARMED NON-STATE ACTOR (ANSA)?

There is no universally agreed definition of an ANSA. For the purposes of this study, the term ANSA is used to indicate organized armed entities that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside effective State control, and lack legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties. This includes non-State armed groups, national liberation movements, de facto governing authorities, and States that are not or are only partially internationally recognized. ANSAs are usually engaged in armed struggle against State forces or other ANSAs in the context of non-international armed conflict or other situations of violence.

* This definition was developed by Geneva Call for operational purposes. There may be other armed entities involved in armed conflict or other situations of violence which do not meet this operational definition: for instance, paramilitary groups and private military and security companies (PMSC) are not considered to fall within this definition.

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According to the 2012 World Disasters Report, out of 73 million people who are forcibly displaced, 43 million are fleeing armed conflict and persecution, a category of displacement which has increased over the last decade. Of this number the majority, about 28 million are IDPs, many of them as a result of non-international armed conflicts. In 2010, ANSAs were reportedly the agents of displacement in a quarter of these conflict situations that generate displacement. A 2009 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey over eight conflict-affected countries revealed that more than half of all people affected by violence had been displaced. A subsequent World Disasters Report, out of 73 million people who are forcibly displaced, 43 million are fleeing armed conflict and persecution, a category of displacement which has increased over the last decade. Of this number the majority, about 28 million are IDPs, many of them as a result of non-international armed conflicts. In 2010, ANSAs were reportedly the agents of displacement in a quarter of these conflict situations that generate displacement. A 2009 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey over eight conflict-affected countries revealed that more than half of all people affected by violence had been displaced. According to the 2012 World Disasters Report, out of 73 million people who are forcibly displaced, 43 million are fleeing armed conflict and persecution, a category of displacement which has increased over the last decade. Of this number the majority, about 28 million are IDPs, many of them as a result of non-international armed conflicts. In 2010, ANSAs were reportedly the agents of displacement in a quarter of these conflict situations that generate displacement. A 2009 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey over eight conflict-affected countries revealed that more than half of all people affected by violence had been displaced.

In his book Killing Civilians Hugo Slim explains how in conflict situations people experience “dramatic change in their normal patterns of space and movement. Spatial suffering takes many forms and results either from people’s efforts to avoid the war or from a warring party’s determination to disperse civilians to break their link with a contested area of land or restrict their movement. In all these different experiences of relocation and spatial suffering, civilian populations have moved with varying degrees of force or voluntarism. Loss of control of one’s traditional space and one’s normal pattern of movement is central to most civilian experience in war and a major form of suffering.” Displacement should be conceptualized both as a response to a threat and/or as a protection strategy and so while displacement is commonly described as a negative outcome, moving away from a real or perceived threat is first and foremost a self-protective measure and may be the only way to avoid death and serious harm.

Furthermore, the perception of displacement as a single, linear, short term event is also increasingly inaccurate. Instead, displacement often takes place in sequential waves and the reality of protracted displacement reflects a landscape of long-lasting conflicts and recurring crises. In short, people tend to be displaced more often, repeatedly, and over longer periods than previously.

Many analysts agree that contemporary conflicts have been characterized by the proliferation as well as the diversification of ANSAs, which some have attributed to generally weaker state institutions in the post-Cold War context. There are in addition multiple factors that influence the composition and behaviour of ANSAs. Some are intrinsic to the very ideology of the group which often includes military, political, economic, ethnic, religious, and socio-cultural components, while others relate to peripheral factors that are concerned with the broader evolution of the particular conflict and the influence of other stakeholders.

Civilians continue to be involved and affected: they can be the target of violence as well as sometimes its source, with phenomena such as popular uprisings leading to the formation of ANSAs. Both the urbanization of conflicts and their increasingly protracted nature have permeated displacement patterns. Combined, these trends contribute to blurring the distinction between civilians and combatants and are the cause of on-going challenges to laws and policies that have been developed based on those categories.

This research takes as its point of departure the close correlation between conflict and displacement and the well-established fact that the law prohibits unlawful displacement. It then addresses the array of scenarios where ANSAs are agents of displacement. Part 1 outlines some of the dynamics at play between ANSAs and the phenomenon of displacement. It looks at the different phases of displacement, starting with scenarios where ANSAs are agents of displacement. It also looks at the role they play when displacement is induced by the other party or when conflict is not (or not the only) trigger of displacement, putting the emphasis on the displaced people’s own role in these processes. It then addresses the array of possible relations between ANSAs and displaced people during displacement and how these can fluctuate according to a range of factors pertaining to the ANSAs, the displaced people, or the evolution of the conflict.

Part 2 provides an overview of the legal and normative framework applicable to ANSAs in displacement contexts, also looking at the interplay that exists between the different bodies of international law (international humanitarian law, human rights law, international criminal law and refugee law). It then points to the gaps, challenges and opportunities for strengthening ANSAs’ compliance with those laws and norms.

Part 3 reviews the broader environment that ANSAs operate within. It describes how other stakeholders — especially the diaspora, States, and international and local organizations — are likely to have an influence on the dynamics between ANSAs and displacement. It provides a mapping of current engagement efforts with ANSAs on displacement issues, reviewing some of the limitations as well as opportunities and comparative advantages of these different approaches.

Part 4 presents a set of conclusions on key findings that have emerged from the research. It uses these to then make concrete recommendations to various stakeholders for engaging ANSAs on displacement issues.
PART I

ANSAs and the dynamics of displacement

The interactions that ANSAs have with displaced populations are complex. At times ANSAs are motivated to trigger displacement while in other situations displacement is not directly intended by ANSAs. During the displacement phase itself, with the evolution of a conflict and when solutions to displacement are being considered, there is a diversity of relationships between the ANSAs and the displaced. The first section of this part outlines some of the dynamics at play. The second section addresses the variety of relationships between ANSAs and the displaced.

1) Triggers of displacement and the roles of ANSAs

There are various — often overlapping — factors that can lead an individual or a group of persons to become displaced, but displacement is essentially the result of a coercive removal from a habitual residence, the outcome of other factors which prompt the departure, or a combination of the two. The coercive factors may be direct or more often result from other violations, either temporary or longer term. The displacement (or the containment) may not be entirely coerced depending on whether the civilians have strong incentives to move with the group. These can range from a genuine allegiance to the fear of retaliation by the ANSA or punishment from state authorities or coerced depending on whether the civilians have historical roots and may be linked to a range of ethnic, religious or socioeconomic dynamics. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ can manifest itself not only through deliberate violence towards a specific ethnic group but can seek its total dispossession through forced removal as took place in Bosnia following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. From 1992, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces expelled Muslim populations from Eastern Bosnia and destroyed their homes or gave them to Serbs displaced from elsewhere, at least partly to ensure that the people expelled would not return in the future. While ethnic cleansing was overwhelmingly committed by Bosnian Serbs, it was adopted by Bosnian Croats and Muslims too.13

Revenge has been identified as one of the factors explaining ANSAs’ violations of IHL. Referring to the concept of ‘negative reciprocity’, recourse to displacement can be used to reciprocate displacement (or other violations) caused by the adversary.14 It can be intended also to punish civilians suspected of collaboration. Mistreatment and human rights abuses committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have been described as ‘revenge attacks’ or ‘punitive actions’. Acts of extreme violence and terror have been perpetrated deliberately by the LRA against displaced people in camps, whether in the form of large scale massacres, repeated attacks, or symbolic acts of cruelty such as mutilations.15 For Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, the reasons behind the attacks on displaced camps were both linked to a sense of betrayal by the Acholi community who left their villages to move to camps on the orders of the Government of Uganda, and were a means to prove to them their mistake by showing them the inability of the government to protect the camps from attack.16

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as control of territory and populations fluctuates between armed groups, some ANSAs displace people or conduct reprisal attacks motivated by revenge. A group may, for instance, displace people because they have allowed another group to occupy a village, or in the case of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda, FDLR) some episodes of displacement have been in retaliation for military attacks against them. Testimonies of IDPs and of former combatants all agree that the FDLR attacked civilians whom it accused of collaborating with the Rwandan army. Military interventions against ANSAs in the DRC systematically and recurrently lead in this way to increases in the number of displaced people.17

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) have used violent acts and threats, including forced displacement, as a means to punish individuals considered to be informers or collaborators with government forces.18

Towards the end of the conflict in Libya, during the summer of 2011, ANSAs from Misrata have been involved in the systematic destruction of the city of Tawargha forcing its inhabitants to flee because they had allegedly supported the Qaddafi forces during the Misrata siege. Tawargha’s IDPs attributed their displacement to the desire of revenge for the crimes and human rights abuses that Tawargha’s fighters committed. Two years after the conflict, Tawargha is a ghost town and the inhabitants of Misrata remain bitterly opposed to the return of Tawarghans and continue to be the target of revenge crimes.19

In some situations the intention of controlling the movement of the population may not necessarily have the objective of harming civilians (although that can be an unintended outcome.) The aim of ANSA in this scenario can be to keep the civilian support base with them, through displacement or by preventing or restricting their movements, or to strengthen the support base by displacing those considered undesirables. This support base provides political support, material support, a source of recruitment, and intelligence, among other things.

The most significant episode of forced displacement by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) — that of the Muslim community from the Jaffna Peninsula in Northern Sri Lanka in October 1990 — illustrates what has been described as the LTTE’s strategy to maintain and strengthen the Tamil stronghold.20 While of different faiths, historically Muslims and Tamils living in the North and East of Sri Lanka were integrated into local life as inter-dependent communities speaking the same language. However, the relationship became more difficult and segregated during the 1980s especially in the East and violence developed between Tamils and Muslims.21 While the LTTE did not officially release any clear reasons for the expulsion of the Muslims, it appears to have been a response by the LTTE leadership to the threat posed by an increasingly strong national Muslim political party and the formation of Muslim home guards which would undermine the LTTE’s goal of a mono-ethnic Tamil state.

While the bulk of the attention to the phenomenon of displacement is on the actual transfer or movement...
of populations (as it is the most visible effect and generally has significant humanitarian impact) it is also worth considering that the motives behind forced immobility — when movement and mobility are restricted — may be similar. As summed-up by Olivier Bangerter, “forced displacement can be used either to force the ‘undesirables’ to flee to the enemy or the ‘desirables’ to remain in or move to the areas controlled by the ANSA, especially if the ANSA relies on their support”.25

Understanding the reasons ANSAs may have for impeding populations from fleeing may be as important as understanding their motives for causing displacement. These might range from a desire to convey a semblance of normalcy to mask a humanitarian crisis or the ‘desirables’ to remain in or move to the areas restricted ― may be similar. As summed-up by Olivier Bangerter, “forced displacement can be used either to force the ‘undesirables’ to flee to the enemy or the ‘desirables’ to remain in or move to the areas controlled by the ANSA, especially if the ANSA relies on their support”.25

Another argument often advanced as to why ANSAs would prevent people from leaving is to deter their adversary from targeting them, as it would also increase the risk of causing ‘collateral damage’ in heavily populated areas. This may have been a factor explaining why in Mali in 2013 there have been reports that armed groups have prevented people displaced in the North from seeking refuge in the South.26

Another clear illustration of this was the strategy of the LTTE towards the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009; as military attacks from the government increased, the LTTE kept civilians closely around them in the hope that this would deter the army from attacking them. In this case the strategy failed as it did not stop the army from attacking despite the civilian costs.25

While States, often with the support of international organizations and the involvement of civil society, play a more central role when return is taking place, less attention has been paid to the role of ANSAs and their motives for either deterring or encouraging return. In Colombia, the FARC have prevented or controlled the return of the displaced where suspicion of collaboration with the State or associated paramilitary groups existed. Returnees had to seek permission to return and, if allowed, they were able to do so under specific conditions resulting in further restrictions on their movements.26 In Burma/Myanmar, ANSAs’ cautious positions towards return appear to be at least in part based on humanitarian grounds. Burmese ANSAs believe that the security conditions in areas of return inside the country — including precarious ceasefires, the failure of the national army to withdraw, and the presence of landmines — are not yet conducive to the return of refugees, a view which is mostly shared by the refugees themselves.25

The position of some of these groups towards return may also be based on more strategic and political considerations. It has recently been suggested that the KNU has a preference for the return of the displaced before the 2015 elections in order to enhance their electoral prospects.27

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iii) To control territory
Some ANSAs may clear the land of its inhabitants in order to access and exploit a specific territory for military or economic purposes (e.g. land rich in minerals, grazing or logging opportunities, access to the sea and fishing opportunities). These types of intentional displacements may or may not be combined with some degree of harmful intention towards civilians. For example, through looting and burning villages, attacking IDP camps, amputating, raping, and killing civilians living in government-held zones, the apparent aim of the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) practices in Sierra Leone was to drive away rural populations living on the fringes of rebel strongholds in order to create a protective no-man’s land for themselves.28

In Eastern DRC where power dynamics between State and ANSAs have shifted several times and are linked to one or more of them forming temporary military and trading alliances to curtail the dominance of the other(s), the ethnic motivation for the displacement or containment of populations has at times been superseded by territorial considerations. The exploitation of mineral riches by various power-holders and arms-bearers has caused both displacement and migration; thousands of people have left their agric-
also be that ANSAs may opt for these actions to attacks and facilitating evacuations. This type of inten-
tually focuses on violations rather than positive actions. Furthermore, the international State-centric framework lets States respond to accusations of human rights abuses, including displacement, through mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council, whereas such forums do not exist for ANSAs. It could also be that ANSAs may opt for these actions to remain discreet for the very same purpose of preventing follow-up targeted attacks on civilians in the new locations or reprisals against the ANSA itself. Because of the above and the diversity of behaviour, it is not easy to deter-
mine what the factors or circumstances are that would lead an ANSA to protect populations from displacement by bringing them by facilitating their flight and relocation. In general, however, the closer the group is to its constituency, the more inclined it will be to improve rather than impair civilians’ lives. Organic links may exist such as a common ethnicity, but also the members of the ANSAs may be from the community and share political objectives.

In the Philippines, displacement has been cyclical and chronic (taking place over short time periods and distances), with people generally going back to their villages after a month or two in displacement. While civilians may have moved by themselves, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have in some instances facilitated their movements. The MILF women’s wing in particular has reportedly played a role in providing warning to the population in advance of government attacks and facilitating evacuations. This type of inten-
tional displacement is lawful according to IHL, justi-
fied by an imperative military reason as well as the intention to protect civilians.

In the Burmese context, ANSAs had ethnic and religious ties with civilians and these communities faced violence or persecution committed by the army especially in the areas close to the border which remained under the ANSAs’ control. As the Burmese army’s campaigns intensified and entire villages were destroyed, some people benefited from the support of ANSAs which provided safe passage through the jungle and secured their safe crossing into Thailand.

After the invasion of Western Sahara by Morocco in 1975, thousands of Sahrawis fled to Algeria. They were reportedly provided safe passage by the Polisario Front, which helped set up the camps.

b) Displacement as a by-product of conflict and of other drivers, such as natural disasters

There are instances when ANSAs have no direct or deliberate intention to cause displacement. In many situations the trigger for displacement is not the forced physical removal of civilians but the civilians’ deliberate decision to flee (or to stay); it is important to note the diversity and variability in people’s responses as conflict impinges on their everyday lives. Indeed the reasons that would prompt the decision to flee are diverse — with economic, social and psychological dimensions — and often cumulative, notwithstanding the fact that one specific event may be the proximate triggering factor.

In contexts where civilians are suffering from generalised violence triggered by conflict, rather than dis-
placement being a planned strategy by the belligerents, populations may spontaneously flee into the hands of ANSAs in search of protection; or, having weighed up all the evils, conclude that protection by an ANSA is preferable to either chaos or ‘protection’ by the government side.

While ANSAs operating in Somalia have reportedly deliberately caused displacement, the large-scale dis-
placement that took place in the country over 2007 and 2008 was not entirely the result of ANSAs’ actions. Some two-thirds of the population of Mogadishu left the city in the context of violence between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Islamic militant groups. Loss of physical and financial assets and the collapse of socio-political protection were among the key factors that explain their decision to move. Moving was also gradual, with testimonies of people first relocating within Mogadishu before deciding to leave the city.11

Natural disasters can also trigger large-scale displace-
ment and may be combined with pre-existing conflict-induced displacement. In such instances the belligerents find themselves with the responsibility to address new or increased episodes of displacement, as in Mindanao where the 2011 floods affected the return areas of those displaced by the conflict between the government and the MILF in 2008, or in Sri Lanka when both the LTTE and the government responded to the effects of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

There are also situations where ANSAs play a role in preventing or addressing displacement induced by their enemy. In 2010 IDMC reported that about half the situations of displacement took place in contexts where the agents of displacement were either government forces or armed groups associated with the government.12 The assimilation of minorities, especially of Kurds, has been a recurring pattern of Turkish nationalism. Over several decades the Turkish authorities forcibly removed thousands of Kurds by demolishing Kurdish dwellings and deporting the population.13 The Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, PKK) emerged in Ankara in the early 1970s in reaction to Turkey’s move-and-assimilation strategy. Between 1993 and 1995 the Turkish military reportedly expelled Kurdish villagers in the country’s South-East as a punishment for refusal to join the village guards (state-sponsored para-

2) The diversity of relationships between ANSAs and displaced people

Most narratives tend to emphasize the dissociation between ANSAs and displaced people. This is in line with the IHL principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants and might more simply be linked to the tendency to fit people into the categories of perpetrator or victim. The risk with these over-simplified narratives is that they present a partial and often inaccurate account of the range of interactions that may exist between ANSAs and civilian populations and the specific interplay that exists between ANSAs and displaced people.

a) Role and behaviour of ANSAs

Below are some scenarios and examples which highlight the diversity and sometimes ambiguity of these relationships, ranging from being mainly exploitative and predatory through more nuanced ones of toler-
ance and acceptance to ones of mutual support, solidarity, and protection. Specific examples may help to identify the factors in whether the relationship is primarily driven by coercion or by choice and reciprocity. Although there are no traceable consistent or systematic behavioural patterns given the multiple factors and actors that can affect these dynamics, it is possible to highlight some trends and show how relations may vary from being abusive to protective or neutral, keeping in mind that while one set of behaviours may be predominant it can overlap with others.

i) Abusive and exploitative behaviour

The poor human rights record of some ANSAs, combined with the fact that ANSAs often depend on civilian populations for essential resources such as fighters and revenue, has led to a characterization of ANSA’s behaviour as predominantly exploitative and preda-

while some Congolese or foreign ANSAs may refer to improving civilian lives in their political speeches, the translation of these policies into action tends inexorably to result in a spiral of suffering and protracted and multiple displacements that have eroded resilience and heightened vulnerabilities.
Notwithstanding the range of factors that may account for ANSAs’ behaviour — notably the agenda of the group, its internal structure, resources, and relationships with the international system — instances of particularly brutal abuses, such as ‘ethnic cleansing’ or reprisal attacks, are more commonly found when displaced people (and local communities) are dealing with a foreign ANSA or a group which is heavily reliant on foreign elements or on those of a different ethnicity. This was the case during the series of conflicts in West Africa, for instance with Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) which brought together individuals from different nationalities and ethnicities, or more recently in Mali with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The lack of a ethnic bonds and cultural connections can be a barrier for the displaced to negotiate with the group and seek improvement of their situation.

Although the LRA committed countless abuses against displaced Ugandan nationals (of the same Acholi tribe), some subtle but potentially relevant distinctions of behaviour can be observed from the moment the LRA moved out of Uganda and spread its presence between Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR) and the DRC. While sexual violence is a constant feature of the LRA’s behaviour, when the bulk of the troops were still operating in Uganda it was framed as ‘forced marriage’ (and called ‘sexual slavery’) by some UN organizations. Notwithstanding, a non-consensual act whereby a female abductee would become the wife of an LRA soldier or commander. Aside from this, there were few accounts of ‘extra-martial’ rapes, and especially the gang rapes which are common in other conflict contexts. Patterns of LRA sexual violence shifted, however, once the war was exported from Uganda, with reports of systematic rape by LRA members. The pre-existing links with displaced indigenous communities are, however, only one element of a more complex network of factors which may explain shifts in the behaviour of the LRA.

The presence of ANSAs amongst the displaced or in their vicinity, whether in camps or other settings, (often referred to as ‘militarization’) can compromise their personal safety. This can be due to cumulative factors including the circulation and potential use of weapons in camps, the risk of military recruitment, the risk of diversion of aid, and the risk of sexual abuses. For example, the largest camp of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Ein el-Hilweh, is especially dangerous for refugees because of the large number of weapons in circulation in the camp and the presence of various Islamist militant groups engaging in intermecine fighting. The greatest danger, however, is placing what is intended to be a humanitarian and civilian space into the heart of the conflict and the battlefield, including by using camps as bases for armed attacks and therefore at risk of being attacked in return. Another camp of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Nahr el-Bared, was the scene of fighting between the Lebanese army and the Fatah al-Islam group in May 2007, causing its almost complete demolition and the displacement of its 30,000 residents. In Darfur, displacement sites — whether government-controlled urban centres, areas controlled by armed factions, or camps on the Chad-Sudan border — all showed signs of militarization. However the areas under Sudan Liberation Movement/Army-Minni Minnawi (SLM/AMM) control showed a lack of distinction between civilian and military space, including military and military functions, and a lack of civilian infrastructure which indicated that the camps were not so much militarized as under the military control of an ANSA. While the militarization of camps is problematic in itself, the responses to address the militarization have also often been harmful to the displaced. For example, the alleged infiltration of the refugee camps in Kenya by Al-Shabaab led to the withdrawal of many humanitarian workers, who feared attacks on their staff in the camps, the imposition of a curfew by the Kenyan authorities, episodes of mass arrests and beatings of refugees by the police (in an attempt to catch Al-Shabaab fighters), and threats of deportation back to Somalia.

II) Governance role

Where there is no State presence in a territory or if State institutions are weak and no or few humanitarian organizations are involved, ANSAs are likely to fill the power-vacuum. They may do so by being the alternative or, if some level of State presence remains, the additional providers of some form of safety and security and provide variable access to services including health and education systems, police forces, and courts. It is quite rare for the ANSA to hold a monopoly of power.

In the case of the CAR, the presence of indigenous ANSAs in the country is a result of decades of weak governance, impunity for human rights violations committed by government forces, and a failed Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process plagued by failings and corruption. These groups, many composed of frustrated youth, operate in large parts of the country where State authorities have no presence or only marginal visibility. Most ANSAs are said to generally control people’s movements. According to a UN official, “the State is not present because of rebel groups... rebel groups are present because of the absence of the State. Some seek to profit, but many are there to protect the population”. Similarly, foreign ANSAs such as the LRA have benefited from the power-vacuum to establish a base in CAR.

Filling a power gap is not in itself an indicator that ANSAs would adopt a protective role towards civilians but equally it should not be assumed that groups would be abusive towards them. In Somalia, both the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and even Al-Shabaab have to some extent filled a security vacuum and performed a governance role. The ICU provided education and health care and their popular support extended beyond the borders among refugees who desired to return to a stable Somalia. After Ethiopia invaded Somalia and toppled the ICU, Al-Shabaab, although less popular than their predecessors, built on the legacy of the ICU by providing law and order with mobile shari’a courts to settle local disputes. They also did infrastructure work that included the clearing of roadblocks, repairing roads, and organizing markets. This, together with the nationalististic support of Al-Shabaab, was able to count on while Ethiopian forces remained inside Somalia, gave it some popular support among the Somali population despite the abuses it perpetrated.

The phenomenon of filling a power-vacuum is common in border zones where State presence is often weaker, allowing ANSAs to assume governance functions in the territories they control. In some of the rural areas of Colombia a form of ‘shadow citizen security’ has emerged whereby the FARC and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) provide public goods such as roads and health centres. By filling the void left by the government and providing social services, the groups are often able to win the communities’ respect. If the ANSA benefits from popular support, there is in turn little need for it to coerce the population. However if its authority is contested that authority tends to be maintained by coercion. Thus while at times citizens approve of the ANSA’s substitution of State functions, at others they simply do not have any choice but to accept it.

Many insurgencies have taken over large territories for extended periods of time, set up elaborate governance structures, and established extensive quasi-governmental structures mirroring the apparatus of State institutions through which they rule the civilian population, derive support for their political authority, and achieve some form of legitimacy. Sri Lanka is an interesting case as the government continued to provide certain public services such as education and health in LTTE-controlled territory; the LTTE monitored these services while retaining exclusive control of other sectors such as the judiciary and defence. Between policing and military functions, and a lack of connection with the areas outside its control and the Government of Sri Lanka to maintain some form of legitimacy. Somaliland was an interesting case. The LTTE’s presence continued to maintain some limited influence and services, and to provide some legitimacy to the group. In the context of the displacement of Burmese to Thailand, in the absence of international organizations, the ANSA’s substitution of State functions, at others they simply do not have any choice but to accept it. In the context of the displacement of Burmese to Thailand, in the absence of international organizations, ANSAs played a leading role in setting up informal settlements and in negotiating with the Thai authorities.
so that people would not be forced back into Burma/Myanmar. They also actively supported the development of Refugee Committees and the creation of local community-based organizations (CBOs), and were instrumental in liaising with missionaries and faith-based organizations to obtain additional assistance as the refugee population increased. While various factors and influences — especially of the Thai government and the international community — have contributed to loosening the ties between the ANSAs and the refugees, their shared ethnicity and the experience of persecution in Burma/Myanmar has enabled the connection to persist. Talking about the displaced people, a leader of the KNPP stressed how they are “interrelated with the people and feel obligations and responsibilities towards them”.

A mostly protective behaviour is also found in ‘States in exile’ situations. A long-standing example is that of the Polisario Front or ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’ (SADR) that since mid-1970s “asserted control over some 155,000 ‘refugee-citizens’ living across four major camps through the development of its own constitution, camp-based police force (and prisons), army, and parallel State and religious legal system”.

The Polisario Front has found a balance between promoting self-sufficiency and strategically relying on external aid. It showed its commitment to civilian populations — especially of the Thai government and the international community — have contributed to loosening the ties between the ANSAs and the refugees, their shared ethnicity and the experience of persecution in Burma/Myanmar has enabled the connection to persist. Talking about the displaced people, a leader of the KNPP stressed how they are “interrelated with the people and feel obligations and responsibilities towards them”.

b) Other dimensions of the relations between ANSAs and displaced people

i) A reciprocal more than a unilaterial relationship

The relationship between ANSAs and displaced communities is often portrayed as one-sided, with those bearing arms holding ultimate power over non-combatants. It is true that ANSAs may have much to gain from proximity to or control over a displaced population, for example by keeping some link with their support base or having the possibility of accessing human or material resources through the displaced communities. Nevertheless the presence of the displaced can also be a burden or a disturbance for ANSAs. The movement of people or their presence in a given place, as well as the intervention of other stakeholders, is able to disrupt or pre-empt the military strategy of ANSAs but may not prevent the fighting. The impact on civilians is likely to be especially severe in urban contexts, where the distinction between civilians and combatants is voluntarily or de facto blurred, on all sides. ANSAs can find themselves in a situation of de facto responsibility towards the displaced while having limited means to provide actual protection. In some parts of Syria in 2012-2013 the insurgents have had to handle the arrival of displaced civilians in their area of control at the same time as they are pursuing combat and sustaining attacks by the army.

In the words of Zachariah Mampilly, “an assumption of unconstrained agency of the rebel leadership does not hold in the face of actual evidence on the ground that demonstrates that insurgent leaders are far more restricted in their actions”. He points out that “like governments, rebel leaders must negotiate with civilians in exchange for their loyalty — no easy task as civilian demands frequently involve a variety of different and often competing perspectives”. As we have seen, in many contexts “groups do seek the support of the civilian population in the territories they come to control, establishing governance systems that provide collective goods in exchange for civilian consent to rebel rule”.

It is clear that ANSAs may have a multi-layered and at times protective and constructive role towards displaced people. Different types of behaviour can be at play simultaneously; relations are complex and nuanced and will be driven by important variables such as the nature of the group itself and the influence of other stakeholders. It may therefore be more useful to think of the relationships in broader terms of power dynamics which can take the form of mutual dependence and reciprocity having social, security, and economic dimensions that often require continual adjustment and negotiation.

ii) Gender and kinship dimensions

While humanitarian situation reports tend to explain the infiltration of ANSAs in refugee or IDP camps as a military strategy to hide amongst civilians, ANSA members often use camps as a kind of ‘family strategy’ for collective survival. The fact that combatants and non-combatants are related by kinship is a reality in many displacement contexts. For instance, in the Philippines military operations frequently result in internal displacements, especially of families of MILF members who constitute the majority of IDPs. Some ANSA members have deliberately taken their families to displaced camps before joining the fight, with the intention of protecting them. Once they are in displacement, however, the family links can be broken leaving family members vulnerable to abuses within camp settings. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), in the DRC the FDLR’s dependents — families that travel with them, sometimes against their will — are considered by all to be extremely vulnerable, challenging how the FDLR is perceived by the general populace and the other armed groups.

The combination of a conflict situation and the experience of displacement shifts gender relations for reasons including the separation of family members, the deaths of potentially large numbers of male combatants, and the military role women may come to play contrary to the traditional culture. Another major factor is the scale of sexual violence either committed by the group and/or by other military or civilian actors, itself the result of factors such as the breakdown of social, family and cultural safeguards, the loss of intimate space especially in camp settings, as well as the more deliberate military intention to harm through sexual violence. While the hardship faced by displaced women is recognized, in many contexts women have chosen to improve their social position during displacement by joining ANSAs. Their apparent motivations include to avoid poverty and the difficulty of living conditions in camps, in the hope of moving away from constraining traditional gender roles, to escape domestic violence (expecting that the ANSA will provide protection), or to learn how to use weapons to protect themselves. For others, there is no choice as they are forced into association with ANSAs.

In Sri Lanka, the effect of displacement reportedly created instability in young women’s lives and played a significant role in encouraging them to regain control and a sense of empowerment by joining the LTTE, with the group representing a form of alternative ANSA. The LTTE succeeded in constructing a sustainable fictive kinship and fostered friendship among women combatants who came from various socio-economic, religious, and caste backgrounds.

While the ability for women to move up the military or political ladder can vary according to the group in question, and some women do hold positions of command and authority, they would commonly find themselves tied to combat or support roles. The gender equality that is often an ideological precept put forward by some groups has little resonance with what takes place in reality; possible exceptions include leftist ANSAs.

Women also tend to be given no role or only a marginal role during peace negotiations, and once the disarmament of combatants is implemented they often find themselves excluded or sidelined from these processes, although this trend may be slowly changing. This exclusion and marginalization has been acknowledged by women members of ANSAs coming from a range of different conflict situations. The DDR framework remains a gendered process where the
focus is on disarming men.44 Many female ex-members of ANSAs do not participate in or benefit from these programmes because they do not fit the classic ‘man with a gun’ profile and so are not identified as combatants. Paradoxically, one of the reasons female fighters choose not to disarm is precisely because they would be identified as former fighters. They are thus left with the alternatives either of remaining in the armed group or of self-demobilizing in the hope that, by quietly drifting back to their families or communities as other displaced people return to their communities, they will alleviate the risk of social stigm and community exclusion or retaliation. Unlike male combatants, they are often excluded from the new army and from new political structures and in many contexts are likely to be deprived of their land rights.

So despite potentially having gained some valuable skills during their time with the group through the variety of roles they may have performed, upon return they are likely to face economic hardship like other displaced civilian women.

Funeral of a Karen General at a KNLA camp just across the Moie River, Burma/Myanmar. © John Hulme (2001)

iii) Displaced people’s self-protection strategies

Even if the population feels resentment towards an ANSA which in their view bears some responsibility for their displacement or other abuses, or if they more generally do not adhere to the group’s motivations, in practice communities are likely to choose to avoid or engage with the group for pragmatic reasons of self-preservation and survival. They may attempt to remain neutral to the extent possible in their acts and use of language to avoid harm. A second option involves being ready to flee at short notice, and a third some form of accommodation with the group. These patterns of behaviour can be found in Uganda and in Colombia, for example.45

In Burma/Myanmar, some people chose to accept relocation to government-controlled areas or opted to move to areas under the control of ethnic armed groups. This provided them with some protection from either the army or the armed groups, and in some cases enabled them to stay in or close to their villages. As the military presence or the capacity of the ANSAs became depleted, displaced villagers who might have been expecting the groups to ensure their protection have also gradually been developing their own systems of individual or collective self-protection, such as ‘home guards’, independently of the ANSAs. Their degree of autonomy from ANSAs may however vary as home guards would often cooperate with the groups and call on their support, making local protection efforts not unproblematic solutions to the protection concerns of displaced civilian communities. For instance, while displaced villagers emphasized the utility of using landmines, they recognized the risk they create of people being killed or injured in planting, stepping on or removing the mines.46

iv) An evolving or dynamic relationship

Factors intrinsic to the ANSAs and the displaced communities with whom they interact play a key role in shaping the relationship between these two constituencies. Yet these local relationships between ANSAs and the displaced are not static and will also be affected by macro-level dynamics, especially the larger evolution of the conflict and the related role and degree of involvement of other stakeholders (as will be seen in greater detail in Part III).

Some ANSAs formed and disappeared over short time periods (due to the rapid resolution of the conflict, or the death of their leader(s), for example) but many insurgencies have been in existence for decades. The reasons for this might be linked to the absence of a determining political or military outcome and the spread of ‘no peace-no war’ situations where the ANSA is likely to go through phases of intense fighting, recuperation, and recruitment. Then variations in patterns of displacement and shaping or shifting of the relations between ANSAs and displaced communities also occur. As the conflict is prolonged increasing demands from and reliance on communities, combined with the heavy hardship faced by civilians in displacement contexts, can push the displaced to dissociate themselves from ANSAs. This is, however, not inevitable and some ANSAs have identified sources of income in addition to or as an alternative to the taxation of populations; this has for instance been the case for the FARC through drug-trafficking.

When links between displaced communities and ANSAs have been close and a complete or definitive separation is not sought, the displaced may opt for a gradual or temporary process of distancing, as observed in the case of some Sahrawi refugees for whom a durable solution to their displacement is improbable as long as the political impasse remains. One manner for the Sahrawi refugees to seek some independence from the camp structure and the Polisario Front — as well as being a means to diversify livelihoods — has been the departure of refugee children to Spain for a few months and the longer-term migration of educated youth there, through the Spanish solidarity groups. In pursuit of some autonomy from the Polisario Front, some families have relocated to the fringes of the camps in Algeria or to the open desert of the eastern region of Western Sahara. The Polisario Front has, however, continuously asserted its ‘authority’ over this region and intends to establish a permanent settlement for the displaced in Tifariti identifying it as ‘SADR’s new capital’, thus reaffirming its intention to retain the displaced within their close control.47

The other factors that would prompt changes in the relationships between ANSAs and displaced civilians relate more directly to the evolution of the conflict itself. Signs of approaching military defeat or on the contrary the likelihood of the conflict moving towards a political or military victory for the group, or some form of settlement with the other belligerent are especially likely to trigger changes in behaviour from the ANSA or the displaced population. In Sri Lanka through the 1980s-90s, the LTTE became a strong and popular movement with high levels of voluntary recruitment recorded. As the resumption of the conflict became imminent in 2006-2007, after several relatively stable years of peace negotiations, violent scenes of forcible recruitment which flouted cultural practices engendered civilian mistrust and resentment towards the LTTE. A former humanitarian worker reported that “the increased presence of aid organizations gradually discharged both the State and the ANSA from social and humanitarian responsibilities that they would have had towards civilians”. The LTTE ultimately prevented civilians who were still with them at the stage of the final battle with the army from leaving, using them — unsuccessfully — as ‘human shields’. This former humanitarian worker described the final bloody battle as at best a “collective suicide” by the LTTE, and at worst a “mass sacrifice”.48
PART II
Legal and normative framework

International law imposes obligations primarily on States. However, since the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 more and more legal obligations have been extended to ANSAs, and further normative improvements in the protection of civilians have also addressed their conduct, including in relation to displacement.

The first section of this part gives an overview of the international legal and normative framework related to displacement in situations where ANSAs operate, i.e., during armed conflict and otherwise. It looks at the extent to which each legal and normative regime imposes obligations on ANSAs and, where relevant, gives some insight into how the regimes provide for protection from displacement, the rights of the displaced, and their rights to or upon return. The second section assesses some of the gaps and challenges of the existing framework. It also identifies the emergence of new opportunities to strengthen ANSAs’ compliance with their obligations.

1) Legal and normative framework for ANSAs’ compliance: scope and limitations

a) International humanitarian law

International humanitarian law (IHL) creates obligations for both State and non-State parties to armed conflict. While the law of international armed conflict governs conflicts between States, the law of non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) governs situations in which ANSAs are in conflict with governments and/or other ANSAs. A NIAC may take place exclusively on the territory of one state, or as many commentators now agree, may be transnational. The main sources of the law of NIACs relevant to displacement and ANSAs are the Geneva Conventions 1949, the Additional Protocols II (APII), and custom IHL.

In all cases the existence of an armed conflict is an objective determination which has generally been interpreted to require: (i) a certain degree of organization of the ANSA and (ii) protracted hostilities, “protracted” having been interpreted to also mean of a certain intensity. While the Geneva Conventions are universally ratified and customary IHL applies to all States and non-State parties to conflict, APII has not been ratified by several States which are parties to non-international armed conflicts.

Prior to 1977, there was no specific reference to displacement in the law of NIAC. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, however, contains prohibitions providing fundamental protections to all persons not participating in conflict — including displaced persons who fit such criteria — from acts such as violence to life and person, torture and other ill-treatment, hostage-taking, and summary punishment. It has also been noted that forced displacement could in fact amount to a violation of one of the expressed prohibitions of Common Article 3.80

i) Explicit protection from displacement

IHL prohibits the parties to a NIAC from ordering the displacement of civilian populations unless the security of civilians is involved or imperative military reasons so demand (see Box 1). Interpretations of this prohibition have downplayed the significance of the requirement that displacement be ordered, suggested that the term should be interpreted to include any deliberate action which results in forced displacement.81 Voluntary movement of civilian populations, on the other hand, is not prohibited by IHL, although voluntariness in circumstances of armed conflict is often difficult to determine.

The exception for the security of civilian populations is self-evident in that it would be inconsistent with the purpose of IHL if its rules resulted in greater suffering for civilians. It goes without saying that this exception, like all of IHL, must be implemented in good faith.82

The exception for imperative military reasons is potentially more problematic. Generally, a balance between IHL and military necessity is already built into IHL, leaving no room to justify contrary conduct. This difficult balancing act recognizes that if the rules of IHL put too many limitations on the ability of warring parties to conduct warfare they will not be respected. In a few specific instances — such as forced displacement — IHL allows for additional considerations of imperative military necessity. The parameters of imperative military necessity are somewhat elusive; the exception should only occur in minimal circumstances, the determination should be "meticulous" and civilians may not be forcibly displaced for political reasons. One example put forward as a legitimate exception is clearing a combat zone for essential military operations. Other examples and conditions may be derived by analogy to rules governing displacement under the law of international armed conflict as well as other areas of IHL where imperative military necessity exceptions are expressly permitted. An example is to prevent the presence of civilians from blocking lines of communication and disorganizing transport, while conditions put forward include: where no feasible alternative exists to gain the same military advantage; harm must not be excessive to the military advantage; displacement must be temporary; the decision must be taken by a commander of a certain rank; and advance warning should be given where circumstances permit.

The protection of civilian populations from being compelled by ANSAs to leave their own country for reasons related to the conflict is not clearly established under customary international law. In conflicts governed by APII, civilians are protected from forced deportation without exception. However, Rule 129 in the ICRC study on Customary IHL (the ICRC Customary Study) does not differentiate between forced displacement and deportation. Therefore, it seems that, at least in the ICRC interpretation, the two exceptions discussed above remain as legitimate grounds for deportation in NIACs not governed by APII.

b) Human rights framework

Human rights law (HRL) covers a comprehensive set of rights of persons irrespective of whether they are displaced or not. Further substantive elements of human rights relevant to displacement are addressed in the displacement law and norms sub-section below too. HRL has been built on the general premise that States are the custodians of individual human rights. Human rights bodies have at times highlighted that only States have human rights obligations; non-compliance by ANSAs is often referred to as “abuses” and similar actions by States as “violations”. This interpretation has been increasingly challenged by legal commentators who argue that it is ineffective simply to rely on a State’s duty to protect human rights from the actions of non-State actors, and that ANSAs also have human rights obligations, particularly when they control territory.

This approach has at times been followed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and other UN bodies and of IHL and international human rights instruments. Special Rapporteurs have been explicitly calling upon ANSAs to respect human rights. For instance, the combined report of nine Special Rapporteurs and Representatives on the situation in Gaza concluded with respect to Hamas that: “Non-State actors that exercise government-like functions and control over a territory are obliged to respect human rights norms when their conduct affects the human rights of the
individuals under their control.” However others express concern that imposing international HRL obligations on ANSAs will detract from States’ obligations to respect, protect, and provide for human rights. Human Rights Watch (HRW) offered a compromise between these two opposing views in the context of Western Sahara by arguing that while “Algeria remains ultimately responsible...the Polisario [Front] needs to be accountable for how it treats the people under its administration”.

c) International criminal law

International criminal law (ICL) — unlike most of the other legal regimes discussed — addresses the responsibility of the individual rather than that of the entity (i.e. State or ANSAs). That said, individual members of ANSAs are subject to criminal liability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Crimes are established through conventional and customary law, but a court must have jurisdiction over both the crimes and the individual in order to carry out proceedings. International crimes (arguably of both State and ANSAs in situations of armed conflict) can be tried in domestic courts, through ad hoc international or quasi-international tribunals, or through the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Under the Rome Statue of the ICC, forced displacement may amount to a crime against humanity or a war crime (see Box 1). Crimes against humanity may take place during military conflict or outside of conflict. While the Rome Statute recognizes that ANSAs are prohibited from engaging in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, it is not clear whether ANSAs can be held criminally liable for the crimes committed by them.

The flight from conflict (per se) is therefore not a recognized ground. In Africa and in Central Europe there is an unresolved debate as to whether the flight from conflict is a crime against humanity. The Rome Statute recognizes that there is an obligation to take steps to prevent and afford protection against situations of mass displacement caused by violence which may not amount to an armed conflict. The enumerated categories have common provisions but each also contains distinct prohibitions. The Kampala Convention explicitly prohibits displacement caused by generalized violence and violations of human rights, while the GPID prohibit displacement caused by large scale development projects. The GPID also require that authorities explore all feasible alternatives to displacement. The IHL exceptions for displacement for the security of civilians and imperative military reasons are mentioned in both documents but are only listed under the “Obligations of States Parties relating to Protection from Internal Displacement” in the Kampala Convention. In the GPID, only the State has a particular obligation to protect against displacement of persons with special dependency on or attachment to their land.

d) Displacement law and norms (refugees and IDPs)

The refugee regime is inherently based on a state-centric model wherein international conventional mechanisms create no obligations on ANSAs. There is no clear consensus whether the principle of non-refoulement — which precludes the transfer of persons by one State to another if they face a risk of violations of certain fundamental rights there — is also applicable to ANSAs. Some lawyers take the view that non-refoulement is limited to States as made explicit in Article 33 (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Others extend the protection of refugees from forced retribution to their country of origin to ANSAs and call for the principle to be binding upon all parties to the conflict. No such provision seems to apply internally where an ANSA controls territory, in terms of an obligation not to send back a person to territory controlled by another ANSA or the State; thus internally displaced people are not protected from forced return.

Under the 1951 Convention, grounds for refugee status are limited to a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”. The flight from conflict (per se) is therefore not recognized. In Africa and in Central Europe there is an unresolved debate as to whether the flight from conflict is a crime against humanity. The Rome Statute recognizes that there is an obligation to take steps to prevent and afford protection against situations of mass displacement caused by violence which may not amount to an armed conflict.

The 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID) are not legally binding but rather both purport to restate existing norms and seek to clarify grey areas and fill in the gaps. Authority of the GPID is further enhanced through recognition in the World Summit, the UN General Assembly and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The GPID constitute a milestone in normative development as they “identify the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs in all phases of displacement to be observed by all authorities, groups, and persons irrespective of their legal status.” As with the Kampala Convention, the primary responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to IDPs rests with national authorities and IDPs have the right to request and receive protection and humanitarian assistance only from national authorities, i.e. that right does not extend to protection and assistance from ANSAs.

The 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (the Kampala Convention) is a unique treaty in the way it addresses the rights of refugees, although it does not cover forced displacement caused by the armed conflict. The Kampala Convention explicitly prohibits displacement caused by generalized violence and violations of human rights, while the GPID prohibit displacement caused by large scale development projects. The GPID also require that authorities explore all feasible alternatives to displacement. The IHL exceptions for displacement for the security of civilians and imperative military reasons are mentioned in both documents but are only listed under the “Obligations of States Parties relating to Protection from Internal Displacement” in the Kampala Convention. In the GPID, only the State has a particular obligation to protect against displacement of persons with special dependency on or attachment to their land.

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interment or confinement of IDPs in camps. Both the GPID and the Kampala Convention address the question of documentation and identity documents, something which is absent from IHL treaty law and only marginally explicitly addressed in human rights instruments. While the GPID mentions that the “authorities concerned” shall issue such documents, thus not excluding that these may be provided by ANSAs, the Kampala Convention clearly identifies this as an obligation for States Parties.iii)

i) Right to return
The Kampala Convention creates obligations relating to sustainable return, local integration, relocation, and the provision of effective remedies only for States. It does however prohibit members of armed groups from restricting the movement of IDPs, which could be construed as a prohibition on impeding return. Under the GPID, displacement shall last no longer than the circumstances require. IDPs are also protected from being forcibly returned if their life, safety, liberty, or health would be at risk. Positive obligations relating to return are restricted to “competent” authorities while access for humanitarian actors vis-à-vis return are restricted to “competent” authorities.

The 2005 UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (known as the Pinheiro Principles), which articulate the right of refugees and displaced persons to repossession of property lost as a result of armed conflict, adopt a more state-centric approach and make no direct reference to the role and obligations of ANSAs.

c) Protection of civilians
Since 1999 the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) has prepared regular reports with recommendations for how the UNSC could improve the physical and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict. The UNSG’s 2009 report highlighted the direct correlation between ANSAs and the protection of civilians, “urging for the development of a comprehensive approach towards improving compliance by all these groups with the law, encompassing actions that range from engagement to enforcement.” All three subsequent reports (2010, 2011 and 2012) have included provisions applicable to “enhancing compliance by non-State armed groups” as one of five core challenges, citing the need for consistent engagement with ANSAs to seek improved compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. The reports highlight the impact of the lack of compliance by ANSAs has in terms of causing displacement, increasing its scale, and preventing assistance from reaching IDPs. In the 2012 report the UNSG emphasized that displacement should not be “accepted too readily as an inevitable consequence of conflict”, that “short of preventing conflict, more must be done to prevent the circumstances that lead to displacement”, and that “parties to conflict must refrain from the use of forced displacement as a deliberate tactic”. There is not, however, a widespread emphasis on displacement.

f) ANSAs’ humanitarian commitments
While greater attention (and recognition) is now given to the commitments made by the ANSAs themselves, no consensus has yet been reached over whether the GPID or its commentary provide any clarity on the distinction between these terms. The existing framework does not address whether ANSAs who control territory have an obligation to refrain from sending back a person to territory controlled by another ANSA or the State.

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The bulk of the commitments are concerned with issues of return and reintegration. These are often focused on the need to restore the socio-political and economic links between the displaced and their area of origin, including through the provision of identity cards, the restitution and rehabilitation of land and property rights, and other compensation mechanisms for the losses suffered. For example, in the 2006 agreement between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) and the Nepalese government, “both sides express commitment to allow without any political prejudice the people displaced during the armed conflict to return voluntarily to their respective places of ancestral or former residence, to reconstruct the infrastructure destroyed as a result of the conflict and to honourably rehabilitate and re integrate the displaced people into the society ... and express their commitments to respect the right of individuals and families displaced during the conflict to return to their original places of residence or to settle in any other places of their choice.” A smaller number of unilateral declarations by ANSAs as well as their internal rules and regulations express their intention to comply with the existing legal and normative framework related to displacement. An example is the statement of the JEM and Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity (SLM/Unity) which reaffirmed in 2008 their commitment to “refrain from forcibly displacing civilian populations...and to curtail the militarization of IDP/ refuge camps.” In 1998 the LITE made a commitment in relation to return, that “the movement of displaced populations who wanted to return to areas now under government control would not be impeded.” They did not, how-
Box 1: Legal and normative provisions addressing ANSAs

1] INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

- Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (1977)

**Article 17 — Prohibition of forced movement of civilians**

1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.

2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.

- Customary international humanitarian law

**Rule 129**

Parties to a non-international armed conflict may not order the displacement of the civilian population, in whole or in part, for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians or imperative military reasons so demand.

**Rule 131**

In case of displacement, all possible measures must be taken in order that the civilians concerned are received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition and that members of the same family are not separated.

**Rule 132**

Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist.

**Rule 133**

The property rights of displaced persons must be respected.

2] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

- International Criminal Court Rome Statute

**War Crime: Article 8(2)(e)(vii)**

Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts.

**Crime Against Humanity: Article 7(1)(d)&(2)(d)**

The following constitutes a crime against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

- Deportation or forcible transfer of population — meaning forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.

3] INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT LAWS AND NORMS

- The Kampala Convention (2009)

**Article 7 — Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Situations of Armed Conflict**

1. The provisions of this Article shall not, in any way whatsoever, be construed as affording legal status or legitimizing or recognizing armed groups and are without prejudice to the individual criminal responsibility of the members of such groups under domestic or international criminal law.

2. Nothing in this Convention shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.

3. The protection and assistance to internally displaced persons under this Article shall be governed by international law and in particular international humanitarian law.

4. Members of armed groups shall be held criminally responsible for their acts which violate the rights of internally displaced persons under international law and national law.

5. Members of armed groups shall be prohibited from:
   a. Carrying out arbitrary displacement;
   b. Hampering the provision of protection and assistance to internally displaced persons under any circumstances;
   c. Denying internally displaced persons the right to live in satisfactory conditions of security, dignity, sanitation, food, water, health and shelter; and separating members of the same family;
   d. Restricting the freedom of movement of internally displaced persons within and outside their areas of residence;
   e. Recruiting children or requiring or permitting them to take part in hostilities under any circumstances;
   f. Forcibly recruiting persons, kidnapping, abduction or hostage taking, engaging in sexual slavery and trafficking in persons especially women and children;
   g. Impeding humanitarian assistance and passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel to internally displaced persons;
   h. Attacking or otherwise harming humanitarian personnel and resources or other materials deployed for the assistance or benefit of internally displaced persons and shall not destroy, confiscate or divert such materials; and
   i. Violating the civilian and humanitarian character of the places where internally displaced persons are sheltered and shall not infiltrate such violations.


The entire GPID is to be observed by “all authorities, groups and persons irrespective of their legal status and applied without any adverse distinction” (Principle 2.1). The principles of the GPID generally refer to the “authorities concerned”, ‘the competent or the ‘responsible authorities’ except for the following, which qualify specific authorities addressed: ‘national authorities’ (Principles 3 and 25.1); ‘States’ (Principle 9); ‘State authority empowered by law’ (Principle 7.3 (a)); ‘legal authorities’ (Principle 7.3 (f) ’competent authorities’ (Principles 18.2, 28 and 29.2).


PART II
Legal and normative framework

Box 2: Scenarios of displacement and legal pathways

These scenarios are based on several legal and normative frameworks: IHL, ICL, HRL, and internal displacement laws and norms. They provide a visual summary of the legal pathway and displacement trajectory:

1. Displacement;
2. Treatment;
3. Return.

These scenarios do not necessarily solve inherent dilemmas:
- The difficulty of interpreting the prohibition to displace 'for reasons related to the conflict' with its two exceptions whereby displacement is lawful and justified by reasons "related to the security of civilians or because the imperative military reasons so demand".
- In some instances the difficulty of ascertaining who or what triggers displacement and of determining when the agency of the displaced comes into play.

Scenario 1: Intended unlawful displacement

TRAJECTORY

The displacement can take the form of direct physical displacement (expulsion of civilians from their habitual place of residence) and/or other human rights/IHL violations which will lead to their displacement.

DISPLACEMENT

The displacement is unlawful as people are intentionally displaced by the ANSA for reasons related to the conflict and not justified by reasons related to the security of civilians nor by imperative military reasons.

RETURN

Neither the ANSA nor the State may obstruct the safe return of the displaced once the hostilities have ceased. The ANSA would have some responsibility in facilitating the safe return of the displaced.

TREATMENT

The ANSA would be responsible for the treatment of civilians and their protection from violence and violations of IHL or human rights in the territory under its control. As the perpetrator of displacement and if they continue to cause harm, members of the ANSA could also be held criminally liable. The State (with the assistance of the international community if needed) would be responsible for the protection and treatment of the displaced.

Scenario 2: Intended lawful displacement

TRAJECTORY

The population displaced is likely to remain in areas under the general control of the ANSA (especially if the State’s violence is the cause of violations and displacement). Some people may spontaneously move to State-controlled areas if fighting is less intense and assuming they won’t be persecuted by the State or to another State.

DISPLACEMENT

The displacement would be considered lawful as the displacement is demanded by the security of the civilians involved or by imperative military reasons.

RETURN

During the displacement phase, the ANSA would have some responsibility for the treatment of civilians and their protection from violence and violations of IHL or human rights in the territory under its control.

TREATMENT

Neither the ANSA nor the State may obstruct the safe return of the displaced once the hostilities have ceased. The ANSA would have some responsibility in facilitating the safe return of the displaced.

Scenario 3 (a & b): Unintended lawful displacement

TRAJECTORY

The trajectory of displacement will depend on the circumstances and on the capacity of civilians to move. For State-triggered displacement, people might be pushed to areas under the control of the ANSA unless the State’s policy is to move people to areas under their control. Other people may flee to another State.

DISPLACEMENT

People are not deliberately displaced by the ANSA and the ANSA is not interfering with the displacement (e.g. by obstructing it or pushing people towards the combat zones). In this scenario, displacement is either: a) caused by the State (lawful or unlawful action); or b) occurs spontaneously as a by-product of the conflict (such as natural disasters). In both cases, the ANSA will not be responsible for the displacement. If the State caused the displacement, it would be responsible for violations unless displacement is lawful (for the security of the civilians involved or for imperative military reasons).

RETURN

As in scenario 2, the ANSA would have some responsibility during the displacement phase for the treatment and protection of civilians in the territory under its control.
PART II
Legal and normative framework

Scenario 4: Unintended unlawful displacement

TRAJECTORY

The trajectory of the population may initially be similar to scenario 3 as the possibility of greater cross-border displacement as displacement becomes protracted.

DISPLACEMENT

The ANSA bears responsibility — at least under the arbitrariness standard used in displacement law and normative instruments (GPID, Kampala Convention) — as even though people are not deliberately displaced, the ANSA’s actions (e.g. threat of food deprivation, violations of human rights) may not be justified by the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons.

RETURN

The ANSA would be expected to facilitate safe return once possible. Preventing the timely return in conditions of safety of the displaced once the circumstances permit would render the displacement unlawful.

TREATMENT

As in scenarios 2 and 3, the ANSA would have some responsibility during the displacement phase for the treatment and protection of civilians violations in the territory under its control.

2) Challenges and opportunities to strengthen ANSAs’ compliance

The legal and normative framework on displacement is both complex and still evolving. The development of new laws and norms provides greater clarity in relation to ANSAs. However some gaps and inconsistencies persist. And the potential to enhance the protection of the displaced in practice will only materialize by grasping the impact these laws and norms have on ANSAs’ own understanding of their obligations.

a) Legal and normative challenges

i) Gaps in coverage

There are some gaps in each of the legal regimes above in respect of their applicability to ANSAs in displacement contexts. First and foremost, the obligations of ANSAs are only partially addressed. Second, IHL does not cover all circumstances of displacement even though displacement is likely to be significant, recurrent, and persistent in situations of internal disturbance or post-conflict. Third, apart from in IHL, the positive obligations of ANSAs in particular are less robust than those of States.

ICRC has identified specific gaps in IHL that should be addressed through the development of law if adequate protection for IDPs is to be achieved. ICRC highlights that “[i]nternational humanitarian law does not contain a general right to “freedom of movement” as the prohibition on forced displacement set down in Article 17 of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions concentrates on the right not to be compelled without justification to leave one’s place of residence or one’s country. It does not contain a right to leave one’s place of residence or to move to another part of the country, and yet that right is essential to allow people to flee combat zones. Furthermore, there are no provisions guaranteeing the right to freely enter and leave camps or other restricted areas.” ICRC also points out that “there is no mention of a positive duty on the part of the parties to conflict to take all feasible measures to facilitate voluntary, dignified and safe return. Depending on the circumstances and the capacities of the parties to the conflict, such measures could include mine-clearance, restoration of essential services, aid to meet urgent needs (shelter, food, water, medical care), the provision of construction tools, household items, farm implements and seeds, the repair of schools, health care facilities and markets, occupational training programmes and allowing visits prior to return.” Although some of these gaps have been filled by the GPID, the ICRC notes their “non-binding” nature.99

Refugee law does not impose direct obligations on ANSAs. Furthermore, on the territory of a (supposedly non-belligerent) country of asylum, ANSAs are assumed not to control any part of the population and, if they act in contravention of refugee or human rights law standards, it is the host State that is accountable. This assumption does not reflect situations that can be found on the ground; there is therefore a gap in refugee law not addressing this. Another gap which remains unaddressed relates to the lack of consensus on whether the principle of non-refoulement also applies to ANSAs.

ii) Lack of clarity and consistency

It is difficult for lawyers — let alone ANSAs — to navigate their way through the international legal and normative framework. The GPID have been a significant improvement in terms of providing a consolidated set of guidance based on existing standards, but ambiguity remains in terms of the qualification of “authorities” for certain obligations. Normative IHR bodies especially have been inconsistent in their characterization of the realm of actions by ANSAs, creating a grey area in the definition of the nature of the violations and the level of obligations of ANSAs. Analysis of UNSC Resolutions also highlights discrepancies in their coverage of displacement and protection of civilians. There is, for example, little reference to these issues in UNSC Resolutions on Somalia despite large scale displacement both inside and outside the country, while Colombia and Turkey that both have massive conflict displacement have not even been on the UNSC’s agenda.100 Furthermore, its resolutions have made hardly any reference to the GPID or to the Kampala Convention.

Those who challenge the dominant conceptualization of human rights as still falling exclusively under the remit of States usually do so on the following grounds: i) it ignores the reality of failing or failed states which effectively do not control portions of their territory, and States that are unable and/or unwilling to protect their citizens and refugees; ii) it leaves abuses by ANSAs largely unaddressed because of the limited capacity of national jurisdictions, the risk of bias in them, and the limited scope of IHL and ICL; and iii) it does not take into account that some armed groups have the capacity to provide some protection to civilians and ensure that their human rights are respected.101

iii) Lack of efficacy

The militarization of sites of displacement and the targeting of these sites through military means present ongoing acute challenges. The civilian and humanitarian character of displacement sites may be blurred by the presence of persons who periodically participate in hostilities. Under IHL, IDP camps are protected as civilian objects so long as they are not used for military purposes, and persons are protected during times in which they do not participate in hostilities — such as when present in a displacement camp. However there is a growing consensus that those who fight regularly will be deemed to have a continuous combat function, lose their right to be treated as non-combatants, and may be targeted at any time.102 The infiltration of displacement camps or their use as temporary sanctuaries may in fact bring about the militarization of sites of displacement, despite the obligations on parties to the conflict to take feasible measures to avoid locating military objectives (i.e. fighters) in densely populated areas such as displacement camps.103 Under refugee law, civilians in a host country who have been displaced from a locality controlled by ANSAs should never take a direct part in hostilities; if they do, they lose their civilian status and are to be considered as combatants.104 This strict interpretation contrasts with the lack of normative clarity over the civilian character of camps in internal conflicts. ICRC has highlighted the need to “set out more specific rules or standards to safeguard the civilian character of IDP camps”.105

As far as the criminalization of displacement is concerned, while in principle the ICL framework has the potential to address impunity for the crime of
displacement perpetrated by ANSAs, “many interna-
tional courts and domestic legal systems have
concentrated only on the violations … that prompt
displacement, instead of also addressing the abuse of
forced migration itself”, even when it is clear that
“displacement is integral to the conduct of a conflict.”
Indeed, while a number of individuals — leaders or
members of ANSAs — have been charged for crimes
against displaced civilians, to date no-one has yet
been convicted for the crime of displacement per se
by the ICC or by a Special Court or by national
jurisdictions. The ICC has, however, confirmed charges
against two prominent Kenyan politicians and one
journalist for the crime of deportation or forcible
transfer of population under the Rome Statute.

In that regard the Kampala Convention may offer an
opportunity: Article 3(2) (e) requests States (although
not explicitly ANSAs) to “endeavour to incorporate
the relevant principles contained in this Convention
in agreements. The adoption of policies going beyond IHL
of or exceed IHL or other normative standards on dis-
placement. The adoption of policies going beyond IHL
and other normative standards could represent an
opportunity to encourage ANSAs to adopt progressive
protection policies that could in turn contribute to
improving the normative framework.

In conclusion, the reference to such commitments in
the 2009 UNSG’s report on the protection of civilians
and their recent documentation by UN bodies seem
to move in the direction of giving some formal if not
legal recognition to ANSAs’ commitments. Further-
more, while it does not change the legal status of
ANSAs, it does allow them to be potential protectors
and increases their accountability towards civilians,
including displaced people.

b) Opportunities

i) Increased attention of norms to ANSAs

The development of norms which also address ANSAs
and the simultaneous reference to the different bodies
of law applicable to all parties to conflict is a positive
development which confirms the objective of putting
the protection of civilians at the forefront of the inter-
national agenda. In UNSC Resolution 1894, marking
the tenth anniversary of the consideration by the
UNSC of the protection of civilians as a thematic issue,
the Council proposed a distinction between “respect
for human rights” for which “States bear the primary
responsibility” and the “protection of civilians” for
which “parties to armed conflict bear the primary
responsibility”. This language — which has been
repeated in other UNSC thematic resolutions such as
Resolution 2106 on sexual violence in armed
conflict — is significant in that the UNSC recognizes
ANSAs as having obligations to protect, although the
extent to which this may extend beyond IHL is unclear.
It is worth recalling that notwithstanding “the extension
of human rights obligations to actors other than the
territorial State does not necessarily displace or dilute
the State’s responsibility under human rights law. The
responsibility of different actors for violations of
human rights law is not mutually exclusive but can be
complementary”. 111

ii) Greater accountability through monitoring
of ANSAs’ commitments

Irrespective of the legal worth attributed to commit-
ments made by ANSAs, their systematic compilation
when these exist in a written form) and their subse-
quent analysis can provide a basis for monitoring
compliance and holding ANSAs accountable. Especially
relevant is to assess whether ANSAs’ policies fall short
of or exceed IHL or other normative standards on dis-
placement. The adoption of policies going beyond IHL
and other normative standards could represent an
opportunity to encourage ANSAs to adopt progressive
protection policies that could in turn contribute to
improving the normative framework.

In that regard the Kampala Convention may offer an
opportunity: Article 3(2) (e) requests States (although
not explicitly ANSAs) to “endeavour to incorporate
the relevant principles contained in this Convention
into peace negotiations and agreements for the
purpose of finding sustainable solutions to the
problem of internal displacement”. By extension, this
provision would also be relevant to ANSAs who are
parties to these agreements and would not preclude
them taking the initiative for including such provisions
in agreements.

Training organized by Geneva Call with the MILF on the Deed
of Commitment banning anti-personnel mines.
© Geneva Call (2012)
The relations between ANSAs and displaced populations are influenced by the dynamics of the political and humanitarian context that ANSAs operate within. Mainstream analysis focuses on the impact of the presence and actions of ANSAs on civilians and humanitarian actors and there are fewer insights on the actual or potential influence other key stakeholders have over ANSAs and on their actions.

The first section describes the main actors that can interact with both ANSAs and displaced people and the level and nature of these interactions. The second section then assesses and discusses the challenges and opportunities for engagement with ANSAs.

1) The interface with ANSAs in displacement environments

Both ANSAs and displaced people have interactions with a wide variety of local and international actors.

a) Concerned and host States

Of all the stakeholders, concerned and host States are likely to be the ones with the greatest potential influence over the relationships between ANSAs and displaced communities. However, scope for positive influence is limited or non-existent if state policies are characterized by hostility towards the ANSAs and the displaced, especially if the latter are perceived as supporting the insurgency. This is particularly true for internal displacement as, if States themselves are violating civilians’ rights, they are most unlikely to have the will (or the credibility) to ensure that ANSAs respect their obligations under international law.

But States can also be seen to protect displaced civilians by designing strategies that address the causes of displacement or remedy its impact in line with their human rights and IHL obligations. The process of peace negotiation is often conducive for parties to address displacement issues, although whether this materializes in practice is dependent on the trajectory of the negotiations and whether peace accords are implemented. For instance, the term ‘internal displacement’ was used in Sri Lanka in 1990, before it became internationally recognized, when the government formally asked UNHCR to provide assistance to IDPs on both sides of the conflict. The attitude of the government had, however, drastically changed by 2006 when the conflict flared up again: international organizations lost the liberty to engage with the LTTE on the protection of the displaced and the government exerted control over access to the displaced population and over the type of activities humanitarian were allowed to undertake. Towards the end of the conflict, the government treated most civilians who had been living in the LTTE-controlled areas as LTTE members in disguise or collaborators.

In refugee contexts, the relationship between host States and ANSAs can be more ambivalent and closely linked to the bilateral relations between the country of origin of the refugees and the country of refuge. In many conflicts, ANSAs move to another country, thus finding a form of sanctuary (like civilians) from state violence against them. Such a safe haven becomes politically sensitive for the host States if attacks are launched from their territory on the State of origin. A number of host States have allowed ANSAs to be on their territory and may have sympathized (even if not publicly) with the political cause of the ANSAs. Some States have been adroit in allowing in the displaced and representatives of the ANSAs while preserving the relationship with the State of origin. An illustration is the attitude of the Thai government which let both Burmese civilians displaced and ANSAs’ representatives into Thailand. Thailand, however, has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and is therefore not granting refugee status, thus not explicitly recognizing the persecution of civilians by the Burmese State and military. Furthermore, the policy of tolerance applied by the Thai government towards both the displaced and the ANSAs in the early days has been gradually eroded in order to preserve the relationship with Burma/Myanmar and allow for the development of bilateral economic ties.

The relations between the Palestinian refugees and Lebanon have to a large extent been framed by the role of ANSAs in the context of regional political dynamics with the Palestinian-Israel conflict at its core. From 1948 to 1958 State authorities and Lebanese population welcomed Palestinians with whom ‘pre-exile’ economic and social ties existed. The next decade, 1958-1969, was marked by the establishment of official camps and exclusionary official social, political and economic policies towards Palestinians; these policies aimed to control the refugee camps and the activities of the ANSAs. However the army’s attempts to control the Palestinian movement in the country met internal and external pressures, leading the Lebanese authorities to in effect accept the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) establishing autonomous or self-governing institutions in the camps and urban areas populated by the Palestinians. With the departure of the PLO from Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982, many of the Palestinians trapped in camps became vulnerable to the violence of militantism and the so-called ‘war of the camps’ led to the destruction of several Palestinian camps.

Other States have more explicitly adopted partisan views towards ANSAs. The Algerian government has gone beyond what is expected of host States by letting the Polisario Front ‘govern’ its refugee populations on its soil and by recognizing the protective responsibility of the ANSA towards the displaced. Even greater challenges arise when ANSAs are allowed to conduct military operations from the host State and/or when the State provides military support to ANSAs and the presence of large displaced populations in border areas can contribute to a regionalization of the conflict. In the late 1990s the then president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, demonstrated his strong ties with the RUF by sending troops into Sierra Leone to reinforce the RUF while allowing refugee camps in Liberia to potentially be used as bases for military operations and recruitments.

b) Host communities

Relations between displaced people and host communities can range from situations where host communities provide sanctuary and support to the displaced to host communities rejecting their presence and showing hostility towards them. Diverse and cumulative factors of a political, ethnic, cultural or economic nature and pre-existing affinities which are likely to trigger acceptance or at least tolerance can also result in fluctuating inter-relationships. This scenario is more common around borders where transnational links already exist. Displaced people and host communities are often exposed to similar immediate threats to their physical security by the State and ANSAs, especially in contexts such as the DRC where the vast majority of IDPs are living in host communities and where repeated displacement means that those who have been hosted may well themselves become hosts to new IDPs. Tensions with local communities are more frequent in refugee contexts. For instance, if social services such as health and education are provided to refugees but not available for surrounding villagers or as donor support for refugee populations decreases over time, competition with host population over scarce resources can become a source of hostility and insecurity.

The relations between ANSAs and host communities remain relatively unexplored. The attitude of local communities towards the displaced and vis-à-vis ANSAs may be aligned with the national policy or diverge from it. In the Middle East, host communities have often exhibited a welcoming attitude towards refugees, especially at the inception of a crisis, and this has been repeated again in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis. However, the prolongation of the conflict combined with rising numbers of people seeking refuge, in places outnumbering local residents as in Lebanon, has led analysts to refer to an ‘uneasy’ or ‘uncertain’ welcome in view of ambivalent community responses.

Refugees, especially in the context of mass displacement, are often described as a security threat as they not generally conform to the stereotype of an ‘universally welcome’ group. By the same token, if an ANSA operates near to or within an area hosting displaced people, this often negatively affects relations between the displaced and the hosts because of the real or assumed links the displaced have with the armed group. In May 2013, Syrian refugees became the target of local angry crowds following a double car blast at the Turkish border town of Reyhanli, an area through which arms and men were reportedly flowing to bolster Syrian insurgents.

In some contexts foreign ANSAs overtly violate or ignore social and cultural community norms and seek to forcibly impose theirs; in others they have chosen to integrate in local tribal structures, especially if they have expansionist ambitions. For example, rather than supplanting Yemeni tribal structures, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has managed to...
collaborate with and integrate itself into them, strate-
gically capitalizing on the tribes’ distrust of and hostil-
ty towards the State.121

c) Local civil society
Civil society organizations (CSOs) engage with ANSAs in a multiplicity of ways.122 They may have been instru-
mental in the creation of the ANSAs in situations where armed struggles were initiated following civil-
ian contestation movements. In Libya, the so-called ‘February 17 Youth Movement’ (LYM) claimed to have about one hundred CSOs under its umbrella, in addition to having considerable student backing. Registered as an NGO on Facebook and highlighting that they “do not belong to a political party, nor to any factions”, the LYM has been an active player in the insurgency.123

CSOs are also increasingly acknowledged as key actors in humanitarian or development work and for promoting peace-building efforts due to their more intimate understanding of the conflict dynamics and their often closer proximity to the belligerents and affected populations. In some contexts this may confer on them potential leverage. If they have pre-existing links with the ANSA, local organizations may more easily play a bridging or intermediary role between ANSAs and civilians, including displaced people, as well as other stakeholders such as interna-
tional organizations. For instance, in areas of the DRC where displaced people and villagers are still at risk of attacks by the LRA, the Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) has set-up ‘Task Forces’, comprising former fighters, community leaders, army officers and business people through which to reach LRA members.124 Another example is that of the Association pour la promotion rurale de l’arrondissement de Nyassia, Solidarité — Développement — Paix (APRAN-SDP), a Senegalese NGO originally created by IDPs which has been supporting the return of IDPs and fostering dialogue with belligerents, their links or affiliation with ANSAs can be potentially problematic and dangerous, and many CSOs have concerns about the risk they face of being closed down or criminalized for that affiliation. Local organizations in many geographical contexts appear to have been significantly affected by the spread of the label of ‘terrorist’ in recent years. For example, Margaret Sekagya, the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders, has said she was “concerned by the branding and stigmatization of human rights defenders [in India], who are labelled as ‘naïvetés [Maoists]; ‘terrorists’, ‘militants’, ‘insurgents’ or ‘anti-
nationalists’”.125

Many Burmese CSOs, based along the Thai-Burma border were actually created by ANSAs and kept close ties with them. Over time these links have, however, loosened and most organizations that were reportedly affiliated with the ANSAs now claim to have full opera-
tional freedom. Yet not all ties have vanished either and the loyalty of these organizations towards the groups persists as many of their representatives and members remain political activists. On the other hand these CSOs reveal that through them ANSAs have retained a link with the displaced civilians and are able to monitor their attitudes and behaviours.

In Mindanao, in areas of fighting between the Govern-
ment of the Philippines and the MILF, local organiza-
tions have engaged in protecting IDPs through a range of activities including early warning mechanisms, facilitating IDPs’ safe and organized return, and advocating with parties to the conflict to restore peace and investigate security incidents involving displaced people.126 Some of the most successful ini-
tiatives are community-based. One example of such an endeavour is in Pikit in Central Mindanao, where

the establishment of ‘zones of peace’ is discussed with the belligerents, religious leaders, community organizations, farmers, and children and youth. With a few minor exceptions, these zones of peace — where armed personnel can enter the zones but are required to respect communities and are not permitted to conduct military operations or to use their weapons — have been respected by all parties to the conflict. Because men in these communities are often viewed with suspicion by the belligerents, women have report-
tedly played a critical role in ensuring the success of these initiatives by leading negotiations and maintaining the relations with all parties.127 Similar models exist in eastern DRC with initiatives such as community-based ‘protection committees’, ‘women’s forums’ and outreach workers (agents du changement) that guide State and ANSAs to fulfil their protection obligations towards communities through training sessions and informa-
tion exchange. The protection committees have, for instance, successfully negotiated that some armed groups stop collecting taxes from the communities.128

While CSOs may be praised for their role in promoting the rights of displaced people and fostering dialogue with belligerents, their links or affiliation with ANSAs can be potentially problematic and dangerous, and many CSOs have concerns about the risk they face of being closed down or criminalized for that affiliation. Local organizations in many geographical contexts appear to have been significantly affected by the spread of the label of ‘terrorist’ in recent years. For example, Margaret Sekagya, the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights defenders, has said she was “concerned by the branding and stigmatization of human rights defenders [in India], who are labelled as ‘naïvetés [Maoists]; ‘terrorists’, ‘militants’, ‘insurgents’ or ‘anti-
nationalists’”.125

d) Diasporas

In recent years, both scholars and humanitarian actors have considered the significant transnational role of diasporas in conflict situations. Diasporas have dual and often ambivalent roles; they are depicted as playing both a significant role in sustaining a rebellion (thus potentially contributing to displacement) yet also contributing to providing vital support to dis-
placed communities, especially in the form of remit-
tances. Diasporas may have an influence over the course of a conflict, including by controlling and ordering displacement ‘at a distance’ or more com-
monly through their financial and political roles.

There are a number of examples spread across time and geographical locations where ANSAs have been formed by individuals in exile; an archetypal case might be the foundation of the Fatah movement by members of the Palestinian diaspora. In some individuals may hold the dual identity of member of the diaspora and leader of an ANSA and are said to have been coordinating military opera-
tions, including population displacement, remotely. This has reportedly been the case for the FDLR, whose top leadership used computers and mobile phones in Germany and France to control operations in the DRC through an organized hierarchy of military officers and men on the ground.129

Analysis of the Tamil diaspora illustrates the multiple roles its widespread members have played especially in terms of speaking for the LTTE cause, financing the conflict, and supporting displaced communities. During the many years of conflict and protracted displace-
ment in Sri Lanka, the diaspora played a critical role in providing IDPs with remittances, but as the conflict evolved the LTTE exercised increasing control both over the IDPs in Sri Lanka and over the diaspora. From the 1980s LTTE loyalists were sent abroad or identified locally and, through the setting up of LTTE offices initially had a direct link with the LTTE. As they infiltrated the diaspora which gradually increased its funding and political support. The LTTE also con-
trolled linkages between the diaspora and the civilian population.130 It set up an elaborate international fundraising system collecting large amounts of funds used for the procurement and shipment of arms and to finance their ‘state-like’ administration, but also goods for communities. Until it was banned in Sri Lanka in 2007 and its branches in the US, Australia and the UK closed down, the LTTE-affiliated Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) received a lot of support from ordinary Tamils across the world. The Sri Lankan Sinhala diaspora also played a significant role during the conflict, especially in attempting to counteract the propaganda of the Tamil diaspora by putting the emphasis on the “terrorist” nature of the LTTE. Later, while remittances still reached the communities,
increasingly larger proportions were taken as tax by the LTTE as the need to fund the military efforts increased after 2005.

The positive contribution of diaspora involvement in humanitarian response, especially through remittances, has led to donor support for diasporic organizations involved in humanitarian initiatives addressing the needs of displaced populations. The role was not given explicit authority to establish direct contacts with ANSAs, leaving limited space for blanket amnesties during peace processes or in post-conflict settings. While this may have in some instances had a positive effect towards reconciliation and encouraging the return of the displaced, it can ignore the need to address impunity.

Part III
Engagement with ANSAs in displacement contexts: operational and policy implications

The role of diasporas goes beyond the caricatured perceptions of agents ‘funding terrorism or building peace’ and the tendency to frame the discussion in a dichotomous way — asking whether diasporas are good or bad for conflict — is problematic. In the Somali displacement context, the assistance provided by Somalis abroad — through emergency aid, care and maintenance and sustainable development aid — represents crucial support for the displaced in camps and urban settings. It has also been documented, however, that Al-Shabaab has access to remittance flows generated from the trading centres led by Somalis, such as Eastleigh in Kenya, to fund its operations in Somalia and enlist new members through indoctrination in Islamic schools.

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e) The international community

1) Third-party States

Third-party States have the monopoly of deciding which ANSAs they want to engage with, when and how. State practices and policies on so-called ‘diplomatic engagement’ with ANSAs are therefore extremely variable. Some States have put themselves forward to engage ANSAs on displacement-related issues. Within a context of broader peace negotiations Norway has, for instance, discussed issues pertaining to the rights of displaced people, including their return, with the LTTE, the FARC and Burmese ANSAs.

While some States may see their involvement as driven by humanitarian needs and by respect of the principles of humanitarian action in IHL, third-party State engagements with ANSAs are often driven by States’ own interests and are therefore often inconsistent.

States’ increasing labelling of ANSAs as “terrorists” and counter-terrorism policies introduced in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the USA in 2001 has added complexity to the relations States and regional organizations can have with ANSAs. It also had related consequences on humanitarian organizations and aid beneficiaries, especially displaced civilians living in areas controlled by ANSAs designated as terrorists. A ‘study of the impact of donor counter-terrorism measures on principled humanitarian action’ commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and IRC makes the point that for instance “in Gaza, the parameters of humanitarian action have for the most part been shifted so that programmes are designated firstly to avoid contact with or support to the designated group (Hamas), and only secondly to respond to humanitarian needs”. At the other extreme, States have on occasion adopted lenient policies towards ANSAs by offering them blanket amnesties during peace processes or in post-conflict settings. While this may have in some instances had a positive effect towards reconciliation and encouraging the return of the displaced, it can ignore the need to address impunity.

ii) The United Nations

It is difficult to state clearly what the UN does in practice in relation to engagement with ANSAs, beyond efforts towards developing an approach to engagement, as it is either not well documented or information is not openly shared beyond each agency. There is no institutional approach on whether the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) should engage with ANSAs, although the UNSG’s reports on the protection of civilians state that ANSAs should be engaged, and UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 gave the ERC the responsibility to “actively facilitate, including through negotiations if needed, the access by operational organizations to emergency areas...by obtaining consent of all parties concerned”. While the Cluster approach has attempted to provide a more structured multi-agency response to humanitarian and displacement crises, there is no UN-specific framework for engagement with ANSAs on displacement issues. At a global level the role of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs is generally political in nature and focused on dialogue with governments; the role was not given explicit authority to establish direct contacts with ANSAs, leaving limited space for engagement. That said, right from the start Francis Deng, the first incumbent, made efforts to sensitize ANSAs to the need to assure greater protection for IDPs, a practice that has been pursued by his successors.

Each UN agency is able in principle to decide the modalities of engagement (or non-engagement) with ANSAs based on its own agenda. Some UN agencies have at times played an intermediary role between belligerents, often including as objectives ensuring safe humanitarian access and protection concerns. A 2012 UNHCR review of its engagement with ANSAs highlighted how the organization has served as an official interlocutor for State and non-State actors; one such example was the creation by UNHCR, during the ceasefire period around 2004-2005, of a Liaison Officer in Sri Lanka which enabled more systematic engagement with the LTTE, including regular field monitoring and specific interventions, advocacy, and promotion around the protection of IDPs and the promotion of safe return using the GPID as a framework.

The UNHCR review states that while as “a matter of principle UNHCR should engage all ANSAs where necessary and if possible ... as this is consistent with humanitarian doctrine, but also reflective of the realities associated with providing assistance and protection in complex environments where populations of concern are often located in areas outside state control”, in practice “there is no universal UNHCR policy on how to engage ANSAs”. In Thailand for instance, UNHCR’s practice of establishing (or not) relations with the political wings of Burmese ANSAs has been contingent on the Country Representatives and their perception of the tolerance (or the lack of it) of the Thai authorities for engagement. This has led to some confusion for the ANSAs, displaced people and NGOs, especially local organizations who are commonly maneuvering between ANSAs and the displaced.

Among other UN humanitarian agencies, UNICEF has had some engagement with ANSAs to demobilize children and to prevent their recruitment. OCHA has played a proactive role in highlighting, in the UNSG’s reports on the protection of civilians, the need to engage with ANSAs and to translate these policies to the operational level.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is gradually starting to refer to ANSAs in its publications and analysis and is acknowledging the evolving policies of the UN. For instance in its 2011 report ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ OHCHR noted the “evolving practice in the Security Council and the reports of some special rapporteurs that ... under certain circumstances non-State actors can also be bound by international human rights law and can assume, voluntarily or not, obligations to respect, protect and fulfill human rights”. In practical terms, however, OHCHR remains structured around State practice with the exception of the designation of a focal point on

The Tamil demonstration at Tophälger Square in London. © Nicholas Van Hear (2009)
ANSAs whose role is to advise field offices in contexts where ANSAs operate. The organization is also develop - ing an internal position on ANSAs. 146

At country level, the choices and approaches of the Humanitarian Coordinator as well as the nature of the humanitarian crisis will affect some of these institutional choices and frame the extent and nature of the engagement with ANSAs. If it is a context where there is an integrated mission, some of these decisions about engagement will be taken in part or in full by the representative of the peacekeeping mission.

In conclusion, while the absence of a UN doctrine for engagement may have enabled flexibility and complementarity, it is also worth noting that the UN is made up of Member States and derives its mandate from those Member States, some of whom may not wish for the UN to engage with ANSAs.

iii) International organizations

There is a wide range of international organizations and institutions that are engaging (directly or indirectly) with ANSAs in displacement contexts, in very different albeit potentially complementary ways.

The monitoring of ANSAs by leading human rights organizations such as HRW and Amnesty International was limited until the 1990s, when they extended their definition of human rights abuses to include acts committed by ANSAs. This approach has led to the global practice of ‘naming and shaming’ whereby these organizations issue public statements and reports about human rights abuses and make recommendations to all parties, including increasingly to ANSAs. Both organizations produce regular reports which emphasize the violations of the rights of the displaced. While HRW’s mandate is to protect the human rights of people around the world by investigating and bringing to justice those responsible for human rights violations, holding (State or non-State) abusers accountable, the interaction it has with ANSAs has included advocacy for the respect for human rights. HRW has sought to obtain commitments from ANSAs on IHL issues, for example in Yemen (on the Geneva Conventions) and in Libya (on land-mines). However this still appears like an ad hoc prac tice with no systematic follow-up and the engagement has not been focused on displacement issues.

While issues related to displacement are arguably central to peace processes, these have often only marginally been included in the substance of the engagement of peace-mediation and negotiation organizations with ANSAs, although this is slowly changing. 147 An organization like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), through its ‘mediation’ work, attempts to address key humanitarian issues, including displacement, with the parties to conflict. 148 For instance between 2008 and 2009 the organization brought together representatives of the main Darfur opposition movements and representatives of the humanitarian community for discussions focused on key humanitarian issues including the protection of refugees and IDPs.

ICRC’s mandate entails a proactive interaction with the belligerents, both State and non-State, to ensure and monitor their respect of IHL.

The engagement can take different forms and includes dissemination of IHL and confidential dialogue on protection issues. Despite having a strategy on internal displacement, 149 ICRC’s focus is on the protection of civilians more broadly and the organization does not appear to engage ANSAs specifically on displacement in a systematic manner.

The Swiss-based organization Geneva Call was set up expressly to entice ANSAs to comply with various humanitarian norms through an innovative accounta bility mechanism called Deed of Commitment. Geneva Call engages ANSAs principally on the total ban of anti-personnel mines, the protection of children from the effects of armed conflict, and the prohibition of sexual violence in armed conflict. It also trains ANSAs on broader humanitarian norms, including on norms relating to displacement. In 2011 Geneva Call co-organized with IDMC a two-day conference on ANSAs and the protection of IDPs and wrote an article on the potential for engagement with ANSAs that was published in a special edition of FMR on ‘Armed non-State actors and displacement’. 150

Organizations working specifically on protecting and assisting displaced people are rarely explicit about how and to what extent they engage with ANSAs, and remain elusive about the outcomes of these interactions. A positive example is UNHCR’s 2012 review of the organization’s history of engagement with ANSAs over the previous three decades and across a wide range of contexts. 151 Some organizations worry that engaging on protection activities may bring them in conflict with governments or ANSAs, place staff at risk, and reduce their access to displaced people and few invest in the capacities required for effective engagement, like training and guidance for field staff.

Among the factors deterring humanitarian organizations from engaging with ANSAs is the fact that they do not consider that engagement is core to their mission, or that they are afraid of jeopardizing their assistance work by being perceived by concerned governments of conferring legitimacy to ANSAs. In some contexts they would seek to respect the principle of State responsibility and would not see ANSAs as the repre sentatives of the people. Yet, interaction is still likely to take place for pragmatic reasons as the militarized contexts in which humanitarian actors operate almost inevitably imply close proximity to ANSAs or the mingling of ANSAs with displaced populations.

When it comes to the substance of engagement, for a large majority of humanitarian organizations, if engage ment with ANSAs does take place it generally focuses on ensuring humanitarian access and on preserving the humanitarian and civilian character of camps. Humanitarian access constitutes the most logical entry point of engagement for humanitarian actors, and once access is secured further opportunities to engage ANSAs on civilian protection and human rights may arise. A number of international NGOs have on occasion conducted sensitization and training sessions with ANSAs. In 2004 and 2005, during the ceasefire period between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) conducted sensitization sessions focused on displacement with the members of the political wing of the LTTE as well as its police force. 152 NRC-IDMC has also conducted a number of workshops on IDP protection using the GPD as a framework. The workshops run by NRC-IDMC involved members of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) in the DRC, the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Somaliland authorities. While members of these ANSAs showed an interest in abiding by international norms, reportedly no ANSAs was willing to make firm commitments on IDP protection. 153

Notwithstanding such attempts, there is no systematic outreach to ANSAs on the rights of displaced people and engagement is irregular, unsustainable, inconsistent, and at times incoherent, often based on a combination of factors which may range from organizational policy choices, country or conflict contexts, the type of ANSA but also programmatic choices or even the personal approaches of heads of offices.

2) Challenges, limitations, and opportunities to engage ANSAs on the protection of displaced people

There are political, practical, and ethical motives to explain the lack of engagement of humanitarian actors with ANSAs. While aggressive or threatening behaviour by ANSAs is another significant impediment to engagement in conflict and large scale displacement contexts relate to the prevailing influence of States that prevent humanitarian actors from engaging with ANSAs or deter their access to displaced populations, which are controlled by ANSAs. However, there are also opportunities for inclusive approaches towards ANSAs.

a) Impact of restrictive State policies and counter-terrorism measures

Engagement with ANSAs is often perceived by States as politically sensitive, in particular triggering concerns of legitimizing ANSAs — despite clear legal basis, in particular Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and policies that humanitarian engagement is neutral and impartial in character and does not affect the legal status of armed groups.

In reaction, some host governments have compelled humanitarian organizations to operate only in government-controlled or designated areas or have banned access altogether. A UNHCR review of key challenges to the safeguarding of humanitarian space reports that governments in Colombia and Afghanistan viewed humanitarian engagement with ANSAs as the equivalent of endowing ‘terrorists’ with legitimacy and were therefore extremely unwilling to allow such engagement.110

The development of counter-terrorism measures by host governments or donor States, has compromised further the space for engagement, by criminalizing dialogue with ANSAs designated as ‘terrorist’. UN agencies have had to follow these prescriptions, as has been the case with Hamas in Gaza since 2006. Such policies have had similar consequences for international NGOs.

There are other circumstances where host governments do not necessarily oppose engagement but it is the organizations themselves that opt for non-engagement with ANSAs to avoid aggravating or jeopardizing difficult relationships with the State. Some donors in their funding agreements have also imposed no-contact conditions with ANSAs listed as ‘terrorist’, limiting who NGOs and UN agencies can interact with if they accept funding.

Such restrictive policies and the increased use of coercive measures that ANSAs have proved detrimental to the protection of displaced populations. For instance, according to WANEP “humanitarian access in the rebel-controlled north of Mali was curtailed by counter-terrorism policies, despite a growing number of internally displaced persons and growing humanitarian need”.111 And after 2008, when the United States listed Al-Shabaab as a “terrorist” group, an 88% decrease in aid to Somalia was recorded between 2008 and 2010.112

b) Restricted engagement or avoidance of engagement

In conflict and displacement contexts, interactions with ANSAs are almost by default conceived as problematic. ANSAs are systemically blamed for their interference with displaced communities, leaving little space to conceive the possibility of more constructive interactions built around ANSAs’ responsibilities towards civilians. This hinders more nuanced and even positive behaviours that ANSAs may exhibit.

Despite policy recommendations that “lives can be saved by engaging armed groups in order to seek compliance with IHL in their combat operations and general conduct”,113 in practice the effect of working in environments where ANSAs are perceived as hostile and dangerous is that some organizations opt for a strategy of avoidance rather than engagement. For NRC, the complexity of some of these dynamics as experienced in Afghanistan and Somalia, as well as what they perceive as a misinterpretation of the humanitarian principle of neutrality, has gradually led some actors to avoid contact with any type of military (including ANSAs) even in contexts where it would be feasible. Yet as pointed out by Liam Mahony, “a commitment to the ‘humanity’ principle demands a commitment to preventive protection, not just services after abuse ... and taking on the challenges of reducing conflict and changing the behaviour of abusers”.114 Recent research by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) on ‘Humanitarian Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors’ found that “many agencies avoided direct structured engagement ... for fear of political, security consequences of engagement”.115 So while many humanitarian actors would define attempts to engage as essential, especially in contexts where there are strong communal connections between ANSAs and the displaced, it appears that on the ground there is still a lack of engagement.

It is equally important to understand what ANSAs make of the behaviour of the international community as this will have an impact on the possibilities for engagement and most likely also have repercussions on the protection of civilians. In fact the reluctance to engage also comes from ANSAs, a number of which have responded negatively to attempts at engagement by humanitarian organizations, especially when they see a strong bias or politicization of these actors. This is particularly the case for ‘integrated missions’, which contribute to blurring humanitarian objectives with political and military agendas, thereby compounding the perception of aid agencies as neutral in the eyes of armed opposition groups. Ultimately this can be detrimental to the protective environment the missions are trying to build.116

Recently Islamist ANSAs such as Al-Shabaab have been framing most humanitarian intervention as a manifestation of foreign policy. The HPG research shows that in the Afghan context especially ANSAs’ hostility towards the UN is linked to the perceived partiality of the UN. There is more diversity in positions toward other aid actors there, although often hostility and suspicion predominate. Aid agencies with the greatest access had consistently demonstrated their neutrality and impartiality over a period of time, while positive perceptions of agencies often reflected personal experiences and engagement.

c) Militarization of displacement sites

Conflicts are by their nature politicized and militarized and in such environments displacement sites, which aspire to offer sanctuary, are both a civilian space where daily life unfolds for families and also a space which is penetrated by the political and military dimension of the conflict, from within and through external interventions.

This de facto interplay between the civilian and the military jeopardizes the civilian character of camps and other displacement sites. Episodes of heavy militarization of camps, especially in West and East Africa in the 1990s, have led humanitarian organizations, with UNHCR at the forefront, to develop operational policies that define what constitutes ‘militarization’ and ensure the applicability of the civilian and humanitarian character of camps and settlements.117 Successful operationalization of this principle as it was conceived has, however, been the exception rather than the rule.118

Although UNHCR can find itself ‘running’ camps in many instances (most often through implementing partners), it is the host State that has primary responsibility. UNHCR can assist the State in the task of preserving the humanitarian character of camps but the State may restrict its ability to intervene in the location of camps for instance, or may have a relaxed policy about ensuring the separation of combatants and non-combatants. On rare occasions the State has even let an ANSA manage camps, the Polisario Front in Algeria being one example. Humanitarian organizations continue to be challenged by the risk of amalgamation between the military space where they would locate ANSAs and the humanitarian character of spaces of refuge whose civilian nature needs to be preserved. While displacement sites are intended to provide refuge from conflict, they are however not apolitical and displaced people have the right to freedom of opinion and association and should be allowed to establish self-governance systems. Instead of systematically denying ANSAs a presence in displacement sites, “active military groups are often not separate from the community but an integral part of it and as such can be key agents of protection and transformation”.119

It is also almost always assumed that the displaced themselves or ANSAs are responsible for the militarization of displaced sites, while governments rarely acknowledge their own involvement in the militarization. Yet violence and persecution by government agents, or perpetrated by ANSAs but tolerated by a government, can lead refugees and IDPs to arm themselves, not for offensive purposes but for self-defence. Finally, although an increasing number of conflicts take place in urban environments and although over half of the world’s displaced people are thought to live in urban areas, existing policies around militarization are all related to camp-based displacement. This is a significant gap.

d) Tools for engaging ANSAs on protection of displaced people

There are some tools that have been developed to engage various stakeholders on the protection of displaced people, and similarly tools have been developed to engage with ANSAs on humanitarian issues more broadly. However, there is no tool or framework specifically aimed at ANSAs’ engagement on displacement.

One of the most significant efforts to provide a much needed structured approach to humanitarian negotiation with ANSAs was the production by OCHA of the Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups:
A Manual and Guidelines for Practitioners in 2006. Yet, this document focuses on negotiations and does not cover the wider range of possible interactions (advocacy, dissemination, training, and capacity building) that humanitarian organizations may have with ANSAs. It makes no direct or specific reference to engagement on displacement.162

Following the repeated reference to the importance of humanitarian engagement with ANSAs in the UNSG’s reports on the protection of civilians, a number of initiatives were undertaken in subsequent years aimed at identifying means to enhance the protection of civilians through constructive engagement with ANSAs. In 2011 the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights carried out a study on how to enhance ANSAs’ compliance with international norms. The study called Rules of Engagement has been followed up by further research on the reactions of selected ANSAs to certain humanitarian norms, especially those protecting civilians, and including norms related to displacement. The final aim of the project is to provide a field manual for “humanitarian engagers”.163

The GPID have proved to be a useful framework to enable a number of organizations to engage with ANSAs on displacement-related issues. Another potentially useful tool for engagement with ANSAs is the manual called The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, A Toolkit for Dissemination, Advocacy and Analysis developed in Sri Lanka in 2001, which is a compilation of useful information, including the modules on internal displacement put together by the NRC and OHCHR.164 The Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons published in 2010 by the IASC gives useful advice to organizations working with displaced populations in conflict settings about engaging with ANSAs. It covers gaining a clear understanding of the command structure of the groups; monitoring and reporting their behaviour towards the displaced; advocating with ANSAs to protect IDPs; putting a stop to violations; and ensuring respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. The tools it contains include public exposure of violations, direct dialogue, and passing information to other bodies with influence.165

e) Opportunities to assert ANSAs’ responsibilities

In contexts where the State is unable or unwilling to assist displaced populations — including because that State itself is responsible for people’s displacement and is violating the rights of the displaced — its policies tend towards letting humanitarian actors provide assistance and protection. There are however some major pitfalls in this approach which tends to put the international organizations, which are by their nature the most “external” actors, at centre-stage of a given humanitarian context. First, there is the risk of ignoring or sideling the self-protection strategies of civilians and local initiatives for protection. Second, the emphasis on the State as the primary protection duty-bearer in bodies of law other than IHL appears to lead to framing ANSA as (only) responsible for causing or prolonging violations. Third, this may be counter-productive as there are more deterrents to ANSAs protecting civilians than incentives for ANSAs to protect them.

Consequently, there is an assumption that ANSAs cannot fulfill humanitarian functions and their role tends to be defined only in military terms, ignoring the social and political dimension that many insurgencies have. This approach in turn risks minimizing or removing their responsibility towards civilians, stripping them of potentially being a “protection actor”, a role that some ANSAs willingly aspire to or see as an important component of their holistic functions. Even an ANSA with a poor human rights record like Al-Shabaab still sees the protection of civilians as falling within their remit.

While laws emphasize the prohibition on ANSA activity in displacement contexts, certain instruments like the GPID and ANSAs’ own commitments offer avenues for improved protection of displaced populations. For a great majority of organizations getting access to displaced populations is almost the sole objective. While achieving this objective involves engaging directly or indirectly with ANSAs if they have control of an area, the engagement is often limited, and because of the operational pressures that are characteristic of displacement contexts, organizations discount the potential protective role of ANSAs there. More could therefore be done to go beyond responding to the effects of displacement by engaging ANSAs on their responsibilities and obligations with a view to preventing future violations. “If everyone is eligible to be a humanitarian actor, we should not exclude armed groups from the opportunity and responsibility of humanitarian action,” argues Hugo Slim. “If an insurgent group is best placed to help meet people’s rightful needs in a mixed disaster then we should expect them to do so.”166

Al-Shabaab fighters distribute relief to internally displaced people at K50 camp, which is outside Mogadishu and has limited access to aid. © Feisal Omar/REUTERS (2011)
PART IV
Conclusions and recommendations

1) Key findings

• Some ANSAs choose to displace populations, whether this displacement is deemed lawful or unlawful. Reasons why ANSAs would forcibly displace people include taking possession of a territory and its resources. While displacement can be triggered by an objective to dispossess, punish or control civilians, populations may also, however, be moved or facilitated to move by ANSAs in order to protect them from greater harm.

• Displacement is not solely a situation forcibly imposed on civilians but is often the outcome of a more complex set of factors, including the evolution or prolongation of the conflict, which in combination trigger movement. In many cases displacement is not a deliberate strategy but a by-product of generalized violence and violations by one or both parties to the conflict, at times combined with the effect of natural disasters or climate change, or a de facto situation where civilians spontaneously move into the hands of ANSAs in search of protection and livelihoods.

• The inter-relationship between ANSAs and displaced populations is complex and not static. There are no discernible consistent behavioural patterns given the multiple factors and actors that can affect these dynamics. However, certain factors including joint ethnicity, the shared experience of suffering, a common ideology, the fact that members of ANSAs have pre-existing ties with displaced communities, may forge strong bonds between ANSAs and civilians. Under these conditions ANSAs are more prone to exhibiting more protective behaviour towards the displaced, who are in turn likely to show greater allegiance to and support for them. If, by contrast, these elements are absent and if it is a context in which the ANSAs and the displaced civilians are of different nationality and ethnicity or have divergent interests, there is a higher probability that the relationship will be characterized by abusive behaviour by the ANSA, resentment, hostility and coerced obedience.

• In many conflict and displacement contexts, framing the relations between ANSAs and displaced communities as that of ‘violators and victims’ does not always accurately reflect the reality on the ground. An over-simplified analysis may lead to policies towards both displaced civilians and ANSAs that are inadequate or inappropriate. While it may suit the political agenda of some States to maintain ANSAs in the role of violators or potential violators of rights — thus reinforcing their criminal status under domestic law — this view risks overshadowing both the potential protective role played by ANSAs in some instances and the human rights violations committed by some States.

• Legitimizing coercive and repressive responses towards ANSAs leaves limited space for constructive engagement. Yet, more systematic and principled engagement with ANSAs over the responsibilities they have towards civilians, in particular displaced people, may yield some positive results in decreasing the probabilities of IHL and human rights violations from occurring in the first place.

• The legal and normative framework applicable to ANSAs relating to displacement and displaced people is manifold: in contexts where IHL applies, the prohibition of displacement is the rule unless displacement is deemed lawful because of a prevailing military imperative and/or if it intends to protect civilians. IHL however does not apply in all circumstances and has gaps in respect of the conditions of displacement and the rights of the displaced; most notably, it does not comprehensively address the civilian character of camps, the return of displaced nor individual remedy mechanisms, including compensation for lost property. In the same vein, unlawful displacement is proscribed by ICL, but notwithstanding the relative novelty of this legal framework, neither the ICC nor any of the regional international courts have yet condemned individuals, from State or non-State entities, for the crime of forcible displacement.

• While an array of research and operational policies and measures have attempted to fill the gap between the protection of civilians as a concept and the lived experiences of civilians, a top-down approach whereby protection is solely the remit of States and humanitarian organizations continues to prevail. Despite popular narratives of community involvement and community resilience within such a model, displaced civilians themselves and ANSAs continue to broadly fit the pre-conceived categories of victims and perpetrators. By refusing to see ANSAs as potential protection actors, protection gaps are likely to persist. Furthermore, the focus by humanitarian organizations on access has led to situations where humanitarians opt for non-engagement if access is denied. In this case the civilians living in territory controlled by ANSAs, including displaced people, risk being deprived of protection and assistance when the very conduct of these groups might call for more robust and innovative engagement.

• There is currently very limited sustained and principled engagement by humanitarian actors with ANSAs on displacement-related issues. It is especially relevant that UNHCR has no universal policy on engagement with ANSAs and that specialized international NGOs — with the exception of some training on the rights of displaced people — generally focus on access.

Both the refugee and human rights legal frameworks are built around a clearly state-centric approach and therefore focus on States’ obligations. ANSAs are identified as agents of persecution and human rights violations and abuses, with only marginal and sporadic reference made to their responsibility to prevent or redress these mistreatments.

• The development over the last 15-20 years of a normative framework on internal displacement has broadened and to a certain degree clarified ANSAs’ obligations for preventing displacement and protecting the displaced, and the provisions related to return and other durable solutions. Recently transformed into hard law in the African context, the new Kampala Convention fails, however, to directly address ANSAs as such but only their members and focuses only on prohibited actions, leaving a vacuum on the potential positive role of ANSAs in the protection of displaced people.

• The relationship between ANSAs and displaced people is not sufficiently analyzed in its broader context. Other stakeholders — especially diasporas, States, and international and local organizations — are all likely to have an impact in influencing these dynamics. Analyzing these layers of complex and fluctuating relations is key to gaining a comprehensive understanding of a given conflict and displacement context; it should be the premise to define the most suitable strategy for an engagement that is aimed at improving ANSAs’ compliance with humanitarian and human rights norms, including the rights of displaced people.
2) Recommendations and suggestions on ways forward

• The study of ANSAs should more systematically assess their role in relation to displacement, especially their protective behaviour, which to date remains largely undocumented. Such research should aim at sharpening understanding of the underlying structural motives for displacement, considering the role played by both ANSAs and civilians in displacement. Further research should be conducted at field level to explore in greater detail specific interactions between ANSAs and displaced populations in diverse geographical contexts. It should also reflect the variety of places of refuge (e.g. in camps, with host communities, or in urban contexts), as well as some of the gendered and generational dimensions of these relations. This work ought to be combined with inputs from and consultations with practitioners, displaced communities and members of ANSAs and should ultimately serve to guide the development of more appropriate policies and programmes.

• To refine our comprehension as to why ANSAs may be unable or unwilling to adhere to certain norms, humanitarian organizations and research institutions with expertise on displacement should consult with ANSAs to better understand their positions on existing norms pertaining to displacement. Geneva Call may, for instance, use its forthcoming meeting of ANSA signatories to the Deeds of Commitment to introduce the issue of displacement and assess its importance in the eyes of ANSAs. Some of these initial discussions could be pursued and deepened with selected ANSAs during follow-up field missions in contexts where displacement-related issues constitute a paramount component of the conflict. ANSAs’ views collected as part of these consultations could complement existing data on ANSAs’ perspectives, including Geneva Call’s Their Words, Directory of ANSA Humanitarian Commitments.167

• Building on recommendations from the UNSG’s reports on the protection of civilians, policymakers, humanitarian organizations, and other influential actors — especially local and diaspora organizations — need to develop strategies for enhancing ANSAs’ compliance with international law and norms pertaining to displacement. Forthcoming UNSG’s reports should more clearly frame ANSAs as potential protection actors, especially in displacement contexts, beyond the preponderant role of States and the complementary one of humanitarian actors. Such an approach, while not affecting the legal status of ANSAs, could in practice create a positive incentive for them to take greater responsibility for their actions and adopt more protective behaviours. These reports should be used by actors engaging with ANSAs as policy guidance.

• Humanitarian organizations should further develop engagement strategies with ANSAs on displacement, such as the Deed of Commitment. The dissemination of relevant norms and provisions, through training sessions and discussions with ANSAs, should be used as a means to strengthen ANSAs’ awareness of their obligations towards the rights of displaced people and as a means to prevent or facilitate displacement in accordance with IHL, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and the Kampala Convention. The involvement of civil society organizations in such activities is essential to ensure the pertinence, appropriateness and sustainability of these actions and ensure greater ownership by the communities concerned.

• Humanitarian organizations that have the protection of displaced civilians at the core of their mandate need to institutionalize their policies over the issue of engagement with ANSAs.168 Internal discussions should take place within and across organizations (at field as well as at headquarters level) in forums such as the Global Protection Cluster, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to identify some of the main challenges and good practices as well as engagement strategies. Organizations could also learn from those such as ICRC and Geneva Call which are already systematically engaging with ANSAs on humanitarian norms. It is essential to ensure participation of local staff and address specific challenges that they may face as well as the leverage they may have when engaging with ANSAs. As a follow-up to internal and external discussions, the leadership of these organizations should develop their own internal guidelines (where these are missing) based on existing experiences of engagement and negotiations with ANSAs.

• Existing human rights monitoring and reporting mechanisms should document more systematically and in an equal and impartial manner on unlawful displacement and violations towards displaced people committed by both State and ANSAs. When reporting on violations against displaced people committed by ANSAs, human rights organizations or humanitarian actors should not restrict recommendations to State authorities and the international community. They should furthermore resist from downplaying cases of abuses and displacement caused by governments against those triggered by ANSAs. They should make recommendations to ANSAs to stop and where possible redress violations they are accused of committing.

• External monitoring of ANSAs’ behaviour related to civilian displacement should be strengthened, including by using as a baseline ANSAs’ own commitments when these already exist. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs should establish a more systematic process for ANSAs to report on progress made towards the respect of norms relevant to displacement.

• Human rights and humanitarian organizations and the media should broaden their coverage of ANSAs’ actions in displacement contexts beyond negative acts. They should also document ANSAs’ behaviour or initiatives aimed at preventing or mitigating the causes of displacement and protective actions towards displaced populations. When protection shortfalls exist because of a lack of capacity or a lack of knowledge by those with the potential to protect, such reports, which have often in the past recommended support to (government) structures, should similarly address capacity issues for ANSAs.

• Host States and donor States should halt policies that obstruct efforts to engage with ANSAs and support initiatives aimed at reducing episodes of displacement triggered by ANSAs and at enabling them to prevent and address displacement.

• Policymakers should consider supporting projects by local organizations and diaspora groups aimed at engaging ANSAs — directly as well as through wider community mechanisms and networks — towards building a more protective environment for displaced people. Such projects can have a positive and complementary role to the protection work of international humanitarian organizations, including in contexts where ANSAs’ hostility towards the international community is limiting ‘protection by presence’ types of activities. These initiatives should have solid monitoring and evaluation mechanisms built in, both to enhance transparency over the role of such actors and to ensure impact.

• As an adjunct to engagement and monitoring, in order to address impunity, persistent and grave violations amounting to the war crime of displacement by State and non-State actors alike should be prosecuted as such by international jurisdictions.
Endnotes

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The Daniela funded Diaspora Fund is an example of an initiative aimed at strengthening the diaspora’s role in rebuilding and development activities in their former home countries www.bbc.co.uk/relief/workshop/diaspora programme(w).


Khalil. 2008. ‘Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees — or at least a tolerance of their presence — which should not be reduced simply to a functional one. The extent feasible, avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas.

ENOTES
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Global Society


Global Society


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### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANSA</td>
<td>Armed non-State actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APII</td>
<td>Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRAN-SDP</td>
<td>Association pour la promotion rurale de l’arrondissement de Nyassia, Solidarité — Développement — Paix</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAF</td>
<td>Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-based organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNF</td>
<td>Chin National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN (M)</td>
<td>Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Centre Résolution Conflits</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Democratic Karen Buddhist Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>The Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDFA</td>
<td>Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMR</td>
<td>Forced Migration Review magazine</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIPID</td>
<td>UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDC</td>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
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<td>HPG</td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Group</td>
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<td>HRL</td>
<td>Human rights law</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAASC</td>
<td>United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<td>IASC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICL</td>
<td>International Criminal Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>KHRG</td>
<td>Karen Human Rights Group</td>
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<td>KNU</td>
<td>Karen National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNPP</td>
<td>Karenni National Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>LYM</td>
<td>Libya ‘February 17’ Youth Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFDC</td>
<td>Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIAC</td>
<td>Non-international armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Forces of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNLO</td>
<td>Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADR</td>
<td>Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLM/A-MM</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Army - Minni Minnawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLM/SLA</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement/Sudan Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRO</td>
<td>Tamil Rehabilitation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West Africa Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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</table>
Geneva Call is a neutral and impartial humanitarian non-governmental organization that engages in dialogue with armed non-State actors (ANSAs) to promote their adherence to, and respect for, international humanitarian norms in armed conflict and other situations of violence, in particular regarding the protection of civilians.

Geneva Call is currently focusing its efforts on banning the use of anti-personnel mines, protecting children from the effects of armed conflict, prohibiting sexual violence in armed conflict and working towards the elimination of gender discrimination. Geneva Call also responds to ANSA requests to help build their knowledge of, and capacities, to implement international humanitarian norms.

The key tool of engagement that Geneva Call uses is an innovative instrument known as the Deed of Commitment, which allows ANSAs to undertake to respect international standards and be held accountable.

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