Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines

Volume I
A Global Report profiling NSAs and their use, acquisition, production, transfer and stockpiling of landmines

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The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT), signed in Ottawa in 1997, intends to eliminate a whole class of conventional weapons. The fact that over 140 countries have consented to be bound by the Treaty constitutes a remarkable achievement. The progress registered with the putting the Treaty into effect is of great credit to all those involved – governments, civil society and international organizations.

Nevertheless, in some of the most seriously mine-affected countries progress has been delayed or even compromised altogether by the fact that rebel groups that use anti-personnel mines do not consider themselves bound by the commitments of the government in power. Such groups, or non-state actors (NSAs), cannot themselves become parties to an international Treaty, even if they are willing to agree to its terms.

Faced with this potential “show-stopper”, Geneva Call came forward with a revolutionary new approach to engaging NSAs in committing themselves to the substance of the APMBT. Geneva Call designed a Deed of Commitment, to be deposited with the authorities of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, which NSAs can formally adhere to. This Deed of Commitment contains the same obligations as the APMBT. It allows the leaders of rebel groups to assume formal obligations and to accept that their performance in implementing those obligations will be monitored by an international body.

The success of this approach is illustrated by the case of Sudan. In October 2001, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) agreed to give up their AP mines and signed the Deed of Commitment. In September 2002, the Government of Sudan, the SPLM/A and the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create a single national program of mine action in the country, and in October 2003, the Government of Sudan ratified the APMBT. It is clear from conversations with senior officials of the Government, that they would not have felt able to ratify the Treaty, if the SPLM/A had not already made a formal commitment to observe its provisions in the territory under its control.

Not only did the initiative of Geneva Call stimulate the Government and the SPLM/A to work together, and with the United Nations, to deal with the problem of landmines, but the contacts made through this process were a valuable building block for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In Nairobi in December 2004, the Review Conference of the APMBT approved a challenging Plan of Action for the period up to 2009 when the first group of countries are due to have completed clearance of all mined areas. A major obstacle to accession to, and successful implementation of, the Treaty in some of the “hardest” countries is the refusal of NSAs to abandon AP mines. The approach pioneered by Geneva Call of engaging these groups in dialogue and persuading them to commit themselves to the provisions of the Treaty offers the best hope of stopping the use of mines in these countries. It is an approach that deserves our full support.

In order for this approach to have the best chance of success, Geneva Call needs to understand what motivates each group to continue using mines, how they are using them, and what initiatives stand the best chance of persuading them to stop. The research contained in this volume will help to provide the basic information that Geneva Call and others need to build effective advocacy campaigns, and thereby hasten the day when anti-personnel mines will be weapons of the past. The lessons learned by Geneva Call in this process should also be valuable to other organizations seeking to obtain commitments from NSAs on other issues, such as the need to respect human rights.

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ABSTRACT

Although armed non-state actors (NSAs) have always existed, in the last twenty years the international community has become acutely aware of their importance for achieving universal compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly true for universalizing the norm prohibiting the use of anti-personnel (AP) landmines.

This report, which builds on an analysis published in 2004, maps the role of NSAs in the landmine problem (2003-2005). The report investigates and analyzes how NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines through a presentation of individual group profiles.

This report has recorded a global occurrence of AP and anti-vehicle mine planting by NSAs, whether activated by a victim, a vehicle or at a distance by command-detonation. Around 60 NSAs have deployed landmines in 24 countries in five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to these NSAs, groups that were difficult to classify or identify made frequent use of landmines in a few other countries. Over 40 groups made use of some type of victim-activated devices. The mines employed were both factory-made and handmade, indicating both involvement in mine transfers and production.

One of the main findings of this report is that there is a need to discuss the mine issue not only with states, but also with NSAs. Many NSAs (as well as states) lack the long-term perspective of the consequences of mine use, and it is therefore crucial for the international community to find channels of communication with NSAs on the AP mine issue. This report argues that only by understanding NSA and region specific dynamics is it possible to address the - current and future - landmine problem caused by NSAs.
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ANALYSIS
1 Introduction

Anti-personnel (AP) landmines and similar victim-activated explosive devices are indiscriminate weapons. Their use is considered to be contrary to universally accepted principles of international humanitarian law. They are therefore prohibited by widely accepted treaties. In times of war they blindly strike civilians and soldiers, friends and enemies alike. Landmines recognize no ceasefire. They remain active and continue to pose a danger to civilians long after the end of hostilities. Beyond the direct threat they pose to the physical safety of those who live near them, landmines prevent communities from having safe access to land, water and infrastructure, and constitute a serious obstacle to the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Landmines also impede the access of humanitarian agencies to vulnerable populations during conflict as well as reconstruction efforts and socio-economic development in post-conflict societies. More concretely, the Landmine Monitor 2004 estimated that landmines cause between 15,000 and 20,000 victims around the world every year, half of which remain unreported.

Due to the disastrous humanitarian and socio-economic consequences of landmines, three-quarters of the world’s states have acceded to the “1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction” (hereafter the “Mine Ban Treaty”, also known as the “Ottawa Treaty”). Despite this significant step in the fight against landmines and the considerable efforts of humanitarian mine action agencies, six years after the entry into force of the treaty, landmines continue to constitute an acute problem threatening human security in over 80 countries worldwide.

One of the important challenges facing a global mine ban is the inclusion of armed non-state actors (NSAs) in the process - whether rebel groups, guerrilla groups or non-internationally recognized governments. This was the rationale behind the launching of the non-governmental organization (NGO) Geneva Call shortly after the coming into force of the Mine Ban Treaty: engaging NSAs in the AP mine ban.

Although NSAs have always existed, in the last twenty years the international community has become acutely aware of their importance for achieving universal compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law. This is particularly true for universalizing the norm prohibiting the use of AP landmines.

This report, which builds on findings published by Geneva Call in 2004, is a global analysis of the role of NSAs in the landmine problem. The report maps how NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines in different regions of the world and presents some conclusions and recommendations with a view to improving the engagement of these groups in the AP mine ban.

1.1 Structure of the Report

This report is organized in two parts; the first part (“Analysis”) maps global trends as well as the regional-specific characteristics of NSAs. It focuses on aspects such as the extent of NSA mine use; the logic behind their mine use; the kinds and types of mines used; the sources of mines (including production and transfer); stockpiling; the relationship between state and NSA mine use; regional disparities, etc. The section concludes with some major findings.

The second, main part of the report (“Profiles”) provides group and mine use profiles and short summaries of the around 60 groups that were identified as mine users in the reporting period (2003-2005). The NSAs are organized by region and primary concerned state, in the cases where they are operating in several states. The groups are presented separately. Both general group profiles and mine use profiles are given. The group profiles are meant to familiarize the reader with the various NSAs and provide background information on the

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1 Throughout this report the terms “landmine” and “mine” are used interchangeably.
3 Ibid. p. 27.
4 Anki Sjöberg, The Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem: A Call for Action, Executive Summary (Geneva Call, 2004).
factors influencing their landmine policy, such as conflict situation, objectives, area of operation, leadership structure, military strength and support base, etc. A few issues are highlighted throughout the general presentation of individual mine use by NSAs through some chosen cases: the impact on the civilian population of NSA use of mines other than AP mines (Nepal); stockpiles of landmines under the control of NSAs (Somalia); the transfer of landmines; the impact of NSA mine use on civilians and NSAs as well as mine use by other non-state actors (individuals, clans, criminal groups, paramilitaries, self-defense groups and private companies).

1.2 Background and Rationale of the Report

Geneva Call conducted a first analysis of the general trends of the 2003-2004 involvement of NSAs in the landmine problem between July and November 2004. The findings were presented in the summary report "The Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem: A Call for Action" (hereafter "Executive Summary"), which was released at the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World in November 2004. In the light of the widespread landmine use by NSAs documented in the Executive Summary, it became clear that there was a need for a detailed analysis of how and why NSAs use, acquire, produce, transfer, and stockpile landmines, and the extent to which civilian populations are affected by this.

Because of their low cost, easy availability and production, landmines have become a weapon of choice for NSAs in many conflicts. In fact, it was found that around 60 NSAs allegedly used landmines in 21 countries during 2003-2004. In addition to these groups, groups that were difficult to classify or identify made frequent use of landmines in a number of countries. The results of the Executive Summary clearly indicate that the number of NSAs using landmines significantly exceeds the number of states (estimated at ten states).^5

The realization that there is a need to know more about NSA mine use and mine action, highlighted by the Executive Summary, is shared by several humanitarian actors, including the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which underlined the need to gather, systematize and analyze in-depth information related to the convergence between NSAs and AP mines last year in a public statement.6 Important work covering NSA mine use has been undertaken by the Landmine Monitor and its researchers. This project is intended to complement the work done by the Landmine Monitor, providing an in-depth survey and analysis of the current (2003-2005) situation as well as the views of NSAs themselves, whenever possible.

This report is part of a larger project, "Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem and Recommendations for their Positive Contribution to a Landmine Ban and Mine Action". The aim of this project is to provide a comprehensive picture of the complex role that NSAs play in the landmine problem and propose concrete recommendations for their role in banning landmines and promoting cooperation in mine action.7 The project investigates the involvement of NSAs in the landmine problem both in a positive and negative perspective. In addition to the present report, another report will be prepared that maps out and draws attention to how NSAs can and in fact are contributing to solving the landmine problem.

1.3 Definition of Landmine and Use

According to the Amended Protocol II of the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) a mine is “a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle”. This report adopts the CCW definition of mine; it considers mines that are activated both by the victim (by pressure, tripwire, pressure release, push, pull or tilt) and by a

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^5 This can be explained by the fact that states, being in possession of more financial resources and having access to the legal international arms’ markets, have more diverse weaponry than NSAs. However, those states that continue to use landmines deploy them in larger quantities than most NSAs. Some states that have been reported as alleged mine users during 2003-2005 are Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Ethiopia (AV mines), Georgia, Israel, Nepal, Russia, and Sudan. In addition, NSAs in Colombia and the Philippines have alleged that state forces have used Claymore mines. In addition, recently a NSA in Turkey has accused the army of using unspecified mines.

^6 Statement by Gustavo Laurie, Liaison Officer, Geneva Office of UNMAS During the Conference "An Inclusive Approach to Armed Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Norms" (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call, the Program for the Study of International Organization(s) (PSIO) and the Armed Groups Project, 2004).

^7 Mine action refers to mine risk education (MRE), humanitarian demining, victim assistance, stockpile destruction and advocacy efforts for a landmine ban. For more information see A Guide to Mine Action, second ed. (Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 2004).
vehicle. In addition, the report also includes mines that can be detonated from a distance (by radio, electronically and string-pulled command-detonated mines).

Command-detonated mines are included in the report for two main reasons. The most obvious reason is that in many cases it can be difficult to determine how a mine has been triggered. Another reason is that if a NSA has the capacity to use command-detonated mines we may consider that it has the potential to use victim-activated mines as well, which generally require a simpler technique. Unfortunately, the trend appears to be that many NSAs that use command-detonated mines often also use victim-activated varieties.

This definition covers factory-made mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs, or improvised or hand-made mines) and booby-traps that act in the same way.

The concept of landmine “use” has two aspects: one referring to the new planting of mines and another including the notion of taking advantage of already available minefields (for example on borders). This report focuses on the first of these two aspects, due to the special implication of NSAs in the new placing of mines.

### The Deed of Commitment Definition of an AP mine

The “Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action” (hereafter “Deed of Commitment”), developed and used by Geneva Call to engage NSAs in the mine ban, requires a total prohibition on the use, acquisition, production, transfer and stockpiling of AP mines. According to the Deed of Commitment, an AP mine is any device that explodes by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, including other victim-activated explosive devices and anti-vehicle (AV) mines with the same effect. Consequently, this definition of AP mine includes factory-made AP mines, victim-activated IEDs and AV mines that can be triggered by the weight or presence of a person or that are equipped with anti-handling devices. AV mines triggered by vehicles and command-detonated mines are not covered by the Deed of Commitment.

### 1.4 Definition of NSA

For the purpose of this report an armed non-state actor is defined as any armed actor with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force to achieve its political or allegedly political objectives. Such actors include armed groups, rebel groups and non-internationally recognized governments.

It is apparent that NSAs (also called non-state armed groups or simply armed groups) are very diverse. They can be composed of men, women, and children. Children have allegedly been involved in laying mines in several conflicts. In addition, in some groups female members are estimated to make up one fifth or even one third of the recruits to the group's combatants and other members. Members of these groups can have been re-

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8 In this report we refer to “anti-vehicle” mines (AV) and do not specify whether these were particularly designed to penetrate tanks (i.e. “anti-tank” mines, AT).
9 Throughout this report the concepts of IED and handmade/improvised mine are used interchangeably unless otherwise specified.
10 It is a fact that even though states or NSAs have halted their mine use they may not be prepared to demine borders or frontlines.
11 Victim-activated IEDs include booby-traps prepared with explosives, i.e. explosive devices that are designed to look like harmless objects, and that are victim-activated. According to the Amended Protocol II of the CCW a booby-trap is a device “designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act”.
12 The Landmine Monitor has chosen to use a wider definition of NSA, including criminal groupings. Non-State Armed Groups and the Mine Ban, Landmine Monitor Factsheet (Mines Action Canada, June 2005).
13 Paramilitary groups are thus excluded from this definition, since these, in a stricter or looser way, are tied to a state apparatus. Responsibility could consequently be attributed to the state for the actions of these groups. The use of landmines by criminal groups or individuals are also excluded from the analysis, which does not rule out that landmine use by such actors can be a problem in some regions, as for example in Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan and Somalia. See Focus Case on “Landmine Use by Other Non-State Actors” in the “Profiles” section.
14 Notably in Chechnya and Nepal.
crucified voluntarily or forcefully. Some of these groups may have clearly defined political objectives, while in other cases this is less clear-cut. Some of the NSAs may control territory and have set up parallel structures to those of the state, while others have loose command structures and weak control over their members. Some concentrate their forces on attacking military targets, while others are attacking civilians.

Although a more complex understanding of NSAs is needed, for the purpose of this report the main concern is that they are not eligible to sign international agreements, including the Mine Ban Treaty.

1.5 Methodology and Material

This report provides a survey of NSA use, production, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of landmines as well as the basic characteristics of individual NSAs (conflict situation, objectives, area of operation, leadership structure, military strength and support base, etc.). The groups analyzed in the profiles are some of those that had been identified as mine users in 2003 to 2005. As to the mine use aspect, the report covers the period from January 2003 to June 2005 in as much detail as the currently available information allows. For the groups against which allegations were considered as weak or the group information insufficient, no complete profile was constructed, but a fact box summarizing the allegations presented.

A template was prepared for group and mine use profiles in order to facilitate a comparative analysis. The emphasis in this report is on the mine use profiles of the NSAs and on the overall global analysis of the trends observed. The group profiles serve to give a general understanding to the NSAs and thus do not provide a complete picture of the groups.

Though the research is mainly based on secondary sources, efforts were made to consult with field based colleagues and partners (in particular UN agencies, Landmine Monitor researchers, academics, conflict analysts, local and national NGOs active in mine action, disarmament and conflict resolution, etc.) as well as NSAs and concerned governments. Information gathered by Geneva Call staff during field missions and engagement work as well as previously gathered information was also taken into account. In order to deal with the limitations of the sources, three levels of reliability were introduced during the research process: confirmed, substantiated and unconfirmed allegations of mine use. The level of reliability of the allegations of mine use was thus categorized as follows:

a) Confirmed use: cases of mine use in which there have been allegations that point to a particular NSA, later acknowledged by a representative of the group or instances when an incident is claimed by a group and there are no particular circumstances that contradict the claim.

b) Substantiated allegations: cases of mine use in which there is strong indication and/or independent allegations from experts or locally based organizations that a certain NSA is responsible; for example from a Landmine Monitor researcher, or other representatives of NGOs and international organizations. Cases of mine use in which circumstances imply that it is most likely that a certain NSA is responsible will be included in this category unless the NSA itself has declared responsibility.

c) Unconfirmed allegations: this category includes allegations made by sources with a vested interest, for example governments, military, police. Media reports, often biased towards authorities, are also included in this category. Though less certain, these allegations still point to possible NSA involvement.

16 In the process of researching data concerning NSA group profiles Internet sources were extensively used. Using Internet as a research tool is always a risk, since the material available is not always reliable. By double checking the information the researchers tried to minimize this eventual bias.

17 These levels of reliability were employed also when investigating the other four aspects of the NSA contribution to the landmine problem (acquiring, production, transfer and stockpiling). However, the focus on ‘use’ is due firstly to the importance of this aspect and secondly to the difficulty in accessing reliable information concerning the other four.
The report was mainly prepared with publicly available information which can be consulted. However, regarding interviews and meetings, in some situations information was provided by individuals that for their own safety or due to other circumstances cannot be named or acknowledged.

The information available about NSAs is unevenly distributed. For some countries and for certain NSAs, abundant material exists. For others, the available material is scarce. This situation increased the difficulty of drawing complete group and mine use profiles for each NSA. In this sense, the limitations of the project reflect the limitations of the information available.

### 1.5.1 Attributing Responsibility for Mine Use

It became evident early on in the research process that the difficulty in attributing mine incidents to a particular actor, whether a NSA or a state, is not only related to the weaknesses of the sources, but also to the lack of detailed and impartial information as well as the complexity of many conflict situations.

Incidents are sometimes reported in the media as being provoked by mines, even when they are the result of other explosives, such as unexploded ordnance (UXO). Conversely, some landmine incidents are not reported as such; given that this report uses a broader definition of landmines than some organizations and media, especially by including IEDs. This sometimes made it difficult to determine if certain incidents should be included or not.

Information coming from conflict zones is often biased. In fact, it is well known that parties to a conflict frequently make allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law against their opponent(s). As AP mines have been particularly stigmatized through the Ottawa process, parties to conflicts—states or NSAs—may manipulate accusations of AP mine use in order to discredit the other party/parties. Therefore, as there was no possibility to conduct field missions to every country and region in which NSAs allegedly had used mines, in addition to the perspectives of both the concerned governments and NSAs, it was important to consult with independent organizations and experts.

A difficulty for attributing responsibility also arises in cases where multiple actors are operating on the same territory. This is true even in cases where there is an official state institution formally responsible for reporting mine incidents and attributing them to perpetrators. In addition, the reliability of allegations relating to landmine use by NSAs is even more challenging to determine since often their perspective is not taken into consideration. Another problem is that it is possible that some actors may have an interest in attributing mine incidents to a specific group. In some cases, the reverse is true: some states may not want to attribute responsibility to an armed group for an incident, if this would mean admitting that the NSA in question controls part of the territory or that it is in possession of more elaborate arms than was previously thought. Sometimes, it also happens that more than one NSA claims responsibility for the same incident. Therefore, it is necessary to be cautious when examining allegations of mine use.

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18 Unexploded ordnance can be defined as “munitions [bombs, shells, mortars, grenades and the like] that have failed to detonate as intended, usually on the impact with the ground or other hard surface.” ([A Guide to Mine Action](#), p. 9.) Explosive remnants of war include both UXO and abandoned ammunition.

19 For example the Colombian government’s Anti-personnel Mine Observatory said it could not attribute user responsibility in approximately half (or 283) of the 2002 mine incidents. ([Landmine Monitor Report 2003](#), United States of America: Human Rights Watch, 2003) p. 179.

20 For example, in Colombia, on 1 October 2002, a civilian died during fighting between the FARC and the army in the village of Caño Don Juan, Antioquia. The Colombian army claimed that the casualty was caused by an AP mine. However, other reports claimed that the victim had actually been caught in the crossfire. Ibid.

21 In August 2003 the Ugandan army both confirmed and denied reports that LRA had mined a road with AP mines to keep hold of it. According to an army spokesperson: “They’re not controlling anything, […] It was us who closed the road in order to pursue them. There’s no evidence that they have planted land mines anywhere.” See Patrick Elouo Angonu, “AAGM - LRA Rebels Declare Full Scale War on Teso,” ([The Monitor](#) 12 August 2003, and “LRA Rebels Reportedly Kill 11 in North,” ([The Monitor](#) 12 August 2003).

22 This seems to have been the case for example for a landmine blast that hit a bus Srinigar, Indian Kashmir, in May 2004. See also ([Landmine Blast, Clashes Leave 22 Dead in Kashmir, 2004](#), Available: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/, 18 October 2004. and Shujaat Bukhari, “28 Killed in J&K Mine Blast,” ([India’s National Newspaper](#) 24 May 2004.) Sometimes, when NSAs are organized in cells, cells from different groups collaborate in specific attacks. Then it is not so strange that two groups claim responsibility for the same incident. This might have been the case in the Kashmir incident just mentioned.
**Landmine Use in Context**

Worldwide armed conflicts are initiated and protracted for multiple reasons. In many of these conflicts civilians are targeted. The authors of this report recognize the obvious fact that in most conflict situations landmines are not a primary concern. The population might lack food, be victimized through the use of small arms, harassed by both sides, women and girls might be raped or exposed to other types of sexual violence, children might be abducted or killed. In fact, sometimes the killings by (other) small arms are also not the primary cause of death. As highlighted by Amnesty International, currently in Nepal “many more children are dying from poverty and disease exacerbated by the conflict”. Nevertheless, landmines may cause important problems after a conflict has ended, for example by denying territory and hindering or delaying reconstruction efforts. Negotiations on landmines can also be an entry point for dialogue between NSAs and humanitarian actors or between NSAs and the concerned government.

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23 Human rights abuses by NSAs have been widely reported, notably by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, see for example http://www.amnesty.org/ and http://www.hrw.org/.

2 Mine Use by NSAs

2.1 Extent of the Problem

In the Executive Summary it was found that around 60 named NSAs allegedly used landmines in over 20 countries during 2003-2004. These trends have been confirmed in this report, which found that around 60 NSAs have deployed landmines in 24 countries in five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to these NSAs, groups that were difficult to classify or identify made frequent use of landmines in three other countries.\textsuperscript{25}

This report has recorded a global occurrence of AP and AV mine deployment by NSAs, whether activated by a victim, a vehicle or at a distance by command-detonated. Over 40 groups made use of some type of victim-activated devices. The landmines used were both factory-made and handmade, indicating involvement in both mine transfers and production.

This report confirms the Executive Summary’s finding of a high concentration of mine use by NSAs in Asia, especially of improvised mines. The second region that was most affected by the number of NSAs using mines was Africa.\textsuperscript{26}

The geographic spread of NSA mine use can be seen in Table 1 and the map below.

\textbf{Table 1. NSA Use of Mines per Region 2003-2005}

- Africa: 6
- Asia: 31
- Europe: 4
- Latin America: 15
- Middle East/North Africa: 3

\textsuperscript{25} In Iraq, Pakistan and Thailand.
\textsuperscript{26} Some regional differences concerning use of factory-made and handmade mines are shown in Table 2.
2.2 How and Why NSAs Use Landmines

2.2.1 Frequency of Mine Use

Keeping in mind the differences in mine use between NSAs is crucial for choosing the most appropriate strategy for engaging them in a mine ban. Indeed, priorities must be set regarding the location of scarce resources: if humanitarian actors target a group that is a frequent user and manages to involve it in the mine ban, the benefits for the population are greater. Yet, a sporadic or non-user may be more open to renouncing mines since they do not constitute a crucial part of its military strategy. These are questions that humanitarian actors must ask themselves all the time, hence the relevance of knowing the frequency of each group’s mine use.

It is clear that there are significant differences among NSAs, not only in terms of the reasons that motivate their mine use and the types of mines they choose to employ, but also in terms of the frequency of use. For some NSAs landmines constitute one of their weapons of choice, such as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) in Nepal; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia; several Burmese and Kashmir groups; the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) in the Philippines; the Kurdistan People’s Congress/Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kongra-Gel/PKK) in Turkey, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) in India. Other groups use mines when they have access or a particular “need” for mines, for example the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines and the Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA) in Somalia. Some groups are sporadic or even unconfirmed users, such as the Albanian National Army (ANA)27 (active in several countries, including Macedonia), the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL) in Burundi, elements of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) in Senegal, and the Shining Path in Peru.

27 The very existence of the ANA as an armed group with a political agenda has been questioned by some analysts. See the ANA profile in the “Profiles” section.
The frequency of mine use is related to the number of reported incidents (i.e. mine blasts) allegedly caused by a NSA. However, a NSA could also plant many mines but have few reported incidents attributed to it. This could mean that there are actually not many incidents, due to mined areas being scarcely populated; the population being afraid to go into the area; the population being warned about where mines are etc. However, it could also mean that incidents which occur are not reported. The lack of reporting could be due to a scarcity of institutions or organizations that gather such information or due to the fear of reprisal if the incident is reported.

Civilians might be afraid of reporting incidents or even going to hospital, relatives of victims might be afraid of reporting, fearing punishment from the government or the NSA. The government may discourage reporting by accusing the victim of being a rebel, or requesting the victim or its family to pay for the mine that has been activated (as the practice has been in Burma, but this has allegedly taken place also in Burundi). The NSAs might hinder reporting as they may want to avoid getting a bad image nationally or internationally, or be unwilling to give the government indications as to where their mines are. It was repeatedly stressed by several individuals in Nepal that many people cannot report mine use, due to explicit threats from the CPN-M that such behavior would not go unpunished.

Although this report covers the period between January 2003 and June 2005, NSAs can and do change the manner and frequency of their landmine use, because of changing political circumstances such as the negotiation of a ceasefire. For example, the CPN-M had practically no registered mine incidents during the ceasefire with the government in 2003. However, after the ceasefire ended, no less than 250 roadside IED ambushes and 280 unexploded IEDs were recorded by the army in less than a year. A similar situation arose in the case of Kongra-Gel/PKK which, since its decision to end the unilateral cessation of hostilities in June 2004, has made frequent use of command-detonated AV mines, with numerous incidents registered. NSAs also intensify their mine use during particular periods, as for example during election times in order to disturb the voting process. This has been seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and India.

In short, just as frequent users may stop their use of landmines permanently or temporarily, sporadic or non-users may become frequent users due to acquisition of know-how and IED materials, new access to factory-made landmines, or simply due to a policy change, reflecting new political or military situations.

2.2.2 Logic behind NSA Mine Use

Although deemed as lacking decisive military utility and despite their disastrous humanitarian and socio-economic consequences, landmines clearly serve different purposes for the NSAs that employ them. Knowing why and how NSAs use these weapons can contribute to developing a successful strategy for engaging groups in the landmine ban. The logic behind NSA mine use may vary widely. The present conflict situation; the control of territory or non-control; the terrain in which it is operating (presence of mountains, forests, or other natural barriers); access to various types of mines, etc., may influence how a NSA uses mines.

Just as the frequency of the mine use can change due to policy changes or an altered conflict situation, the logic behind mine use might change too. According to reports, in 2003 the CPN-M was planting mines and boobytraps indiscriminately on a large-scale in Dhading district. Now the use has turned to command-detonated IEDs targeting government vehicles, thus indicating a shift in the policy on how the group utilizes mines.

Four reasons for mine use were identified for the purpose of this analysis: (a) defensive; (b) offensive; (c) economic gain; and (d) nuisance mining. Obviously, these are not clear cut divisions, and in some cases overlaps are possible. Moreover, it should be remembered that NSAs also make different uses of different mines, for example AP and AV. AV mines can be used offensively or defensively as well as AP. However, AP mines are more often used defensively (but their use is underreported).

32 The presumed logic behind landmine use is determined by the authors of this report on the basis of the descriptions available from the different incidents as well as on statements by the groups.
34 For example between offensive and defensive use of AV mines and between use for defensive and economic gain.
a) **Defensive:** The main aim of defensive mine use is to deter, and the triggering of such mines is thus not the end goal. AP and AV mines are primarily known to be defensive weapons intended to deny ground to the enemy, presenting barriers that must be breached or circumvented. Defensive mine use therefore implies planting mines for the protection of a camp and/or arms caches, but also for slowing down the progress of enemy troops. A further defensive use can be laying mines for the protection of the constituency or family of group members.

b) **Offensive:** Increasingly, it appears, AP and AV mines have shifted from being a primarily defensive weapon to being employed offensively as well. Examples of the offensive use of landmines is the planting of mines in planned attacks such as the targeting of individuals representing the state, or ambushes where members of a NSA plan to attack military personnel after an explosion, i.e. so called “hit and run operations”.

Some NSAs have also used the strategy of mining an area before attacking the enemy. Once the enemy counterattacks, the rebels would lead the soldiers to the mines. Offensive use is predominant among NSAs that do not control territory, but even groups who do control territory often employ landmines for offensive purposes as well. Increasingly command-detonated mines, often triggered by remote-control, are used for such offensive measures.

c) **Economic gain:** Sometimes closely related to the defensive use described above is what we have labeled “economic gain”, i.e. mine use that does not serve any direct military purpose but mainly the economic interest of the NSA. In these cases it might not be necessary to plant many mines, but a few strategically placed mines, and/or spreading the rumor that there are mines in an area might help to keep people away or from harvesting or collecting attractive products. In some areas there have also been reports of how NSAs have placed mines on roads in order to extract road tolls.

d) **Nuisance mining:** The fourth category includes other types of mine use that serve no direct military or economic purpose, and are sometimes labeled “nuisance mining”. This type of mining has been used to disrupt access to and rebuilding of strategic infrastructure (communications, railways, electric or food supplies, etc.). Also mine use that is aimed deliberately at civilians (the so called “land denial” or “population control”), in order to empty a territory, deny use of basic facilities such as water sources, displace communities, isolate a region, or simply spread terror also falls under this category. Explosive traps, such as booby-traps, are also included here.

One unexpected finding of the Executive Summary (given the traditionally defensive characteristics of landmines) was that many NSAs use landmines in an offensive manner (24 of the NSAs, as compared to 14 for defensive use). In many incidents, it appears that NSAs are present at the time and place of the attack. This means that in these cases, NSAs could use command-detonated landmines instead of victim-activated mines and achieve a similar result. The CPN-M in Nepal, the Kongra-Gel/PKK in Turkey, the CPI-M in India, the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front/Free Aceh Movement (ASNLFGAM) in Indonesia, the CPP/NPA/NDFP in the Philippines, the Taliban in Afghanistan, all used command-detonated mines. Many of these groups have also claimed such incidents, notably the CPN-M.

Nevertheless, offensive use is probably significantly over-reported. There are several reasons for this. Offensive use occurs visibly, and often targets soldiers or individuals otherwise tied to the government. In addition, in some cases where there is an international military presence, incidents involving foreigners tend to be more widely reported (for example in Afghanistan and Iraq). Reports of, for example, a farmer stepping on a mine are significantly fewer.

“Nuisance mining” was the second most prevalent reason for mine use (19 of the NSAs). This is not surprising, considering that the definition is quite broad (including the targeting of infrastructure). Contrary to the cases of

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25 One difference between mine use to slow down troops and traditional defensive mine use is probably the quantities used (less for the former) and the possibility or lack of will to map or mark the mines laid (less for the former also here).


27 Actually this kind of use, although taking place during an offensive, has some defensive elements. Such use has been claimed for example by a member of the Nepalese CPN-M. The NSA would force the army out of their garrisons using other weaponry. Rebel fighters would beforehand have mined the area, which would maim and slow down the army troops.

28 Individuals have also often used mines for economic gain. See Focus Case on “Landmine Use by Other Actors” in the “Profiles” part of the report.


30 See for example a statement by Prachanda, Supreme Commander of the People’s Liberation Army, 21 October 2003, quoted in the *Landmine Monitor 2004*, p. 1076.
defensive mining, the number of unconfirmed cases in the category of “nuisance mining” was significant (50% of the cases went unconfirmed). Yet, if one considers only the number of confirmed or substantiated cases, defensive use is more frequent. The most cited example of nuisance mining is that of the LRA. This group has been known to use mines to control the movement of people. According to a humanitarian organization based in Uganda, mines are planted specifically to target civilians, as they are laid close to areas frequented by villagers, such as “villages, boreholes, granaries, gardens, water sources and footpaths.” The CPN-M in Nepal has in the past allegedly been responsible for widespread nuisance mining. In 2003 in Dhading district, mines were planted “everywhere” including in civilian areas. These included booby-traps, such as so-called “banner bombs.” From Burma/Myanmar, reports have indicated that the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) has planted mines around villages with the aim of hindering people from leaving the villages. Another example of nuisance mining comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where, in 2003, numerous sources indicated that two NSAs, The Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), together with Rwanda’s national army, had mined a city before leaving it. Similar allegations were attributed to the FARC in October 2003 when the group allegedly mined the entrances to Santa Rosa in the state of Cauca and placed AP mines and explosives inside houses and vehicles before the town was overtaken by the army. It is of course difficult to determine which mines were planted with a defensive purpose, and which mines were planted with the aim of nuisance and causing damage. Infrastructure and other mainly non-military targets, especially railways and energy sources, have been attacked by several groups, such as a number of groups from India and notably by the Kongra-Gel/PKK in Turkey. The CPN-M has also been known to target infrastructure such as telephone antennas, electricity poles and roads with handmade explosive devises triggered at a distance.

Landmine use for economic purposes is not frequently reported, although this is probably due to underreporting rather than the insignificance of this kind of use. For example the FARC allegedly utilize landmines for the protection of coca plantations; and the MFDC in Senegal is reportedly known to plant landmines to hinder the local population from benefiting from economically profitable land, i.e. cashew nut cultivations and fruit trees. A similar approach has been followed by the DKBA in Burma/Myanmar, who, according to the Landmine Monitor, planted AP mines around timber concessions in order to control them. Some Somali groups allegedly use AV mines on roads in order to collect tolls. Although largely unconfirmed, economic motives seem to provide an explanation for a significant degree of the mine use in the DRC; mines were allegedly used to protect areas rich in natural resources that were under the control of one armed group or another.

Thus, when engaging NSAs in the mine ban process, it is important to know how NSAs themselves justify their mine use. Not surprisingly, NSAs often confirm defensive and offensive mine use. No recent statements were found in which NSA affirmed economic gain or nuisance mining as a reason for their mine use, although there have been statements claiming attacks on infrastructure. Landmines are utilized for defensive purposes according to most NSAs. For example, the Burmese Karen National Liberation Army (KNUA) has told the Landmine Monitor that it needs landmines to protect internally displaced Karen people from attacks by the Burmese Army. The LRA in Uganda has reportedly used AP mines to avoid attacks on their families and relatives. The

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62 Ibid.
63 “Dhading Residents Live in Constant Fear of Death.”
68 Currently in Dhading district some of the roads that have been blasted or need maintaining are left the way they are, due to the fear of rebuilding them, since the CPN-M allegedly have threaten to punish those who work on them. Interviews Nepal, Chitwan, Dhading and Kathmandu, July 2005.
69 According to observers, economic use has been seen in Casamance. MFDC would mine areas were there were cashew nut trees and other fruit trees, in order to hinder villages from collecting the fruits and themselves benefit from selling the fruit. In these cases they probably do not lay many new mines, but use the ones formerly laid. It would be enough to lay two-three mines to keep people away, since if one person is victimized others will be deterred. Interview [3 Geneva, September 2005 (2005)]. Other observers have claimed that the MFDC has used landmines also to protect cannabis fields. Richard Reeve, “Senegambia’s Trafficking Hubs,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (2004).
72 Email from the Congolese NGO Horizon Kind, Received September 2005 (2005).

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Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) has admitted to using mines to defend their camps and bases as well as to protect themselves from robbery, or from the Bangladeshi army. Many NSAs use mines for multiple reasons. The FARC in Colombia plant mines to avoid confrontations with the army and the paramilitaries or to slow them down. It also uses mines to protect areas that it has been “controlling” for years. In addition, there have been allegations of the FARC mining areas in order to displace population and to protect coca plantations.

2.2.3 Handmade and Factory-Made Mines

In addition to factory-made landmines, specifically manufactured to be victim-activated, vehicle-activated or command-detonated, there are also improvised or handmade mines (IEDs), and modifications of other weaponry that function as landmines. For example, hand grenades have been set up with trip-wires for victim-activation. Mortar shells have also been converted into landmines, as has been the case in the Philippines. IEDs can use both conventional and homemade explosives. Thus, other handmade mines can be fabricated from scratch, using homemade explosives.

As can be observed in Table 2 below, most NSAs that are employing IEDs are concentrated on the Asian continent (around 30). Four groups are based in the Middle East/North Africa region, four in Europe and three in Latin America. IEDs have not been used frequently in Africa, with the exception of at least one Burundian group. In addition, factory-made mines have previously allegedly been modified in Sudan and more recently allegedly also in Somalia.

The high concentration of IED use (and presumably production) in Asia can be seen as resulting from a “domino-effect”. In other words, IED use by one NSA in a region may have led to use by other NSAs. Hence the heightened importance of entering into dialogue with NSAs operating in regions where the knowledge and materials for the production of handmade mines are readily available.

Table 2. NSA Use of Factory-Made and Handmade Mines (IEDs) per Region

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57 Hence, in order to stop the movement of the paramilitaries, the FARC have mined different roads and paths. Allegedly they sometimes tell the population not to use these roads and paths. This is one example of how the mine use by NSAs is not always intended to harm, but rather to deter.
58 In Somalia it has been observed that many mines cannot be removed because they were booby-trapped and too dangerous to be removed (require on spot destruction). Geneva Call Mission to Somalia, July 2005.
Two Burmese groups (the CNF and the RSO) have explained how their IEDs are made. The CNF has stated that they (until 2003, when they halted IED production) made their IEDs out of iron pipes filled with gelatin and metal fragments, and are activated with traditional batteries. These mines would remain active solely for six months.\(^{59}\)

The RSO, on the other hand, uses batteries in their IEDs that last about one year. The standard construction is made out of 2 pieces of battery, one spring, detonator, explosives, and a plastic soap box.\(^{60}\) There have been examples of how NSAs, when producing their own mines, have been very successful in copying the factory-made mines produced by states. For example Hezbollah have been very skilful in imitating Israeli so-called “rock-mines” or “rock-bombs” (i.e. mines that look like rocks).\(^{61}\) Also the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are known to have developed sophisticated mine production techniques.

There are two main differences between factory-made landmines and IEDs: their life span and predictability.\(^{62}\) Once in the ground, IEDs normally have a shorter life span than factory-made landmines. This could possibly facilitate mine clearance, since the mine might become inactive after a year, although there are no guarantees that the mines are really inactive.

On the other hand, the possibility of predicting the strength of an IED is limited because the composition and quantities of explosives used are unique for each device. It is therefore possible that handmade landmines are more deadly than commercially manufactured ones.

The difficult predictability of IEDs is obviously a problem not only for deminers, but also for those who produce\(^{63}\) and plant the mines. There is an on-going discussion within the demining and explosive disposal communities as to how to treat IEDs, i.e. how to safely detect, remove and/or destroy these devices. Clearly there is still some confusion and uncertainty. It appears that conventional mines and unexploded ordnance would cause comparatively less difficulties for demining, since, by recognizing the type of device, experts can predict how it will react and what the main dangers are. For the person who is planting the device it is also less dangerous to have access to factory-made devices for similar reasons. The unpredictability of homemade explosives is perhaps one reason why NSAs would transform mortars, grenades, etc. into mines, rather than use homemade explosives. Another problem with disposing IEDs for the experts is the uncertainty as to exactly what one is looking for. For example, in order to use dogs, these need to be trained on searching for specific smells. If the explosives are not known this might cause a problem.\(^{64}\) However, it has been suggested by some humanitarian deminers that when demining manually using metal detectors there is no major difference between IEDs and regular mines, even when the metal content is low.\(^{65}\)

Nevertheless, the demining of IEDs is still more complex. In Colombia reports indicate that handmade mines have proven to contain very low levels of metal and the mix of explosives and coffee make them difficult to detect for both metal detectors and for dogs.\(^{66}\) When landmines are produced in these ways, they may cause greater difficulties for demining than do commercially manufactured mines.

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The cost of producing handmade mines in Colombia is between one and three U.S. dollars.

*Pablo, ELN Chief of the Jose Solano Sepúlveda Front, South Bolivar*\(^{67}\)

“[In Pakistan] you can buy a landmine for a mere 200 rupees (3.40 U.S. dollars).

*Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director, Sustainable Peace and Development Organization*\(^{68}\)

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\(^{59}\) Geneva Call Meeting with Representative of the CNF, May 2005.

\(^{60}\) Interview 1 (1) Geneva, June 2005.


\(^{62}\) With predictability we refer to the possibility of establishing how the mine will react when it is uncovered as well as when it is planted.

\(^{63}\) For danger for NSAs of producing landmines, see the section on “Consequences of NSA Mine Use: The NSAs”.

\(^{64}\) Interviews with Demining and Explosive Disposal Experts During the Attendance of the Summer Conference of the Nordic Demining Research Forum, Stockholm, 23 August 2005 [2005].

\(^{65}\) Interview with Staff of a Humanitarian Demining Agency, Geneva, September 2005 [2005].


\(^{67}\) CCCM Interview with Pablo, ELN Chief of the Jose Solano Sepúlveda Front, South Bolivar 2005 (2005).

2.2.4 Victim-Activated and Command-Detonated Mines

The employment of command-detonated landmines (improvised or factory-made) appears to be increasing, with over 20 NSAs having utilized such devices. Over 20 NSAs were identified to have made use of command-detonation in 2003-2004. Sjöberg, The Involvement of Armed Non-State Actors in the Landmine Problem: A Call for Action. Executive Summary, p. 17.

Unfortunately, over 40 NSAs made use of some kind of victim-activated device, such as factory-made and handmade AP mines, booby-traps, or AV mines that can be trig-

mered by a person [see Table 3 below, comparing use of AP and AV mines]. Some NSAs that use victim-activated devices use more than one type (for example, a combination of victim-activated IEDs and commercially manufactured AP mines, and/or booby-traps).

In addition to this complication, the presence of Claymore mines can signify a further problem. Claymore mines can be used both to target individuals and vehicles. This is also the case for improvised mines, as they also have different purposes and triggering mechanisms.

Over 40 NSAs made use of some kind of victim-activated device, such as factory-made and handmade AP mines, booby-traps, or AV mines that can be triggered by a person (see Table 3 below, comparing use of AP and AV mines). In some cases, the triggering mechanism could not be determined. It is therefore possible that the number of command-detonated landmines is higher than reported here, just as it is likely that the number of NSAs using victim-activated detonation is higher.

Command-detonated landmines are the most frequently confirmed triggering type. This is probably a sign that a growing taboo surrounds the use of victim-activated mines. PKK, CPP/NPA/NDFP, and CPN-M have stated that they only use command-detonated mines. The ASNLF/GAM has gone further, specifically stating that they did not use victim-activated landmines due to the risks this would entail for the population in whose name they are fighting.

A similar argument has been put forward regarding the Chechen forces: they would avoid using AP mines in order not to lose local support on which they depend for their operations. For this reason many of the mines reportedly laid by Chechen forces would be either command-detonated IEDs or AV mines. However, in spite of this, victim-activated devices are reportedly still being deployed by the Chechen forces.

As mentioned above, the use of command-detonated mines is widespread and appears to be on the increase: there seems to be an increased use of such triggering mechanisms for example in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Dagestan, Nepal, and India. By an increase we refer both to the number of NSAs deploying the technique and the frequency of incidents reportedly provoked by such devices. However, the most commonly used mechanisms among NSAs are still victim-activated devices.

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Command-detonated mines are normally used to target vehicles. In fact, they are ideal for moving targets and allows for the NSA to select the target carefully. Nevertheless, there have been reports of command-detonated mines for the targeting of soldiers on foot, for example in Nepal.

Command-detonated mines can be triggered in various ways. The classical triggering mechanism is by cable or wire. However, NSAs especially in Asia, Caucasus and the Middle East, are applying increasingly sophisticated remote-controlled techniques, including mobile phones, garage-openers, electronic toys, or similar devices.

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See respective profiles.

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What is striking is that even though NSAs make use of command-detonated mines, they still – at least partially – also rely on victim-activated mechanisms. However, it is possible that some allegations of victim-activated mine use are unfounded.

It has been suggested that the advantages of command-detonation should not be exaggerated. The human factor involved, or the instability of the devices (when handmade) may still cause significant dangers to civilians. Passenger buses have been targeted by NSAs using command-detonated devices.\textsuperscript{79}

\subsection*{2.2.5 Anti-Personnel and Anti-Vehicle Mines}

AV mines\textsuperscript{80} activated by vehicles are also indiscriminate weapons.\textsuperscript{81} Similarly to AP mines, they do not distinguish between civilians or soldiers, and in the same way as AP mines they remain active in the ground after a conflict has ended. In a report by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining [GICHD] - exclusively focusing on AV mines - it is concluded that the most significant consequence of mines other than anti-personnel mines [MOTAPM]\textsuperscript{82} is that they can block access to populations in need and impede socio-economic advances.\textsuperscript{83} Populations thus risk being isolated from aid both during and after a conflict. An additional problem is that the costs of delivering aid to these places can increase sharply, since it might have to be delivered by air. South Sudan is a well-known example of this. Not only the actual use of AV mines, but also only the rumor about an area being mined, might lead to the abandoning of a territory or the non-use of a road. For example, when studying the case of Angola, the GICHD found that after a clearance project it turned out that one road that had not been used due to fear of mines was in fact not mined at all.\textsuperscript{84}

During 2003-2005 30 groups were reported to have used AV mines, as can be observed in Table 3 below. There were some cases of AV mine use only, such as the Somali SNF and RRA, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), and possibly the CPP/NPA/NDFP and the Kongra-Gel/PKK. The Senegalese MFDC is an example of a NSA believed to have used both AP and AV mines. Due to the group’s history of planting AV mines, there has been a high frequency of AV mine incidents, probably higher than in other places. Due to fear of mined roads, many people do not travel, or take particular roads only.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{table}[h!]
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\caption{NSA Use of AP and AV Mines per Region}
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\textsuperscript{79} See Focus Case “The Impact on the Civilian Population of NSA Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines: The Case of Nepal” in the “Profiles” section.

\textsuperscript{80} In this report we refer to “AV mines” and do not specify whether these were particularly designed to penetrate tanks (“anti-tank mines”, AT).

\textsuperscript{81} According to the GICHD, the most commonly used AV mines are activated by downward pressure mechanisms. In addition, some AV mines are equipped with sensitive fuses (pressure activation, tripwire, etc), which can be activated by a person. Moreover, sometimes AV mines are “protected” by anti-handling devices in order to complicate demining. Such anti-handling devices can be activated by the “release or application of light pressure, or the application or release of pressure.” Humanitarian Impact from Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 2004), pp. 8-9. AV mines that can be activated by a person are prohibited by the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

\textsuperscript{82} According to the GICHD, although there is no formal definition of MOTAPM an accepted definition would be: “mines primarily designed to be exploded by... vehicles”, for example helicopters, tanks, amphibious (in shallow water) and other vehicles. Ibid., p. 35.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., pp. 3 and 7.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{85} Interview (3) Geneva, September 2005.
When it comes to improvised mines it can be very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between AP and AV mines, if there are no details available as to the sensitivity of the triggering mechanism. The only possible distinction is in the size of the explosive device which could indicate the intended target. Claymore mines can also make up a border case: they are specifically designed to target people, however, have a sufficient power to endanger vehicles.

NSAs are more prone to using AV mines then states (in internal conflict), given that the latter more often possess tanks and other vehicles as compared to NSAs. There are some exceptions to the “rule” that NSAs are poorly equipped in terms of vehicles; for example in cases of “failed” states (Somalia), and non-internationally recognized governments (Western Sahara, Abkhazia, South Ossetia). It appears that states would as a rule rather use AV mines in international conflicts. NSAs also use AV mines against each other. This is the case in Somalia.  

The Deed of Commitment does not currently ban the use of AV mines unless they could be victim-activated. Neither have states prohibited AV mines. However, there are ongoing discussions on how to limit the danger posed to civilians by these devices within the framework of the CCW. It has been suggested that NSAs might be ready to ban AV mines before states do. However, since NSAs in many conflicts depend largely on these weapons (in Chechnya, India, Nepal, Philippines, among others), it appears unlikely that a significant number of them would agree to a total ban. Delimitation with the aim of diminishing the impact on the civilian population, similar to the CCW process, might instead be more acceptable to these groups.

"Khadija was traveling between Dolo and Getweine in April 2002 when a lorry she was traveling in was hit by a mine near Shatulo. She sustained injuries on the hips, lost a four month old baby and suffered reproductive complications. Khadija at the time was fending for herself and ever since has turned to be a street begger. She has visited no hospital and has been ostracized by the society in general.”

(Khadija’s situation remains the same.)


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86 See Somali profiles.
87 As discussed during the conference An Inclusive Approach to Armed Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Norms [Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Call, the PSIO, and the Armed Groups Project, 2004].
2.2.6 NSAs and Explosive Remnants of War

Explosive remnants of war (ERW), or unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance, are frequently found in the areas of operation or control of NSAs. This is the case for example in Colombia, the Philippines, Iraqi Kurdistan and Somalia. In many cases ERW contamination is the result of targeted military aerial and artillery bombings by government forces. In other cases NSAs suffer also from ERW remaining from earlier interstate conflicts, as in Iraqi Kurdistan and Somalia.

In some cases ERW produced by NSAs are a major problem for the civilian population, as for instance in Colombia and Nepal. For example in Nepal one of the major problems appears to be the handmade grenades or “socket bombs” left behind by the CPN-M. Civilians, and especially children, are often victimized when these devices, frequently thrown at pursuing troops, but which are left when they fail to explode. There is also a serious ERW problem in Northern Uganda, the area of operation of the LRA. In addition, there have been allegations that one NSA, the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the war against the Soviet Union, formerly has made use of cluster munitions. This might prove to be a problem for the future, since NSAs generally have access to the same weapons as the state against which they are fighting.

As a consequence, many NSAs find themselves in control of or operating in ERW-contaminated areas. Not only the civilian populations in these areas, but also the NSAs themselves, are victimized by ERW. In fact, one NSA in Colombia (ELN) has stated that it would be willing to ban AP mines (IEDs and factory-made devices) if the government forces stop their bombing campaigns, since, they argue, the impact on the ground is basically the same.

ERW is not only seen as a disadvantage by NSAs, but it is used by some groups to produce improvised mines. NSAs, especially the resource-scarce ones, try to reuse AV mines, shells, and large bombs launched by aircraft, often at the cost of their lives. Usually, when poorly-equipped NSAs find ERW that contain explosives they would try to deactivate them and reuse the explosive. The most well-known examples of this are Iraq and Chechnya, but it has also been the case in Afghanistan and the Philippines. Around 40 groups have made use of improvised mines. How many of these IEDs were produced using ERW is unknown. No less than 17 groups were believed to have employed improvised AV mines.

Signatory groups of the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment are committed not to use victim-activated IEDs. Signatories are also required to cooperate in mine action, which covers both landmines and ERW. ERW clearance is a major concern to some NSAs (notably the MILF in the Philippines, who requested Geneva Call to facilitate joint ERW clearing projects with the government).

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89 Ugandan government sources claim that this would be due to weapons, for example grenades, left behind by the rebels (Interview with Representatives of the Ugandan Government, Geneva, September 2005 [2005]). Other sources indicate that the LRA would not intentionally leave behind such weapons (which they need), but that the contamination is rather due to battles and belonged to both parties. Email from Davide Naggi, Received 28 September 2005 (2005).
91 It might not always be evident to determine when an improvised mine becomes an ERW, but one aspect is that the former have been planted, not abandoned.
2.3 Sources of Mines

2.3.1 States

One of the main sources of factory-made landmines for NSAs is the very state against which they are fighting. Incidents of NSAs managing to loot or capture landmines from the state are reported regularly. The CPP/NPA/NDFP in the Philippines has stated that it has confiscated Claymore mines from the army. In Burma/Myanmar, army mines have been seized during operations but they have also been lifted and sometimes replanted. In fact, it has been reported that at least several hundred landmines in NSA arsenals in Burma/Myanmar are derived from army mines that have been removed. The RSO in Bangladesh has admitted to having demined factory-made AP mines in the border area which is often referred to as a “no man’s land” (between Bangladesh and Burma/Myanmar). The reused mines are mostly of Burmese production. Also the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army [KNU/KNLA] is known to have lifted mines from government minefields.

Sometimes states can even serve as a source of the production and planting of mines and booby-traps, even involuntarily. It is ironic that the current Iraqi insurgency fighters (combating the coalition and Iraqi forces) have been found to use manuals in how to best produce and hide booby-traps that were developed and published by the U.S. Department of the Army.

NSAs have also reported that soldiers from state armies have offered to sell them landmines, as was the case on the Thai-Burmese border in 2001. In the Chechen conflict, there has been weapons trade, including landmines, allegedly on behalf of both parties (the Chechen rebels and the Russian forces). In other countries, NSAs have claimed that they were buying weapons from state soldiers, although mines were not specifically mentioned.

Another source of factory-made mines for NSAs is states other than the concerned state. Some states supply, or allegedly supply, NSAs in other countries with landmines. For example Ethiopia has been accused of providing Somali factions with landmines. Sudan has repeatedly been blamed for being a major source of AP and AV mines for the LRA and Rwanda has been alleged of supplying RCD-Goma and the UPC in the DRC with mines.

2.3.2 Black Market

Large areas of the world are not under the effective control of any state, a fact that facilitates the trafficking in arms and possibly IED making material among NSAs. This has been the case for Burma/Myanmar, Colombia, Iraq, and in the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Both AP and AV mines can also be bought openly at the Barkat market in Mogadishu, Somalia. Burmese NSAs can reportedly buy U.S. made landmines easily on the black market from former conflict zones, such as Cambodia and Vietnam. The MFDC has formerly had easy access to landmines from the border area between Senegal and Guinea Bissau.

One of the most recent examples comes from Iraq, where there is a very large black market for landmines (AP and AV) or UXO that used to be found in former Iraqi army stores. At the beginning of the war, large quantities...
of ammunitions were either stolen by Iraqi soldiers themselves, by resistance groups, or simply abandoned by the soldiers during and after the fighting. The result is that much of the ammunition now used by the current Iraqi insurgents is the same as that used by the state during the Gulf War. With respect to landmines, this includes AP mines from China, the former Soviet Union and Italy. Consequently, landmines that formerly belonged to the Iraqi state are now purchased and transferred within the country, thus providing easy access to factory-made mines for the insurgents. Mines are also spreading to NSAs in neighboring countries, such as to the Kurdish rebel group Kongra-Gel/PKK, which operates in Turkey.

It should be noted that in some post-conflict situations there is no need for NSAs or individuals to look for sources of mines, since weapons including mines are plentiful and easily available. Clear examples of this are the cases of Lebanon, Somalia, and the DRC.

### 2.3.3 NSA Transfer

The information concerning transfers between NSAs is often limited and unconfirmed, due to the nature of this activity. It should not be ignored that, as with allegations of indiscriminate use of AP mines, allegations of transfer could be used by the counterparty in order to discredit a NSA whom they are fighting. Hence, the data presented below is clearly not extensive or confirmed.

Different NSAs have allegedly transferred to each other not only arms and explosives, but also the knowledge and technology on how to manufacture landmines, for example in Burma/Myanmar, India and the Philippines. Burmese groups have allegedly transferred knowledge to each other, and, according to the government, the KNU and the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) conducted courses in explosives training in Thailand at separate occasions during 2003. The Burmese RSO (operating in Bangladesh) is alleged to have learned mine production from the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is an area of important mine transfer. Thus ”([l]andmines and other types of small arms and light weapons are frequently smuggled from Afghanistan to the areas adjoining Afghanistan border and Baluchistan area. [...] Once smuggled into Pakistan these weapons including landmines are smuggled to other parts of the country.” Its prices are very low and anybody has an easy access to them...”. In Afghanistan Russian type landmines exist in abundance and are easily available. Moreover, Chinese made mines were supplied from Pakistan to Afghanistan during the subsequent wars in Afghanistan.

There are allegations that some NSAs transfers would be of a more permanent character, and include for example the joint running of camps. For instance, it has also been alleged that there have been intense contacts between the Nepalese CPN-M and some Indian Maoists (CPI-M), including joint training. Allegedly Indian Security Forces overran a joint Nepalese-Indian Maoist training centre located on the Indian side of the border in the Bagaha district (connected with the Chitwan and Parsa districts) of Nepal in mid-2005. According to media reports, the training center contained both (unspecified) landmines and huge quantities of explosives.

Similarly, in the Philippines, according to government allegations, since 1997-1998, NSAs have conducted joint training in explosive making and use in camps in the Mindanao region. The training camps were allegedly run by members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and logistic support provided by the MILF. In 2004 the Philippine government has also accused the MILF of training the CPP/NPA/NDFP in manufacturing explosives, including landmines. The MILF has denied this, as well as having any links with JI.

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105 Email from Patrick Hirard, Iraq, October 2004 (2004).
106 Ibid.
108 See also the Focus Case on “Transfer of Landmines” in the “Analysis” section.
111 Email from Raza Shan Khan, Received September 2004 (2004).
112 Ibid.
In addition to the allegations of NSA-NSA transfer, there have also been reports that NSAs not currently using mines have transferred mines, probably for their own use or to add to their stockpiles. For example the LTTE in Sri Lanka is alleged to have been transporting claymore mines.116

2.3.4 Self-Production

In some cases, when other sources of mines are blocked, many NSAs turn to the self-production of mines. Another reason for self-production is an abundant supply of material for making handmade mines, such as artillery shells, grenades, explosives, etc.117

NSAs all over the world, but mainly in Asia and in Colombia, have proven to be extremely inventive when it comes to the fabrication of IEDs. Their “creativity” appears to be endless, in terms of how they acquire/prepare both the content (explosives) and the containers of the devices. An estimated 60 NSAs manufacture their own landmines, while 20 groups have employed factory-made mines.118 An unspecified number of NSAs have the capacity and knowledge to do so, but are not currently believed to produce their own mines, like the PKK.119

The material for making IEDs is often easily available to NSAs, either because they can produce it or because it is used in legitimate industrial contexts and therefore readily available. It is believed that the CPN-M acquires explosives from the Indian construction industry, but they are also known to produce their own explosives.120 The People’s War Group (now CPI-M) in India suggests multiple sources of explosives for NSAs: by raiding police stations and coal mines, through “local dealers and contractors who are involved in drilling operations [...] In some cases, naxalites collect the explosive material as a substitute for funds.”121 Colombian NSAs are reportedly capable of making explosive out of fertilizers.122

According to the coalition forces in Afghanistan, Afghan NSAs have also been “creative” in manufacturing explosive devices, using explosives, UXO and ammunitions taken from available stockpiles.123 In Burma/Myanmar, NSAs are able to produce blast and fragmentation mines, including Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.124

The use of IEDs makes it difficult to make a difference between booby-traps and handmade landmines. Again, to use the Colombian example, NSAs use soda cans, boxes of sweets, metal cans, and even footballs or football-shaped containers for making mines. It is therefore difficult to say that a mine was produced as a booby-trap to trick soldiers into thinking that the object is harmless, or that it was made in this way because no other containers were available.125 Similar trends have been observed in Nepal, where young children are frequently victimized when picking up and playing with so-called socket bombs (handmade grenades)126 and pressure-cooker bombs.127

117 These reasons were stressed for the Chechen case for example in the Landmine Monitor 2002, p. 802.
118 Some groups have deployed both factory-made and improvised mines. See Table 2.
122 See the profiles of the Colombian groups, the ELN and the FARC.
123 Email from Captain Pete Gray, ISAF Headquarters Press Information Centre, Received October 2004 (2004).
124 Landmines Are Used Extensively.
125 Email from Camilo Serna Vilegas, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Colombia, October 2004 (2004).
2.4 Stockpiles

It is difficult to get specific data on stocks of mines (factory-made AP and AV mines as well as IEDs) held by NSAs. One reason could be that the NSAs do not want the enemy – be they state or non-state - to know what weaponry they possess. Another reason might be that the NSA, lacking organizational capacity and control over its own weapon caches, does not actually know the exact number of mines in its stockpiles.

One preliminary conclusion is that NSAs that control territory are more often prone to keeping stocks, while more mobile guerrilla forces often carry most of their weaponry.

One group that controls territory is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario Front). On a recent mission to Western Sahara, Geneva Call was invited to see some of Polisario’s stocks, estimated at approximately 1,600 mines. Nevertheless, more specific numbers will be provided later, in order to prepare for stockpile destruction.

Some NSAs that are former mine users still maintain stocks. The SPLM/A in Sudan is a good example of this, having recently declared to be in possession of 5,000 mines. Also the LTTE in Sri Lanka most probably still holds mine stockpiles.

As mentioned above, some highly mobile guerrilla organizations may not keep any important stocks, but rather produce the devices when they are “needed”. This seems to be the case for the CPN-M. Nevertheless, sometimes mines are still stockpiled, for example in sacks that are buried in the ground, containing as much as 200-300 handmade mines in one such a cache. There is no information about how long the mines in such stocks last. There have also been (unconfirmed) allegations that the CPN-M keeps stockpiles in the homes of civilians.

Stockpiles frequently contain mines lifted from minefields. Some NSA stockpiles contain both factory-made and handmade landmines. Burmese groups in Bangladesh are known to keep stocks; for example the RSO is believed to still maintain large stockpiles, but their exact quantity remains unknown. One interesting aspect with regards to the RSO stocks is that, containing handmade mines, the mines will be inactive after the end of the lifespan of the batteries. However, even though the mines are inactive after about a year, the mines could be made active by changing the battery, and thus their lifespan (normally one year) could be prolonged. Groups that produce IEDs most probably keep stocks of explosive and other material for making them. Arms caches containing such material have been found in the Philippines, allegedly belonging to the CCP/NPA/NDFP, and in Chechnya.

For a further discussion of stockpiles held by NSAs and the problems this might cause see Focus Case “Stockpiles under the Control of NSAs: Somalia” in the second part of the report.

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128 See also Focus Case on “Stockpiles of Landmines under the Control of NSAs: the Case of Somalia” in the “Profiles” part.
129 This figure coincides with earlier estimates of the Landmine Monitor Report Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 767.
130 The stock included 1,000 M14, 1,500 PMZ2, 750 No.4, 1,250 PRB M35, 500 Type 72 A. Article 7 Report, South Sudan, April 2005 (2005).
132 Interview with a Resident from Ramechhap District, Nepal, July 2005.
134 Ibid.
135 For more details, see the respective profiles.
2.5 Regional Disparities and Preliminary Strategies

Important differences exist among the different regions in which NSAs are responsible for new planting of landmines. Understanding these regional differences is essential, since they have important implications for the engagement of NSAs and implementation of strategies for a mine ban.

On the African continent NSAs are frequent users of AV mines. African NSAs have reportedly utilized almost exclusively factory-made mines. However, in contrast to the findings of the Executive Summary, research for this report found that IEDs and modified mines were also used in the region, though by a limited number of groups. The access to factory-made mines is partly due to the availability of these devices in the ground and on the black market. However, certain African states have reportedly supplied landmines to NSAs in Africa. One potential strategy for engaging African NSAs is to advocate a total ban on victim-activated AP mines, and, possibly, a total ban on AV mines that are activated by the vehicle among groups that agree to expand their ban on AP mines. Another focus should be on destroying mine stockpiles stored by NSAs, in order to prevent them from reaching other NSAs or individuals. Since all states in the sub-Saharan region (except for Somalia) are parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, a complementary approach would be to pressure them to respect the total prohibition of transfer. It is important that states parties to the treaty are held responsible for violations of their obligations.

In Asia, NSAs rely to a large extent on IEDs, of which some are utilized in a command-detonated fashion, but most are victim-activated. Hence, a different engagement strategy is required, focusing on targeting NSAs in regions where the proliferation of landmines and know-how on making IEDs is available. Several of the reported cases of NSA transfer concern Asian NSAs, as can be observed in the respective profiles for Burma/Myanmar, India (non-Kashmir and Kashmir), Nepal and the Philippines. A preventive approach would therefore be useful, possibly using inter-group connections. A second focus should be on advocacy, as a way of halting victim-activated landmine use.

The Latin American NSAs have shown certain similarities to some of their Asian counterparts, for instance concerning the use of handmade devices and the relationship between the groups and the local population. However, there have been no definitive steps towards a total ban. Colombian NSAs have shown openness to advocacy efforts both at the leadership and the cadre level through community pressure. This is a strategy that might also be appropriate for some Asian groups.

Other regions show less obvious similarities, which limits the possibilities of discussing appropriate regional strategies. For instance, the information available for the Middle East and North Africa is pretty limited, and the cases do not show many similarities, except for a preference for handmade devices and especially improvised AV mines (in Algeria and against Israeli troops in Israel/Palestine and Lebanon/Syria).

Europe shows the biggest diversity among the regions reviewed. While Russia has seen frequent mine use in Chechnya and a recent spread of mine incidents to the Russian Republic of Dagestan, mine deployment in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) has been related to an intensification of the respective conflicts. While the first two currently employ mainly improvised devices in a largely offensive way (although in the case of the Chechen rebels not exclusively), the latter (and especially Abkhazia) have employed factory-made mines in a predominantly defensive mode. Europe has seen more limited and targeted use during the reporting period (in Turkey and Macedonia).

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136 The frequency of reported incidents of mine use in Africa is relatively low as compared to very frequently reported incidents in Asia, Europe and Latin America. Since African incidents are more sporadic, they are described in more detailed in the respective sections in the “Profiles” part of this report. The frequency of use by NSAs in Middle East and North Africa is more unclear.

137 There were reports that a NSA in Burundi had been using improvised mines, and that NSAs in Somalia had been modifying factory-made mines.

138 For example in the DRC, Uganda and Somalia, see respective profiles.

139 Victim-activated AV mines are already banned by the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

140 See Focus Case on Focus Case on “Stockpiles of Landmines under the Control of NSAs: the Case of Somalia” in the “Profiles” part.

141 Of these cases there have been clear allegations of AP use only for the GSPC in Algeria.
2.6 NSA Mine Use versus State Mine Use

2.6.1 “Poor Man’s Weapon”

Landmines are often considered a poor man’s weapon. Low cost and widespread availability make landmines especially attractive to NSAs with scarce resources. Indeed, the cheapest landmines can be bought for only three dollars and produced for half that price, or even less.\(^\text{142}\) Consequently, landmines – whether victim-activated or command-detonated – have become one of the weapons of choice for NSAs in many conflicts.

As mentioned previously, the number of NSAs using landmines significantly exceeds the number of states using this weapon. One can find several explanations for this. Firstly, states in general have considerably larger military budgets than NSAs and therefore have access to more diverse weaponry, such as tanks and helicopters. Regarding AV mines, as discussed in the section “Anti-Personnel and Anti-Vehicle Mines”, NSAs are more prone to using these than states (in internal conflicts), given that the latter more often possess tanks and other vehicles than NSAs.\(^\text{143}\)

Secondly, states enjoy easier access to the international legal arms markets for weapons acquisition, while NSAs have more limited sources and often turn to self-production. However, in some exceptional cases states have allegedly used improvised mines as well, for example in Nepal and Burundi.\(^\text{144}\)

It has to be underlined, however, that due to states’ larger resources and organizational capabilities, their mine use, when they do use mines, is often on a larger scale, possibly leading to higher costs in human lives. For instance, the consequences of the planting of 10,000 landmines by a state army could be more devastating to a community than the mine-laying of a NSA, even if this is a very frequent user. However, it is also true that states more often map, mark and/or fence their mines than do NSAs, and that their mines are more concentrated on borders and other defensive positions such as military posts. In this sense, some states might use a significant number of mines, but the number of victims might still be low. This was observed in the early 2000s in the Indian-Pakistani conflict, when both parties laid significant numbers of mines, without causing many victims.

One problem connected to mine use by NSAs is that these groups are generally less organized and more disperse than state armies (also due to the conduct of guerrilla war). This can lead to mines being inappropriately laid, without records or maps of their location, which may cause problems for future mine action. For example, in Gedo region in Somalia it was stated that one of the main problems was that “most of the people that had laid the mines were either dead or out of the country”.\(^\text{145}\)

2.6.2 The Relationship between NSA and State Mine Use

Even though the relationship between NSA and state mine use needs to be further explored, it is evident that the greater proportion of NSA mine use occurs in non-signatory countries: 60% of the NSAs operate in states not parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^\text{146}\) Given that 140 of the world’s 200 states have adhered to this international agreement, it appears that non-signatories are more exposed to NSA mine use than signatories. Being a state party to the Mine Ban Treaty does not protect a country from NSA mine use. In fact, two very frequent mine users, the FARC and the ELN, operate in a state party to the treaty, Colombia.

Obviously, not only NSAs, but also states, contribute to the landmine problem. We can find several “pairs” in which both a government and NSA/s are or were (allegedly or confirmedly) deploying mines,\(^\text{147}\) for instance in Burma/Myanmar [government and several NSAs]; Georgia [government and at least two NSAs]; Nepal [government and CPN-M]; and Russia [government and NSAs in Chechnya, Dagestan, and more recently allegedly in

\(^\text{142}\) In Nepal, the price of some handmade mines has been estimated at no more than 50 dollar cents. Interview (1) Nepal, July 2005.

\(^\text{143}\) There are some exceptions to the “rule” that NSAs are poorly equipped in terms of vehicles, for example in cases of “failed” states (Somalia), and non-internationally recognized governments (Western Sahara, Abkhazia).

\(^\text{144}\) It is possible that the use of improvised mines by states is underreported. A military commander of a state reported that “every soldier” knows how to modify factor-made mines and produce a simple IED. Interview (2) Geneva, June 2005 (2005).


\(^\text{146}\) A significant part of these groups were concentrated in two Asian states: Burma/Myanmar and India.

\(^\text{147}\) In instances of so-called “inter-communal violence”, i.e. conflicts between two or more NSAs, they have also used mines against each other, notably in Somalia and the DRC.
In some of these cases NSAs have been known to use the same mines as the state, in addition to their own handmade mines, as has been the case in Chechnya and Burma/Myanmar. The concerned state then serves as a source of mines for NSAs, which both captured mines and reused those that they have demined. Even a state that is no longer using mines but that still keeps stockpiles can serve as a source of mines for NSAs (as discussed in the section “Sources of Mines”).

Recent changes stress that there is a connection between the landmine policy upheld by states and that of the NSAs active on the same territory, as for example in the case of the positive developments registered in South Sudan. The SPLA/M signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001. The Sudanese government followed by ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty in October 2003 (it had signed the it on 4 December 1997) This link – or “tit-for-tat” principle – is emphasized by both states and NSAs, most notably in the Sri Lankan conflict. The Sri Lankan government has stated that it would be willing to sign the Mine Ban Treaty if the LTTE takes on a similar commitment. In fact, many NSAs also underline reciprocity as an important feature in arms regulation negotiations.148 This principle can also have delaying effects on a mine ban, since mine use is not only dependent on the mine use by the opponent, but also “justified” by it. Reciprocity was stressed by several NSA representatives during discussions about obstacles to NSA engagement in the landmine ban.149

Sometimes NSAs have been using mines in states other than the state of their origin, as is the case for example for some Burmese groups operating in Bangladesh, and for some Indian groups operating in Bhutan. In still other cases, such as Colombia, the Philippines,150 and Turkey,151 there have been mutual accusations of mine use.

State and NSA use can also be indirectly linked by the mine use of paramilitary groups or pro-government militias. Paramilitaries are known to have used landmines in past and ongoing conflicts (for example in Colombia and Sudan). This link is particularly clear in situations in which states are reported to have provided paramilitaries with landmines to be used against NSAs. The Burmese government is known to have supplied groups (notably the DKBO/A) with weapons, including mines, to fight other NSAs.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the link was found missing in other cases. States have also been known to deploy landmines against each other, but not against NSAs operating on their territory, as is the case of India and Pakistan.152

### 2.7 Impact of NSA Mine Use

#### 2.7.1 The Civilian Population

The effect of NSA mine use on the population is by definition difficult to measure, given that mine use normally occurs in conflict situations and in areas where little or no mine action is taking place. In this sense, the long-term impact of NSA mine use is more detectable only after the end of the conflict, when large-scale mine action efforts can start taking place. The impact of NSA mine use is therefore difficult to distinguish from the conflict itself until after the conflict has ended, when information becomes available through mine action efforts. While a truly accurate and complete picture of the impact of NSA mine use on the civilian population can only be provided by in-depth case studies, some general observations are still worth highlighting.

In general there are no major differences between how NSA and state mine use affects the population: the negative consequences in terms of casualties, freedom of movement, access to infrastructure, impact on health care, economy, and refugees/IDPs, are all well-known.

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148 An Inclusive Approach to Armed Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian Norms.
149 For example in the Philippines Ka Julian [NPA] stated in 2001 that a mine ban was not possible as long as the U.S. “refuses to stop stockpiling, using and providing their allies and dependents with far more powerful and far more sophisticated anti-personnel mines.” Email from ‘Ka Julian”, NPA, to Fred Lubang, 2001.
150 NSAs operating in these countries have expressed concern that the states – both signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty – would have been using mines. It seems that in both Colombia and the Philippines the accusations referred to the use of Claymore mines.
151 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005 (2005).
152 India has a policy of non-use of mines in internal conflicts, but it does utilize mines to protect its borders.
Instead, control of territory by a certain NSA may be a determining factor. Thus, the mines used by a NSA that controls territory would be more concentrated geographically, while those of a NSA that does not control territory would possibly cover a much larger parameter, following the relocation of camps.

Somalia is an example of the impact that landmines can have on the population. In spite of not being as seriously mine affected as many post-conflict countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique) and with the exact scale of the landmine problem unknown, landmines and UXO have a harmful effect on the population. Missions conducted by Geneva Call have confirmed that the presence of landmines has provoked human and livestock casualties, denial of pastoral and cultivable land as well as blockage of drinking water sources and irrigated cropland. The mine and ERW problem has thus affected people by depriving them of their life, limbs, livestock, and vehicles. Roads remain a main concern. In Bay province alone, at least 12 roads are believed to have been mined and are, therefore, not used. As a result of poor security conditions and the decrepit state of the health system, the majority of survivors are left with no assistance. In the remote areas which are most affected by mines, the situation is even more acute. New mine use in the Bay, Bakool and Gedo makes the situation even more complex. There were also frequent reports of road closures, about which owners of public transport have expressed anxiety. In addition, people are often unable to bring their goods to markets or sometimes even gain access to their farms, due to the widespread presence of mines.153

Landmines also cause a major obstacle to the return of refugees and IDPs. For example in Burma/Myanmar, landmines placed by the state and NSAs, especially inside Karen state, but also elsewhere in the country, are a major hindrance for the return of refugees and IDPs to their homes.154 More than 70,000 Karen refugees have fled to neighboring Thailand155 and many others have sought refuge in other regions of Burma/Myanmar. In Sulu, the Philippines, there has been an example of mine use specifically targeting refugees (February 2005). Mines were placed on the routes to refugee evacuation centers. As a result, relief goods had to be transported through other routes, mainly by sea, thus delaying arrival.156 It is not clear which group was responsible for laying these mines, although they were planted in an area where the ASG operates.

As with AV mines, it is not the actual number or even presence of AP mines that determines the impact they have on the population. The fear created by one incident, or suspicion that a particular area is mined, might cause the population to stop using a particular zone. As observed in Nepal, villagers from the Ramechhap and Dolakha districts are afraid to go to the forest in search of wood, organic fertilizers, etc., due to a persistent fear of mines. This has been the case when victim-activated mines or other explosive devices have been found in the forest, and nobody knows how many more mines there are, if any, and where.157 In Casamance, Senegal, the population has been kept away from fruit and nut trees by the rebels, who have been planting mines in order to deter the population from approaching them. The actual number of mines used is probably very low, however.158

As highlighted in earlier studies (notably by UNMAS in their manual “Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes”), mines and ERW have different consequences on different members of society, notably children and adults,159 but also women and men. Using the Somali example anew, the majority of the survivors visited during Geneva Call missions were male adults, followed by male children aged between 8 and 15 years. Women were the least affected group. Male adults had often been injured during the 1977 war and during inter-clan wars. A considerable number were injured while traveling in vehicles or while processing explosives for economic use. Most of the women adults were injured while traveling. It is important to note that in the cases of female victims, the affected women often did not come out to tell their stories due to religious and cultural considerations. A representative of a women’s group told Geneva Call that women were among the most affected by mines, but usually felt “shy” about showing their injuries as they often appeared on parts of the body considered “private” by their religion.160

157 Interview with a Resident from Ramechhap District, Nepal, July 2005.
159 For example trends indicate that adults are proportionally more often victimized by AP and AV mines, while children are more exposed to UXO and booby-traps.
2.7.2 The NSAs

Similarly to the effect of landmines on civilians, the impact on NSAs is also underreported. In the cases when it is reported that NSAs have been victimized by mines, this is often because some of their members have been killed.

Reports of NSA members that allegedly have been killed while planting mines have come from Chechnya, Nepal, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, the Philippines and Turkey. According to media reports, NSAs are also vulnerable to their own mines. It was reported in May 2004 that ten CPP/NPA/NFDP members were killed and six wounded while trying to plant a landmine. The KNU/KNLA appears to suffer a lot from mines planted by the SPDC, but also from its own mines. CPN-M members have been victimized by government mines as well as by their own mines, while producing, planting, and transporting them. In early July, two Maoists were allegedly killed while planting explosive devices in a road in Pyuthan.

Mine production is an extremely deadly occupation. As estimated by a Burmese NSA member, 60% of mine engineers die, while 20% are maimed. Some NSAs have even taken the decision to put a moratorium on the production and use of improvised mines, due to the dangers caused to group members. The CNF has stated that they took such a decision in 2003. In addition to the numerous accidents involving group members in the production and planting of explosive devices, IEDs pose a danger to other group members when the person who planted the mine has died. Suspension was mainly introduced temporarily “in order to develop better IEDs” – but the group did not succeed and thus has not restarted IED use.

NSA victims normally do not have access to health care or rehabilitation. This could be due to limited health care in the region, but also to fear of being discovered by the government as a member of a rebel organization. Access to health care and rehabilitation for NSA survivors could thus be employed as an incentive in negotiations with NSAs on a mine ban.

“We used landmines more than the GoS [Government of Sudan] and are paying the price for this now. We are victims of our own mines.”

Commander Edward Lino, SPLM/A

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165 Interview with a Resident from Ramechhap District, Nepal, July 2005.
167 This information was provided to Yeshua Moser, as quoted in Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: A Pioneering Conference. Full Conference Proceedings [Geneva: Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines in cooperation with the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Mines Action Canada, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, the UK Working Group on Landmines, and the Zimbabwean Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2000].
2.8 The Flip Side of the Coin: The Role of NSAs in Mine Action

In order to make sure that mine action benefits those in need, it is necessary to involve NSAs in mine action: if they have laid the mines, they are the ones who know where the mines are and hence who would be in a good position to assist in removing them. Involving NSAs in mine action is also a way to find work for demobilized rebel soldiers. International organizations and NGOs are currently cooperating with NSAs (or former NSAs) in many frozen conflict or post-conflict situations (notably in Abkhazia, Iraki Kurdistan, Sri Lanka and South Sudan). However, it should not be forgotten that NSA mine action does not only refer to the participation or facilitation by these actors of different mine action programs: NSAs can and do also conduct spontaneous and sometimes ad-hoc mine action, for example when requested by the local communities.

There is a need to further investigate mine action by NSAs in conflict and post-conflict situations in order to map the benefits and challenges related to involving these actors in humanitarian demining. Further on, by mapping NSA mine action other NSAs that are not currently involved in mine action could discover what others have done in this respect, and thus become aware of the possibilities and opportunities available to them. For these reasons this report will be complemented with a forthcoming mapping of NSA mine action.

170 Reports from Dhading districts in Nepal 2003 indicate that even in the middle of an offensive that involves extensive and indiscriminate mine use NSAs can be convinced to undertake some kind of mine action. Allegedly the CPN-M responded to requests from villagers to remove some mines placed close to the villages. “Dhading Residents Live in Constant Fear of Death.” The ELN in Colombia has also demined some civilian areas including a road in Micohumado.
3 Conclusions

CURRENT SITUATION

- **Widespread use of landmines among NSAs:** NSAs often have more limited resources than the states against which they are fighting and therefore use landmines, "the poor man’s weapon," more frequently. Globally around 60 NSAs in 24 countries have deployed landmines in five geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa. Apart from these NSAs, groups that were difficult to classify or identify also made frequent use of landmines in a few other countries.

- **Regional disparities:** This report confirms earlier findings of a high concentration of mine use by NSAs in Asia, especially of improvised mines. The second region that is most affected by the number of NSAs using mines is Africa.

- **Relationship between NSA and state mine use:** A greater proportion of NSA mine use occurs in non-signatory countries: 60% of the NSAs identified as mine users operate in these countries. Given that 140 of the world’s 200 states have adhered to this international agreement, it appears that non-signatories are more exposed to NSA mine use than signatories. However, being a state party to the Mine Ban Treaty does not protect a country from NSA mine use. In fact, two very frequent mine users, the FARC and the ELN, operate in a state party, Colombia.

- **Difficulties accessing data on NSA mine use:** During the research process it became evident that accessing reliable data on NSA mine use can be very sensitive. International and national staff members of mine action agencies are sometimes afraid of sharing information for fear of jeopardizing their work in areas controlled by the NSA.

- **Over-reporting of offensive use:** Offensive landmine use by NSAs is probably significantly over-reported as compared to defensive use. There are several reasons for this. Offensive use occurs visibly, and often targets soldiers or individuals otherwise tied to the government. In addition, in cases of international military presence, incidents involving foreigners are more widely reported, for example in Afghanistan and Iraq.

- **Command-detonation:** NSAs frequently use landmines offensively, targeting state security forces or other individuals tied to the state. In many cases, NSAs are present at the time and place of the landmine attacks. This suggests that for these NSAs, command-detonated landmines could be an alternative, and hence, a total ban on AP mines is more likely. There is currently a trend in many conflicts toward increased use of command-detonated mines. However, although command-detonation is clearly a less "bad" option to victim and vehicle-activation, this does not constitute a guarantee that civilians and humanitarian actors will not be victimized.

- **Victim-activation:** In spite of the trend regarding the increased use of command-detonation, most NSAs (over 40 groups) still rely on some sort of victim-activation.

- **Widespread production and use of IEDs:** The production and use of IEDs (or improvised mines) as reported in this study indicate that a strategy which solely targets access to factory-made landmines and explosives is not sufficient. Easy access to IED material – UXO, self-manufactured explosives as well as cheap and available industrially produced explosives – as well as knowledge and technology transfers among NSAs, contribute to spreading the landmine problem. Nevertheless, IEDs do not always constitute indiscriminate weapons as this depends on how they are put to use.

- **Sources of factory-made mines:** Factory–made landmines are accessible to NSAs through at least three sources:
  - Landmines can be acquired from minefields or stocks;
  - Certain states have reportedly supplied NSAs in other countries with landmines;
  - NSA-NSA transfer and/or black markets further supply groups with mines.

- **NSAs and ERW:** ERW are often used by NSAs as raw material for making mines. However, NSAs are also themselves victims of ERW contamination and may support clearance. A growing problem is contamination caused by improvised devices other than mines, notably in Colombia and Nepal.
IMPACT

- **Humanitarian impact:** In general, the impact on the population provoked by NSA mine use is by definition difficult to measure, since mine use normally takes place in a conflict situation, in areas where little or no mine action is taking place and where civilians fear reporting mine incidents. The impact of NSA mine use is therefore difficult to distinguish from the conflict itself until after the conflict has ended, when information becomes available through mine action efforts. The impact of former mine use by NSAs (AP and AV) can be seen in Angola, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka.

- **Consequences on the NSAs themselves:** NSAs all over the world are victimized by their own, the government’s, and other NSAs’ mines. This fact could be used in negotiations with NSAs, and so could negotiations on access to victim-assistance for combatants that have suffered mine incidents.

MOVING FORWARD

- **Inclusive approach:** There is a need to discuss the mine issue not only with states, but also with NSAs. Many NSAs lack the long-term perspective of the consequences of mine use. It is therefore crucial for the international community to find channels of communication with NSAs on the AP mine issue.

- **Need for prevention:** Of particular importance is preventive work with groups in areas where mines, explosives, and the knowledge about how to produce and use these devices are easily available, as a way of averting the proliferation of the use of these indiscriminate weapons.

- **Stigmatization of AP mines:** AP mines have been stigmatized through the Ottawa process. Therefore parties to conflict often use accusations of AP use to discredit the other party (both states accusing NSAs and the other way around). NSAs as well as states are reluctant to admit that they are using a victim-activated weapon. This provides a hint that an inclusive approach involving advocacy based on accurate information, which was the main tool for the ICBL network in the struggle for a mine ban with states, could also be the key to success for a mine ban among NSAs.

- **Listen to the NSAs:** When engaging NSAs in the mine ban, it is important to know how NSAs themselves justify their mine use. Not surprisingly, NSAs confirm both defensive and offensive mine use. Landmines are utilized mainly for defensive purposes according to most NSAs.

- **Limit the effects of AV mine use:** As shown in numerous studies, AV mines triggered by vehicles are also indiscriminate weapons. NSAs appear to be more frequent users of AV mines in internal conflicts than states. However, since NSAs in many conflicts largely depend on these weapons, it appears unlikely that many of them would agree to a total ban. A delimitation similar to the CCW process, aiming to diminish the impact on the civilian population, might instead be more acceptable to the groups.

- **Need for prioritization:** Just as frequent users may stop their use permanently or temporarily, sporadic or non-users may become frequent users due to acquisition of know-how and IED materials, new access to factory-made landmines, or simply due to a policy change as a reflection of new political or military situations. Keeping in mind the differences in mine use between NSAs is crucial in the process of choosing the most appropriate engagement strategy. Indeed, priorities must be set as to where to allocate scarce resources: if humanitarian actors target a group that is a frequent user and manage to involve it in the mine ban, the benefits for the population are greater. Yet, a sporadic or non-user may be more open to renouncing the use of mines since mines are not a crucial part of its military strategy. Also, negotiations on humanitarian issues such as landmines may lead to further dialogue on other issues.

- **Strategy:** This report, by explaining specific characteristics of the NSAs and their mine use, intends to provide a background tool for humanitarian actors to strategize as to which NSAs to target and what the appropriate approaches might be. Of the different, often complementary, ways of conducting advocacy, one way is through establishing direct contact with the groups’ leadership. Another way is by disseminating mine ban information within civil society, since many of the groups do not exist in a vacuum, but are dependent, at least to some extent, on popular support. That said, the understanding of why NSAs choose to renounce the use of landmines is still limited and needs to be further explored.
• **Regional strategies:** Understanding regional patterns is essential, since these may have important consequences for the engagement and implementation of strategies for a mine ban. This may be particularly true in cases where regional dynamics appear to fuel the landmine problem or provide possibilities for its solution.

• **Involving NSAs in mine action:** Considering the disastrous effects of landmine use, there is a necessity for national and international agencies to undertake mine action in areas of operation and/or under the control of NSAs. Given the benefits of mine action to populations, it is indispensable for the concerned government to allow such actions.

• **Need to know more:** Lastly, in order to map the benefits and challenges related to the involvement of these actors in humanitarian demining and to encourage other NSAs to ban AP mines and get involved in mine action, there is a need to further investigate current mine action efforts undertaken by NSAs in conflict and post-conflict situations.
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PROFILES
Burundi has been engaged in a civil war between the Tutsi-dominated army and armed Hutu rebel groups since the killing of democratically elected president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993. While minor factions signed a power sharing agreement in 2000, the largest faction of the National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Defense Forces of Democracy (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie — Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD-FDD) joined the transitional government in 2003. However, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-National Liberation Forces (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération, Palipehutu-FNL) of Agathon Rwasa, despite exploratory talks, remained outside the peace process and continued to fight the army. In 2005, the CNDD-FDD won the elections and formed the new government.

**Group Profile**

The Palipehutu-FNL is the longest-established Hutu rebel group. It was formed in 1980 as a political party (Palipehutu) by Rémy Gahutu to fight against Tutsi domination. The armed wing (FNL) took time to mature and remained a minor force until the mid-1990s when the FNL’s contact with the Rwandan army and militias during the 1994 Rwandan genocide seems to have bolstered its military capacity.

The Palipehutu-FNL has suffered many internal divisions since its creation, the last being in 2002 when it split into two factions, one led by Alain Mugabarabona, which subsequently integrated with the government, and one “hardline” faction, led by Agathon Rwasa, which is hostile to participation in the political process. The leadership of Agathon Rwasa, former chief of operations in Bujumbura Rurale, has been described as highly centralized and guided by mysticism. Other key figures are Ibrahim Ntakarutimana, FNL Chief of Staff, and Psteuru Habimana, the spokesperson. Little information is available on the current movement’s organizational structure.

The Palipehutu-FNL does not control territory. It operates mainly in its stronghold of Bujumbura Rurale, but there are indications that it has extended its operations to several other provinces. Estimates of the military strength of the FNL vary. They generally revolve around 3,000 to 5,000 fighters, although there are rumors that the FNL is currently undergoing a period of defections and divisions.

The Palipehutu-FNL is believed to sustain itself through voluntary and forced contributions from civilians, including refugees in Tanzania and the diaspora. It also has links with the Mai Mai groups across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There is no obvious evidence of state support, although the Tanzanian government has been said to support the Palipehutu-FNL. There is also a strong suspicion that millenarian religious movements, as well as some local adventist churches, fund the group.

**Landmine Use Profile**

In meetings with Geneva Call late 2003, the Palipehutu-FNL claimed that it does not use AP mines and indicated an interest in signing the Deed of Commitment. However, a few months later, Geneva Call was informed that the movement’s Congress, held in Tanzania in April 2004, decided not to sign the Deed of Commitment for the time being because ongoing fighting would prohibit independent monitoring in areas of operation of the FNL and would thus expose the FNL to accusations of non-compliance.

During the reporting period, there have been reports suggesting new mine use by the FNL. In March 2003, when it split into two factions, one led by Alain Mugabarabona, which subsequently integrated with the government, and one “hardline” faction, led by Agathon Rwasa, which is hostile to participation in the political process. The leadership of Agathon Rwasa, former chief of operations in Bujumbura Rurale, has been described as highly centralized and guided by mysticism. Other key figures are Ibrahim Ntakarutimana, FNL Chief of Staff, and Psteuru Habimana, the spokesperson. Little information is available on the current movement’s organizational structure.

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the Landmine Monitor referred to an incident in which an AV mine exploded in Mugoboka, Bujumbura Rural without causing injury, which the army had attributed to the FNL. This followed an alleged acknowledgement by undisclosed FNL officials that the group had been using landmines to defend its ammunition depots, training centers and military positions since October 2002. In April 2004, the army again accused the FNL of "using antipersonnel mines more and more," highlighting in particular an incident in Bujumbura Rural where four soldiers were injured and one killed by an AP mine in Muhata commune. That same year, the army spokesperson, Major Adolphe Manirakiza stated that "[s]ince mid-March, about fifteen soldiers have been injured by antipersonnel mines in this commune [Muhata]." The FNL denied the allegations.

The FNL has allegedly made use of IEDs, purportedly set with trip-wires rather than by pressure. There have also been accusations that the FNL uses booby-traps, although it is not clear how these would be set up.

The FNL is believed to use mines both for defensive and offensive purposes. Mines are thus set up in order to stop pursuing government troops and to defend positions and areas of strategic importance, but they are also used for ambushes (with tripwire). The main targets of FNL mine use appear to be government troops on foot. It is unclear if the FNL possesses AV mines; some have denied this possibility, however, the army has accused the FNL of at least one AV incident (see above). The group is also believed to use mines for defensive purposes by protecting temporary camps. Mines are planted overnight and removed when the units leave in the morning. However, if the group has to leave suddenly, for example if the army is approaching, mines planted nocturnally are unlikely to be removed.

 Civilians have also been injured or killed by mines allegedly placed by the FNL. In relation to regions of mine use, the most affected areas are those in which the FNL operates. This is principally Bujumbura Rural, although other regions have also been affected.

As mentioned above, allegations suggest that the FNL is currently using handmade mines and thus has the capacity to produce these devices. The devices used are constructed with mortars, grenades or other UXOs. Such mines would be reinforced with sand, pieces of glass and metal in order to give the device a lethal effect. Some FNL mines are purportedly equipped with anti-handling devices.

It is very difficult to establish the source of the FNL's supply of mines, although multiple sources are possible. The FNL has been known to capture mines from the enemy (i.e. the national army). It is believed that the group recently acquired factory-made mines on the black market. It has also been suggested that the FNL might cooperate and trade with other groups in the Great Lakes region, although this remains unconfirmed.

The group has some small arms caches, but no large quantities of stockpiled weapons. It is a mobile guerrilla group, which has to carry its equipment when it moves on.

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4 Ibid.
7 After the end of the reporting period of this publication, new mine incidents have been attributed to the FNL. Email from Major Adolphe Manirakira, Army Spokesperson, 8 October 2005 (2005). and Radio Publique Africaine, 11 October 2005 (2005).
8 Interview with Colonel Ndikuriyo, Army Chief Engineer, Geneva, June 2005.
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22 Email from Major Adolphe Manirakira, Army Spokesperson, 11 October 2005.
23 Interview with Colonel Ndikuriyo, Army Chief Engineer, Geneva, June 2005.
Since 1998, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been afflicted by a series of civil and international conflicts which have earned it the sobriquet, “Africa’s first world war”. Indeed, several armed groups, often linked to foreign backers, have gained permanent footholds in parts of the country, and continue to operate despite the formal end to the conflict. Most of these groups have become part of the transitional government formed under the Sun City Agreements of April 2003. They include the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (RCD-N) and the Mai Mai militias. Needless to say, the process of transition is fragile. The effort to establish an integrated national army is faltering and various dissident factions and groups have emerged and continue to engage in armed activity.

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There were unconfirmed allegations in early 2003 that the National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) had used landmines. According to the Landmine Monitor, in May 2003 local radios reported two AP mine incidents on the hill of Taba, commune of Rango, in Kayanza province. The mines, which were allegedly laid by CNDD-FDD rebels, killed three people, including a child, and injured three others. The CNDD-FDD denied these allegations.

However, while signing the Deed of Commitment in December 2003, the Secretary General of the CNDD-FDD, Hussein Radjabu, admitted that the group had laid mines in earlier years. It had mined certain areas in the provinces of Makamba, Rutana, Bubanza and Muramvya with both AP and AV mines. AP mines (principally POM-Z) were reportedly often upgraded with additional explosives to increase their impact. The CNDD-FDD used mines for both offensive purposes (ambushes) and defensive purposes (to protect ammunition depots, training grounds and positions, as well as to slow down the enemy’s advance). The CNDD-FDD is not known to have produced mines. In February 2004, it showed to Geneva Call a small stock of AP mines it declared to have cleared or captured from army soldiers.

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**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

**Mine Ban Treaty:** Party

**CCW Amended Protocol II:** Non-signatory

**Conflict Summary**

Since 1998, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been afflicted by a series of civil and international conflicts which have earned it the sobriquet, “Africa’s first world war”. Indeed, several armed groups, often linked to foreign backers, have gained permanent footholds in parts of the country, and continue to operate despite the formal end to the conflict. Most of these groups have become part of the transitional government formed under the Sun City Agreements of April 2003. They include the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National (RCD-N) and the Mai Mai militias. Needless to say, the process of transition is fragile. The effort to establish an integrated national army is faltering and various dissident factions and groups have emerged and continue to engage in armed activity.

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25 Email from CNDD-FDD to Geneva Call, Received 12 October 2005 (2005).
28 Interview with Colonel Ndikuriyo, Army Chief Engineer, June 2005.
32 Ibid.
Fact Box: Unsubstantiated Allegations of Landmine Use by Various NSAs in the DRC

Reliable information on mine-related activities in the DRC is scarce. The country has hosted many alleged mine users: states such as Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe have been accused of employing mines in the conflict, as have NSAs. A few states, notably Rwanda, have also been accused of supplying armed groups with mines. The Landmine Monitor has alleged that numerous rebel groups have employed landmines in the country. Furthermore, foreign groups such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FLDR) are alleged to deploy mines in the country, as have groups such as the Rwandan Interahamwe and Burundian CNDD-FDD in the past.

The Landmine Monitor 2004 has named some of the groups cited in the conflict summary above, as past users of landmines. In many cases, incidents of mine use by these groups may have gone unreported. Allegations of mine use are often made by parties with vested interests and remain largely unconfirmed. Due to the difficulty of verifying whether mine use has actually taken place during the reporting period (2003-2005), this section provides profiles on RCD-GOMA and Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) only; groups against which specific allegations of mine use were available. The following discussion is a brief overview of other alleged mine users.

- **MLC**: The Landmine Monitor 2004 referred to allegations that the MLC was using mines at least until early 2003 in joint operations with the RCD-ML. Other sources also point to mine use by the group in the equatorial region, particularly in gold-rich areas.

- **Mai-Mai**: Geneva Call has received unconfirmed allegations that Mai Mai groups have deployed AP mines in the high plateaus of Uvira as well as in the territory of Walungu. It appears that the purpose of this is the strategic defense of economically important territory (e.g. gold-rich areas).

- **RCD-National**: The RCD-National is a past alleged landmine user. There have been unconfirmed allegations that landmines were used by the RDC-National in cooperation with the Ugandan army around the gold mines of Mugwalu and on the border with North Kivu.

- **RCD-ML**: According to the Landmine Monitor, in January 2003 the UPC accused the RCD-ML of supporting the Lendu militia by deploying AV and AP mines in the city of Bunia, as well as on the road between Bunia and Komanda. It appears that mines were also deployed in the provinces of North Kivu and Maniema.

- **FDLR**: In 2004 there were unconfirmed allegations that this Hutu group had planted mines in the DRC. One observer has claimed that the FDLR used landmines in the Mwenga territory, particularly in order to cover their withdrawals following military defeats. The Landmine Monitor 2004 has reported that newly planted mines were discovered in April 2004 in north Kivu province, near the Rwandan border, where there was fighting between the army and “exiled Rwandan Hutus”. On this occasion, the army alleged that “Hutu rebels” had been planting mines.
Group Profile

The Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais Pour La Démocratie, RCD) was originally a heteroclite coalition of forces in opposition to late President Kabila. In 1999, it split into two factions: RCD-Kisangani (subsequently the RCD-ML), led by the movement’s former president Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, and the mainstream RCD-Goma led by Emile Ilunga.\(^{46}\)

The RCD-Goma is today part of the transitional government. It is led by Azarias Ruberwa, who is also Vice-President of the Republic. The group has remained divided over whether it should remain in the government or advocate autonomy for Kivu, and has retained control over its fighters [estimated at between 20,000 and 40,000]. In 2004, dissidents from the RCD-Goma sparked clashes in the Kivu provinces which were the result of disagreement within the transitional government over power-sharing in the army and the administration.\(^{47}\)

The group continues to control much of the eastern part of Congo (the provinces of Kivu and Kasai, and part of the province of Katanga), particularly the towns and areas of economic importance, such as mine facilities.

The RCD-Goma has allegedly been supported by Rwanda.\(^{48}\) According to the International Crisis Group, the RCD-Goma does not have a broad base of popular support.\(^{49}\)

Landmine Use Profile

In the past, the RCD-Goma has declared possessing and deploying AP mines.\(^{50}\) According to the Landmine Monitor, the RCD-Goma pronounced itself in favor of a mine ban in 2002.\(^{51}\) However, mine use allegations against the group continue.

The RCD-Goma deployed mines at the beginning of this reporting period (i.e. the first half of 2003). The group allegedly planted mines in joint military actions with other actors: the UPC, Hema militias and the Rwandan army (Armée Patriotique Rwandaise).\(^{52}\) Mines may also have been used by dissident factions of the RCD-Goma in the war in Kanyabayonga, although this information has not been fully substantiated.\(^{53}\)

It appears that the group has deployed AP mines, generally of factory-made description.

The RCD-Goma's previous landmine use appears to have served several purposes. Unconfirmed allegations have indicated that the RCD-Goma deployed mines to protect areas rich in mineral resources, with mines allegedly being laid to protect diamond mines in the districts of Sankuru and Kabinda.\(^{54}\) Substantiated allegations by the Landmine Monitor indicate mine use for “nuisance” purposes. For example, the 2003 Landmine Monitor states that the group “systematically mined” the city of Bunia before abandoning it in March of 2003, leading to several civilian casualties.\(^{55}\) In addition, the RCD-Goma/UPC coalition reportedly also used mines in Mando, Mwanga, Mahagi, Ngongo and Tsai.\(^{56}\)

An Amnesty International report identifies transfers of arms and landmines to the RCD-Goma by Rwanda, facilitated by Rwandan military authorities and business leaders.\(^{57}\) The RCD-Goma is alleged to have provided AP mines to UPC forces in return.\(^{58}\)


\(^{47}\) The Congo’s Transition Is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, p. i.


\(^{49}\) The Congo’s Transition Is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, p. 18.

\(^{50}\) Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 196.

\(^{51}\) Ibid. p. 193.

\(^{52}\) Ibid. p. 196.

\(^{53}\) Email from the Congolese NGO Horizón Kiné, Received September 2005. and Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 344.

\(^{54}\) Email from the Congolese NGO Horizón Kiné, Received September 2005.

\(^{55}\) Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 196.

\(^{56}\) Ibid.


\(^{58}\) Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 345.
The levels of stockpiles under the control of the RCD-Goma is unknown, although they were reduced through stockpile destruction by an international NGO (Handicap International Belgium) in 2002.59

Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)

Group Profile60

The Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, UPC) was formed by Thomas Lubanga in 2002 in opposition to the transitional government. It began operating in Bunia, the main town in Ituri, in 2001, but only rose to prominence a year later. Lubanga, a former military commander of the RCD-ML, established the UPC after splitting from the RCD-ML.

The UPC is reported to be backed by politicians and business interests from the Hema ethnic group, one of the two largest ethnic groups in Ituri.

The movement took control of most of Bunia before being forced out of the area by the Ugandan army in March 2003. Tension between the UPC and Uganda, its original supporter, surfaced in late 2002 when the UPC demanded the immediate withdrawal of all remaining Ugandan troops from the DRC. This tension widened into a split in January 2003, when the UPC formed an alliance with the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma. In March 2003, anti-Lubangists in the UPC defected to Uganda, which was already supporting another Hema militia coalition opposed to Lubanga, the Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo.

Thomas Lubanga was arrested in March 2005, following an investigation into the killing of nine UN peacekeepers in Ituri. The UPC’s secretary-general, John Tinanzabo, was also arrested in April 2005, one day after declaring that the group had officially renounced armed struggle.

Landmine Use Profile

To our knowledge, the UPC has not made its mine use policy public, although the group is known to have declared that it possesses mines.61 As mentioned in the RCD-Goma profile, the UPC has been accused of deploying mines in collaboration with the RCD-Goma and other allies in joint military operations. Hence, allegations suggest landmine use in early 2003.62 There have been no substantiated allegations of recent UPC mine use.

Apart from these joint mine-laying operations with the RCD-Goma there were other mine incidents in 2003 that were attributed to the UPC. According to the Landmine Monitor, “after the UPC left Lendu Ngiti between Gety and Bogoro, they are reported to have planted mines along the road.”63 The UPC was also alleged to have planted four mines across an airport road during an attack on the Ugandese army.64

The types of mines employed in these incidents are not known, however, mines which were allegedly captured from the UPC are known to have included factory-made AP and AV mines.65

The UPC deployment of mines has reportedly taken place across the Ituri region,66 with mine use apparently serving offensive and “nuisance” purposes.

It appears that the group obtains its supplies of mines from Rwanda, through the RCD-Goma.67 According to the Landmine Monitor 2004, “[i]n a January 2004 interview, a high-level official of the rebel group UPC claimed that his forces had received antipersonnel mines and other military support from Rwanda.”68

In addition to the UPC’s declaration in 2004 that it possessed landmines, media reports have noted the capture in 2003 of several mines belonging to the UPC. These mines were found in the garden of UPC leader, Thomas Lubanga.69

59 Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 194.
63 Ibid.
64 Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 196.
65 Ibid.
66 Email from the Congolese NGO Horizón Kiné, Received September 2005.
68 Ibid.
Landmine Use by Other Non-State Actors: Individuals, Clans, Criminal Groups, Paramilitaries, Self-Defense Groups and Private Companies

Armed NSAs and states are not the only ones to put civilian lives in danger by using landmines. Globally individuals, clans, criminal groups, paramilitaries, self-defense groups and private enterprises have access to, and do use, AP and AV mines. This section does not purport to provide an overall survey of the problem, but rather pinpoints some examples.

Individuals use mines for non-combat purposes. For example, individuals may use mines in personal feuds (Pakistan), for fishing (Philippines), or to “punish” more successful neighbors (Cambodia). Farmers also use AP mines to protect their land. In Somalia, individuals appear to use landmines primarily for economic gain. For instance, there have been reports from Dolo that the local militia would mine roads and set up toll stations to collect cash from passing vehicles. In a 2005 Geneva Call mission to Somalia, it was found that in the Gedo region, individuals often kept a number of mines (from 15 to 120) in order to sell the explosives. Again in Somalia, there have been cases in which individuals have used landmines to protest against the perceived unfair distribution of jobs and resources. Clans are also known to employ mines. There have been reports from Pakistan that various arms dealers and individuals in the tribal areas have access to both AP and AV mines. Mines would then be planted by rival tribesmen, for example, in the course of a dispute over territory in the mineral-rich mountains.

As to criminal organizations, media reports in Bolivia in 2004 alleged that “small groups of coca farmers have begun taking up arms to protect their plantations in the central Chapare”, in protest against government anti-coca operations. The same media report claimed that “[h]alf a dozen police and soldiers sent to eradicate coca in the region have also died from the explosion of crude land mines in the last 18 months.” Other sources have denied this to be the case. Media reports have also suggested that drug gangs in Rio, Brazil have access to landmines.

Groups that use landmines mainly for defensive purposes include self-defense groups. In the Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) has previously stated that “peasants” would use handmade mines in such a manner. No further information has been found regarding this assertion. In Nepal, besides the landmine use reported by the two main parties to the conflict, there have also been reports of self-defense groups using landmines against the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist. Paramilitaries use landmines defensively, and also offensively. There have been reports that paramilitaries have used mines in Colombia, Georgia, and South Sudan.

In addition, reports have also highlighted the problem of corporate actors. For instance, in 2003, anti-landmine activists accused the multinational petroleum company ChevronTexaco in Angola of making use of old minefields in order to protect its oil fields. In 2002, a NSA active in Cabinda, the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), expressed to Geneva Call its concern over mine use by oil companies in the region.

In conclusion, ready access to landmines may also lead to widespread use among actors other than NSAs and states. One way of combating the abundant supply of landmines would be to destroy stockpiles held by non-state and state actors, as well as to protect available stocks from actors that could make use of them.

72 Ibid.
73 One such incident took place in May 2004 in Dinsor, when some local young men planted an inactivated mine on the side of an airstrip. Email from NGO Staff Member, Received October 2005 [2005].
74 See SNF profile.
75 More specifically in Bajaur, Kurram Agency, Khyber Agency and Dara Adam Khel.
76 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Received September 2004 [2004].
78 Though some observers have questioned if the agenda of the cocaleros is purely economic, see for example Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru, Latin America Report No. 12 (International Crisis Group, 2005).
81 Email from “Ka Julian”, New People’s Army, to Fred Lubang, Landmine Monitor Researcher for the Philippines, Forwarded to Geneva Call 17 May 2001 [2001].
83 As reported by Landmine Monitor 2004, pp. 315, 753 and 1180.
84 The minefields, located at Malongo, Cabinda, were planted by the Angolan military during tensions between South Africa and Angola in the 1980s. “Campaigners against Landmines Have Called for the Removal of a Minefield,” Publico 30 November 2003.
85 Geneva Call Meeting with a Representative of the FLEC, September 2002 [2002].
ERITREA

Mine Ban Treaty: Party
CCW Amended Protocol II: Non-signatory

Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement/Islamic Salvation Movement (EIJM)

Conflict Summary

Having gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has since been governed as a de facto one-party state under the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. However, President Issayas Afwerki’s dominance of the Eritrean government has been contested by several armed opposition groups, including the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM).

Group Profile

The EIJM (also known as Islamic Salvation Movement) was formed in 1988 from the merger of five smaller groups of similar orientation. Since then, and throughout the period of Eritrean independence, it has sought the overthrow of the government and its replacement by an Islamic regime.

The group operates primarily in the Gash Barka province of Eritrea and recruits mainly from the Beni Amer groups on the Sudanese side of the border. It also operates from bases in Sudan, where it allegedly enjoys safe-haven. The group’s leader is believed to be Sheikh Khalil Mohammed Amir but there appears to be no information available about the structure and decision-making process of the organization.

The EIJM does not have significant cadre strength. In 2001 Mondes Rebelles estimated it to have around 300 to 350 combatants and this relatively low number has recently been substantiated by an independent observer. However, the group retains the support of a relatively large number of sympathizers.

Other than its links to Sudan, the EIJM is also alleged to have been associated with Al Qaeda since the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict in 1998. This connection is currently unconfirmed. In addition, the group is part of the Eritrean National Alliance; an organization of groups opposed to the Eritrean government and allegedly supported by the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments.

Landmine Use Profile

The EIJM is a self-declared mine user. In March 2003, the group used the Internet to claim responsibility for a mine blast that killed five Eritrean soldiers. The mine was placed on a road near the town of Om Hajer, within the UN “Temporary Security Zone” (TSZ) separating Eritrea and Ethiopia, which had reportedly been cleared several times of such explosives.

Between January 2004 and April 2005, there were no less than nine incidents caused by newly laid AV mines in the TSZ.

According to the Landmine Monitor, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) reported 15 incidents in total between January and July 2003 that involved mines “randomly scattered” on roads in the TSZ that had previously been cleared. It is unclear who was responsible for these incidents, as the EIJM has claimed responsibility for only one attack. In March 2003, Eritrea publicly accused the government of Ethiopia of laying new AV mines in the TSZ. Of the 50 or so incidents in the past five years, very few appear to have hit military targets.

84 Email from Horn of Africa Expert, Received 17 October 2005.
87 Email from Horn of Africa Expert, Received 17 October 2005.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 This connection is currently unconfirmed. In addition, the group is part of the Eritrean National Alliance; an organization of groups opposed to the Eritrean government and allegedly supported by the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments.
In 2004, the U.S. State Department reported the widespread use of mines by the EIJM, although this remains to be confirmed.\(^9\) As the available information on mine use by the EIJM is scarce, it is difficult to draw any significant conclusions about its nature. However, it is possible to deduce that the EIJM’s mine use is probably restricted to AV mines.

There is no available information on the sources of supply of mines to the EIJM. It is possible that the group might possess mines from previous conflicts (looted from military stores), or taken from existing minefields. Human Rights Watch reported in 1999 that the EIJM had access to landmines that were the same as those provided to Sudanese troops and “Sudan-supported rebels in southern Sudan and Uganda.”\(^9^9\)

**Fact Box: Unconfirmed Allegations against the Oromo Liberation Front, Ethiopia**

There were unconfirmed allegations in 2004 that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) had used landmines. Media reports have alleged that members of the OLF were responsible for planting an AV mine in Moyale, Northern Kenya, in June 2004.\(^1^0^0\) The mine allegedly killed one person and injured nine others when the truck in which they were traveling was blasted by a landmine in Oda locality.\(^1^0^1\) According to another media report, during that same month, the Ethiopian army claimed to have found AV mines and fuses used to detonate mines during a raid against the OLF\(^1^0^2\) in the area of operation of the group.\(^1^0^3\) Another media report has suggested that, during 2004, several Kenyan police officers were killed by landmines which were believed to have been planted by the OLF.\(^1^0^4\)

Nevertheless, other sources have raised doubts about these allegations, suggesting that Ethiopian intelligence could be responsible for planting mines while pursuing the rebels.\(^1^0^5\) Other media organizations have reported that “the OLF as well as sources in Kenya’s military allege that Ethiopian defense force soldiers are planting mines on roads in Kenya.”\(^1^0^6\) In an email to Geneva Call the OLF denied having used landmines during 2003-2005, specifying that: “OLF was not responsible for the said landmine incident in Moyale in June 2004. In fact it is important to note that OLF has not and does not conduct its military engagement in Kenya.” Further on it stated that the mine incident was the result of “the Ethiopian army’s attempt of maligning the OLF name by planting landmines on the Kenyan roads to spoil our relations [with the Kenyan government]”.\(^1^0^7\) According to the OLF, the Ethiopian government has accused the OLF of using landmines on other occasions, such as the “recent intertribal war between the Borana and Gabra tribes of Oromo”.\(^1^0^8\)

In the early 2000s the Landmine Monitor and media reported on the use of AV mines by the OLF.\(^1^0^9\)

However, the OLF has stated that it “repeatedly passed strong anti mine resolutions, the latest being in its 3rd national Congress held in December 2004.” The group also denied mine use in the past claiming that “the OLF [...] has neither strategic nor temporary interest in using anti personnel mines that will harm the unsuspecting innocent civilians.”\(^1^1^0\)

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103 The OLF is reported to operate in north-eastern Kenya, close to the Ethiopian border.

104 Stating that "The attack came barely a week after a landmine suspected to have been planted by members of Ethiopia’s Oromo Liberation Front exploded in Moyale.” Nyaboke and Obare, “Ethiopian Militia Kill Kenyan Officers.”

105 The Standard leave both possibilities open, stating that “Last year, several Kenyan police officers were killed by landmines believed to have been set by Oromo rebels or Ethiopian intelligence pursuing the rebels.” John Kamau, “Ethiopian Rebel Link to Kenyan Killings,” [The Standard 15 July 2005](http://www.standardnews.co.ke/15july2005/articles/article_ThES_20050715_04534_001405_0021.html).


107 Email from the Oromo Liberation Front, Received 14 October 2005 (2005). This was stated already in a 2003 press release by the group. [Oromo Rebels Blame Government of Terrorists’ Acts in Kenya](http://www.oromoliberationfront.org/Terrorist_act%20in%20kenya.htm), Accessed 13 June 2005.

108 Email from the Oromo Liberation Front, Received 14 October 2005.


110 Email from the Oromo Liberation Front, Received 14 October 2005.
**SENEGAL**

Mine Ban Treaty: Party
CCW Amended Protocol II: Party

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**Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC)**

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**Conflict Summary**

The separatist Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance, MFDC) has been struggling with the Senegalese government over the status of the Casamance “enclave” since 1982. The conflict has subsided in recent years, with a series of peace and cease-fire agreements being signed between the government and the MFDC’s political wing; the latest being in December 2004. However, the legacy of earlier conflicts remains in the form of mined territory, especially in the Casamance region. In addition, the combination of the heavy factionalization of the MFDC’s military wing, its dispersal over three countries (Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal), and the fact that the political wing does not represent all factions, makes a final settlement of the conflict a complex issue.

**Group Profile**

Originally formed in 1947 with the objective of expressing regional identity, the MFDC initiated its armed struggle in 1982. The conflict intensified in the early 1990s when the MFDC’s military wing, known as Atika, began to launch attacks against the Senegalese government.

The MFDC has been fighting against what it perceives to be economic and political injustice regarding Casamance and the “domination” of the “north”. Its goal is the creation of a separate Casamance state, or at the very least, increased autonomy for the Casamance enclave and the sharing of wealth. Abbé Augustine Diamacoune is the historical and political leader of the MFDC, but he now appears to be largely disconnected from the military factions.

In 1992, the MFDC’s military wing split into two factions, the Front Nord and the Front Sud, owing to disagreements over a series of cease-fire agreements which had failed to satisfy the more radical elements in the group. The two factions have themselves subsequently split into several smaller factions. The group is particularly active in the Casamance enclave, where the different factions of the MFDC’s military wing control different parts of the territory.

The Front Nord retired from active combat following negotiations with the government in 1992 in return for de facto control of certain territory in Casamance and it has been noted that the Front Nord “maintains de facto control of large areas of Lower Casamance north of the Casamance River”. By contrast, “[t]he Front Sud is the active military force for separatism, its bases situated mainly along both sides of the region’s porous, forested, southern border with Guinea-Bissau.” The Front Sud previously maintained bases on Guinea-Bissau territory, but its ability to operate there was restricted once the Guinea-Bissau’s incoming President, Kumba Yala, aligned himself more closely with the Senegalese government, and took a tougher line against MFDC activities in his country.

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116 Mission D’évaluation [Sénégal], p. 8.

117 It has not completely surrendered its arms, however, and will occasionally still become involved in armed encounters. Evans, “Senegal: Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques De La Casamance,” p. 5.


119 Ibid.

The current military strength of the MFDC is estimated at approximately 2,000 to 4,000 combatants, which appears to be considerably smaller than in the past. Combats are not believed to have difficulty in arming themselves, as most weapons are said to be available on the numerous West African arms markets.

Sources of support for the movement are considered to come from the local population, the Diola diaspora, trade in raw materials (eg. cashews, timber and charcoal), drug production and armed robberies. According to the Small Arms Survey, the government of Guinea-Bissau provided weapons to the MFDC until 1998. According to Jane's Defense, the MFDC received arms from Mauritania in 1990 and another source has stated that it has received weapons via trafficking with insurgents in Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Landmine Use Profile

Following peace talks, the MFDC and the government committed themselves to stop the use of landmines in the Banjul Declaration of December 1999. However, significant use of landmines by the MFDC continued to be reported up to 2001. According to analysts factors such as Guinea-Bissau's ending of its supply of mines to the MFDC following the change of government there appear to have been more effective in reducing the MFDC's mine use than commitments made by the group to stop using mines. MFDC representatives admit to having made limited use of both AP and AV mines. According to observers, the MFDC has been laying mines since 1997, with a peak of reported incidents in 1998 and 1999. The extent to which the Front Sud may currently be using mines is not clear. Although media reports and informed observers have alleged new mine use, others have expressed doubts on this issue.

The MFDC has used both AP and AV mines of the types that are traditionally found in Africa (Belgian PRB M-35 (AP), Spanish Expal C3A and the Russian TM-46 mines (AV)), in addition to other types. According to army estimates, two thirds of the mines used in Senegal are AP mines and one third is AV.

The MFDC has traditionally used landmines in a defensive manner, for the purpose of protecting bases and roads. While the principal target has been the Senegalese army, mines have also been used in conflicts between factions, against cattle thieves and to protect drug production.

Also use for economic gain has been reported. The MFDC has allegedly mined areas where there were cashew nut trees and other fruit trees with a view to preventing villagers from collecting the fruits. In order to keep the population out of the fields the group probably does not need to plant many new mines every year, but only two or three new mines in strategic positions. Although the MFDC members may know where they have laid the mines, they do not keep maps.

According to the Landmine Monitor researcher for Senegal, there have also been new allegations of AV

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122 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
123 Evans, Ni Paix Ni Guerre: The Political Economy of Low-Level Conflict in the Casamance, p. 12.
125 Ibid.; and Richard Reeve, "Senegambia’s Trafficking Hubs."
129 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Other types of AP mines used by the MFDC, activated by pressure, include: Expal, PMN, PRB-ENCRIER, k35 BG, APDV, NR 409. Interview with Boubine Touré, 15 June 2005.
136 Reeve, "Senegambia’s Trafficking Hubs."
138 Interview with Boubine Touré, 15 June 2005.
mine use in Senegal in 2005, although the army denies them.\textsuperscript{140} While AV incidents involving soldiers have been reported,\textsuperscript{141} it is possible that they were caused by old mines. In 2004 there were no AV incidents, but in April 2004 MFDC members attacked soldiers while the latter were demining.\textsuperscript{142}

Some areas of Casamance have been heavily affected by the widespread planting of AP mines by the MFDC, and possibly also by the army. A study conducted by Handicap International in 2002 found that 70\% of the interviewees in Diattacounda district felt that their movement was restricted because of the presence of landmines.\textsuperscript{143} Owing to the high frequency of AV mine incidents, people are afraid of traveling.\textsuperscript{144} Attacks on deminers have rendered demining efforts more difficult.\textsuperscript{145} Moreover, observers have expressed fears that the number of victims will increase now that IDPs have begun to return to the area.\textsuperscript{146}

The fact that mines are cheap\textsuperscript{147} and readily accessible on the West African market has probably contributed to extensive mine use as well as making the production of homemade mines unnecessary. It is therefore unlikely that the MFDC has been producing its own mines. According to the Small Arms Survey, increased difficulty of procuring weapons, including landmines, may mean that they are now traded or confiscated in successful encounters with the military.\textsuperscript{148} It is also possible that mines are acquired from Chad.\textsuperscript{149} There has been no known use of booby-traps or modified mines.

According to the Landmine Monitor researcher for Senegal, the MFDC probably keeps stocks of mines,\textsuperscript{150} although other observers have speculated that the ready availability of mines has probably meant that the MFDC has not needed to maintain stockpiles.\textsuperscript{151}

\textbf{SOMALIA}\textsuperscript{152}

\textbf{Mine Ban Treaty:}  Non-Signatory  \\
\textbf{CCW Amended Protocol II:}  Non-Signatory

\textbf{Conflict Summary}

Somalia has been without an effective central government since the overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991 by opposition movements. Subsequent division and fighting among factions has occurred ever since.

In the northwest, the Somali National Movement declared the independence of the Somaliland Republic. Although not recognized internationally, secessionist Somaliland has achieved some level of stability. In the northeast, the Somali Salvation

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{140} Interview with Boubine Touré, 15 June 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} "Land Mine Kills Soldier in Senegal’s Separatist Province,” AP 14 April 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} ‘‘Three Soldiers Killed by Separatists in Casamance,” IRIN 2 April 2004.
  \item \textsuperscript{143} Evans, “Insecurity or Isolation? Natural Resources and Livelihoods in Lower Casamance,” pp. 10 and 12, and Mission D’évaluation (Sénégal). According to Evans: “the most significant event for the development aid in the Casamance over the course of the conflict was the widespread seeding of landmines by the maquis from 1997. This provoked a precipitous flight of Western donors from the Casamance, most importantly USAID”. Evans, Ni Paix Ni Guerre: The Political Economy of Low-Level Conflict in the Casamance, p. 17.
  \item \textsuperscript{144} Interview (3) Geneva, September 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} Evans, “Senegal: Mouvement Des Forces Démocratiques De La Casamance,” p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{146} Interview (3) Geneva, September 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{147} The price has been estimated at around US$15 per mine (Interview with Boubine Touré, 15 June 2005.) Evans have estimated the relative price at “a rate of three sacks of cashews for a landmine (…)” (Evans, Ni Paix Ni Guerre: The Political Economy of Low-Level Conflict in the Casamance, p. 13.) or 1’500 francs CFA for an AP mine or 2’500 francs CFA for an AV mine. (Evans, Chatham House, p. 8.)
  \item \textsuperscript{148} Florquin and Berman, “Armed and Aimless,” pp. 361-362.
  \item \textsuperscript{149} Interview with Boubine Touré, 15 June 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{151} Interview (3) Geneva, September 2005.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} The Somalia section was largely based on the field research by a Geneva Call consultant, Major (rtld) Mohamed Noor Ali. Also earlier Geneva Call missions constituted a basis for the profiles.
\end{itemize}
Democratic Front established an autonomous regional administration, Puntland, in 1998, while in the south, most of the territory has been divided into fiefdoms ruled by rival factions.

Peace efforts have been numerous since 1991 and culminated last year with the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG, which incorporates most faction leaders and war-lords and relocated to Somalia early in 2005, is divided and not yet functioning.

**Somali National Front (SNF)**

**Group Profile**

The Somali National Front (SNF) was formed in 1991 by loyalists of the then President Siyad Barre with the objective of restoring the former regime. It is predominantly Marehan clan-based, being the clan to which the former President belonged.

The SNF has been in conflict with several other Somali factions from the disintegration of Somalia in the early 1990s until today. It first fought the United Somali Congress (USC) of General Mohammed Farah Aideed in 1994, then the Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA) in 1995, in addition to the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) faction of Colonel Omar Jess and the Islamist group al Ittihad in 1998 and 1999. There have also been internal armed struggles until recently, when the differences were put aside and the internal factions allied against the Kenyan Gare clan for the control of the border town of Elwak. The most recent confrontations took place in July 2005 when the SNF routed out the Gare clan from Elwak. Tensions are still high between the two parties.

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The SNF controls most of Gedo region in south Somalia. The territory is considered to be heavily mined, particularly along the border with Ethiopia.

Its structure is somewhat fragmented. The chairman is Mohamud Sayid Aden, presently also Minister for Government Assets in the TFG. However, since sub-clans are settled in districts, it has district local authority and traditional leaders for decision-making. At the same time, each sub-clan district has its own militia. Each sub-clan is independent in decision-making but when an issue concerning the Marehan clan or a dispute among sub-clans arises, the sub-clan leaders come together for a final decision. The militias operate in the same way; if a common enemy emerges they come together, otherwise each militia operates independently.

The number of armed combatants is estimated to be a couple of thousand but can increase easily with clan solidarity. In principle, every able clan member is a member of the militia and holds his own weapon. Additionally, all the vehicles owned by clan members are taken over by the militia when a conflict arises. Most of the weapons and ammunition are bought from Mogadishu or are seized from stocks of the former Somali army. There were also allegations in 1998 that Ethiopia was supporting the SNF by supplying weapons and ammunition. The SNF’s power base predominantly arises from clan support, the main supporters and founders being the Marehan businessmen, both in Somalia and abroad.

**Landmine Use Profile**

The SNF chairman Mohamud Sayid Aden signed the Deed of Commitment in November 2002.

During the recent clashes between the SNF and the Gare clan, both parties allegedly used AV mines, notably around the town of Elwak. Several incidents were reported. During a mission to Gedo, Geneva Call received information that in early August 2005, a vehicle carrying civilians exploded along the Elwak–Bardere road, killing four people and injuring three children. Also in August, the SNF chairman reported to Geneva Call that “the militia of Gare used anti-tank mines which exploded one of our vehicles, injuring 16 militia of which 5 were seriously injured, and destroyed one car.” The SNF’s Chairman has denied using AV mines but Geneva Call received conflicting testimonies from SNF members. New AV mine incidents took place after the reporting period in Elwak.

The SNF is a sporadic mine user, which appears to employ AV mines when the need arises. The types of mines used are allegedly TMAG and TM 56 AV mines. AV mines are not banned under the Deed of Commitment as long as they are not victim-activated. They were used mainly for defensive purposes. As control of Elwak town changed hands several times, it is believed that both sides mined entry points and the main supply routes. The roads between Elwak and Bardere and from Elwak to Bullahaw are believed to be mined. The impact of mine use has been felt by the militia and civilians alike. In April 2005, the SNF lost one of its commanders. It is not clear if he was killed by an enemy or friendly mine. Moreover,

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153 Email from Mohamud Sayid Aden, SNF Chairman, Received 25 August 2005 (2005).
“some of the roads that connected the town to the rest of the districts in Gedo region were feared to be impassable since it was buried with antitank landmines, which will in future, have possible impact on both human beings and livestock.”

The SNF is not currently producing mines. Most of the mines held by the SNF are stocks inherited from the former regime. Others have been captured from rival factions, particularly Al-Ittihad, or bought from arms markets. Moreover, there are allegations that the Ethiopian army supplied the SNF with mines and other weapons, particularly during the SNF-Al-Ittihad conflict between 1996 and 1998. In 2004, the SNF informed Geneva Call that it held 200 AV mines scattered in different places, ready for destruction.

Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA)

Group Profile

The Rahawein Resistance Army (RRA) was formed in the early 1990s as the armed wing of the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) to resist occupation of the Rahawein-populated Bay and Bakol regions by the late General Aideed’s forces. The RRA has also been in conflict with the SPM faction of Colonel Omar Jess and the SNF. In 2001, the RRA split into factions which started to fight among themselves, a conflict that is still raging.

RRA factions control much of Bay and Bakol regions. To date, forces loyal to Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur ("Shatigudud"), the former founding Chairman of the RRA, and to Sheik Aden Madobe, his former deputy, control most of Bakol, whereas forces loyal to Muhammad Ibrahim Habsade, another former deputy, captured the strategic town of Baidoa and control most of Bay. It should be noted that these regions are considered the “grain basket” of Somalia, so that control of this territory means control of an important income source.

Little information is available on the current operating structure. Before the split, the RRA set up an administration with district and regional levels controlled by an executive committee in Baidoa. Decisions were made by RRA commanders in consultation with local civil authorities, traditional leaders and elders.

In all, the RRA militia numbers around 2,000 to 5,000 troops. Although the RRA as a whole draws its major support from the Rahawain clan, its various factions are supported by different external parties. The Shatigudud/Madobe faction draws its support mainly from the TFG President and the Ethiopian army. “Shatigudud” is currently the Minister of Agriculture and Madobe the Minister of Justice in the TFG. The Habsade faction is politically aligned with the opposition forces based in Mogadishu.

Landmine Use Profile

Both "Shatigudud" and Madobe signed the Deed of Commitment in November 2002. In meetings with Geneva Call in May 2005 in Baidoa, Habsade indicated interest in signing as well.

During the reporting period, there are strong indications that RRA factions used AV mines in the course of their internal conflicts, notably in May 2005 for control over Baidoa. The factions are believed to have mined the Wajid-Baidoa and Tiyeglow-Baidoa roads, as well as the Kulujujarer and Bonkai areas. According to an UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report, "Baidoa has become inaccessible by road after vehicles stopped using the crucial Baidoa-Wajid road for fear of landmines.”

Habsade has admitted AV mine use to Geneva Call.

There were also earlier reports of AV mine use. For example on 2 July 2003, a technical expert from Habsade’s Leysan militia detonated a landmine some 20 kilometers North of Baidoa, killing one person and seriously injuring several others. Many of the victims were expected to die.

Generally speaking, mines seem to have been used for defensive purposes, with each faction seeking to stop the other factions from gaining access routes to its areas of control.

The use of landmines by the RRA has reportedly resulted in several casualties. Key supply roads have also been rendered inaccessible, forcing people to take deviations, making journeys longer and more cumbersome.

There are no reports of mine production or transfer. The RRA factions possess unknown numbers of stockpiles, which they have committed to destroy. Even Habsade, leader of a non-signatory faction, has declared holding stockpiles and stated his willingness to destroy them if assisted.

Somali Patriotic Movement—Faction of General “Morgan” (SPM)

Group Profile

The Somali Patriotic Movement faction of General “Morgan” (SPM) was formed in 1989 by senior military officers of the national army to oppose the Siyad Barre regime. The SPM is predominantly composed of members of the Ogaden clan, and is predominant in Jubba region.

In 1992, the SPM disintegrated into several rival factions, which fought each other, mainly for control of territories and towns such as Kismayo. Main faction leaders were General Adan Abdullahi Nur (“Gabyow”), Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess and General Mohamed Said Hersi (“Morgan”).

In 1993, with alleged support from the Kenyan army, General “Morgan” (who is Barre’s son-in-law and former Minister of Defense), captured Kismayo. He lost the town six years later when the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) forced him out. His forces have tried on several occasions since 1999 to regain Kismayo, but have never succeeded. The most recent attempt occurred in September 2004, when some 1,200 militiamen and vehicles mounted with machineguns attacked the JVA and were defeated. General “Morgan” currently controls no territory.

General “Morgan” is a member of the Majerten clan, the main clan in Puntland. He has been allegedly supported by the Puntland administration and Ethiopia.

Landmine Use Profile

General “Morgan” has not made any commitment to a ban on AP mines. On the contrary, in a meeting with Geneva Call in 2002, he stated that he considered mines a strategic weapon and that he had no intention to renounce their use. He admitted that his forces had used mines in the past and would do so again in the future, should the need arise.161

This is what happened in all probability in September 2004. Several reports suggest that “Morgan’s” forces laid mines in clashes with the JVA in Middle’s Jilib and Buale towns.162 These allegations were also reported to Geneva Call during a mission to the area in July 2005. Mines were allegedly planted for route denial and to protect military positions. Most mines used were factory-made AV mines. According to a media report, “people in the area complain of landmines planted by warring sides, which have injured civilians, animals and damaged vehicles”.163

General “Morgan’s” forces have repeatedly used mines in past conflicts with the JVA. However, no substantiated evidence has been found of landmine use by the JVA during the reporting period, including during the clashes in September 2004.

General “Morgan” is believed to have acquired mines from Ethiopia. No information is available about the actual stocks of mines held by the SPM.

Fact Box: Inaccurate Allegations of Mine Use by Somaliland and Puntland

In early 2004, allegations of mine use were made against Somaliland and Puntland forces. The two groups were alleged to have used AV mines in the disputed region of Sool. Somaliland authorities and Puntland (a signatory to the Deed of Commitment since 2002) both denied the allegations.164

The Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) conducted an investigation which led to the conclusion that the allegations were unfounded. According to the Manager of the PMAC, Suleiman Haji Abdulle, the mine incident took place around Hudun, which was not in the area where the two parties had engaged in conflict. It was concluded that the incident in question had been caused by an old mine that had been planted in the late 1980s during fighting between the forces of former President Siyad Barre and the rebel SNM.165 Subsequent interviews with international mine action operators have confirmed this conclusion.

Somalia has been without an effective central government since the overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. The country has seen continuous fighting between various factions ever since. Although Somalia is not a producer of mines, factions enjoy ready access to both AP and AT mines. All of these factions have stated that they are prepared to destroy these stocks as part of their commitment under the Deed of Commitment. Even Habsade, leader of a non-signatory faction, has indicated a willingness to destroy his stocks if assisted.  

This access to mines has been facilitated by at least three factors:

➢ With the disintegration of the regular army in 1991, large quantities of munitions, including landmines, were either stolen or simply abandoned;
➢ Landmines can be bought openly from arms markets in Mogadishu and other towns;
➢ Several states, particularly Ethiopia, are alleged to supply factions with weapons, including landmines.

Factions that are in possession of stockpiles of mines include, among others:

• USC/SNA: Its Chairman, Eng. Hussein Farah Aideed, has stated that it has over 3,500 landmines.
• The SNF: The SNF has declared to Geneva Call that it possesses 200 AV mines scattered in different caches. A Geneva Call mission to Gedo in April 2005, however, found greater numbers;
• RRA factions: The RRA faction leader, Habsade, has declared an estimated 1,500 mines, both AV and AP;
• Puntland: The PMAC is reported to have approximately 800 AP and AT mines stockpiled in three military camps;
• JVA: The JVA is said to possess several hundred mines.

\[166\] Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia (UN Security Council 2005). See in particular the reports for August 2004 and February 2005. These developments have also been highlighted by the Landmine Monitor 2004. Similar accusations have been made by signatory faction leaders to Geneva Call.


\[169\] It is often difficult to determine the ownership of stocks and the linkages between individuals and groups. The Geneva Call mission to Gedo revealed that an individual closely linked to the SNF has three weapons holes, containing some 2,000 AP and AV mines, under his command. In addition, a militia close to the SNF is reported to possess approximately 100 mines. Geneva Call Mission to Somalia, Gedo and Bay, April-May 2005.


Mine stockpiles in Somalia are often kept in arsenal holes in the ground or in warehouses such as Villa Somalia in Mogadishu. Sometimes ownership of the weapons holes is not totally clear. It appears that in some cases, stocks are held by private individuals, sub-clan leaders, businessman or “freelance” militia, and not solely by faction leaders.

Addressing the problem of stockpiles in Somalia is crucial for several reasons. First, stockpiled mines can be used when the need arises, as occurred in Elwak and Baidoa during the reporting period (see SNF and RRA profiles). Secondly, although there have been no reports of the production of IEDs in Somalia, explosives extracted from AV mines have been reused for various purposes, including stone extraction and digging rainwater catchments. For example, in Gedo region and in Puntland there were reports of individuals extracting explosives from mines in order to sell them. As a kilogram of raw explosives is worth around 100 U.S. dollars, mines and UXO are considered valuable commodities. This has resulted in people being maimed or even killed while trying to extract explosives from bombs, shells and mines. More worrying, however, are unconfirmed reports of such explosives being recycled by Islamist militants.

Fact Box: Sudan, Darfur: Non-Attributed Mine Use

According to a UNDP, UNMAS and the National Mine Action Office report [NMAO], there were four AV mine incidents recorded in Darfur in 2004, caused by what appeared to be newly-laid mines. Two staff members of Save the Children UK were killed and three were injured in two of these incidents, which occurred on 10 February and 10 October, 2004. The incidents took place in Um Barro and North Darfur. The mines were apparently laid on tracks used by the army, suggesting that rebels would have been responsible. According to the same report, army engineers lifted further AV mines. An investigation report by UNMAS analyzing the incident in North Darfur states that “seemingly the mine was recently planted” and that this was done in a professional way.

It is difficult to identify which rebel groups or militias are responsible for the mine incidents. One media report has pointed to the National Movement for Reform and Development. The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) has been also mentioned, not only in relation to mine use but also regarding the acquisition of mines and training in their deployment, leading to fears that this group was engaging in mine warfare. The SLM/A has denied these allegations and invited Geneva Call to conduct a verification mission on the ground. Nevertheless, there is as yet no significant mine threat in Darfur.

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173 In some cases mines are put in plastic bags and then simply dug down. Due to the weather conditions, some of the mines rust. In other cases, the holes are of more complex construction, being cemented inside and weatherproofed.


178 The report specifies: “It is suspected that the mine was laid shortly before the incident by rebels to target Army movement”. Preliminary Report: Mine Action Assessment Missions to the Darfur, 17 September 2004.

179 Abdal Latif Matin, Mine Incident Investigation Report, Musbat to Um Barr, North Darfur, 10 October 2004 (UNMAS, 2004), p. 5.


182 The SLM/A was alleged to have received 40 AV mines. Email Concerning Darfur, Received 10 February 2005.

Fact box: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Sudan

In early 2003, there were unconfirmed allegations made by the Sudanese government that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) had planted new landmines.

In January 2003, the Sudanese army issued a press release stating that the SPLM/A had planted landmines in the road between Rubkona and Leer in the Western Upper Nile, an oil-rich area. In July 2003, the government repeated the accusations to the Landmine Monitor: “All the mines planted around oil fields were planted by rebel factions.” The government contended that, despite signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, this “didn’t stop rebel factions from planting mines in rural areas and along main roads. These mines hurt the shepherds, farmers and impaired humanitarian aid efforts.” However, the accusations were withdrawn in June 2004, when a government representative stated that the SPLM/A had not used mines since signing the Deed of Commitment.

SPLM/A denied the use of mines during the mentioned time. The SPLA/M signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001.

UGANDA

Mine Ban Treaty: Party
CCW Amended Protocol II: Non-Signatory

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)

Group Profile

The LRA emerged in the late 1980s. Led by Joseph Kony, it was inspired by the Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Lakwena, one of Kony’s relatives. The LRA retains a Messianic focus, although one entwined with Acholi tribalism. Its stated aim is to establish a Christian state in Uganda, replacing President Yoweri Museveni’s secular regime with one based on the biblical Ten Commandments. Included within this objective is the demand that wider Acholi grievances are addressed. The LRA consists mostly of Acholi people, a minority ethnic group that lives in northern Uganda and has long felt economically and politically marginalized by the central government. The LRA claims to fight for the rights of the Acholi, but the support it initially enjoyed has eroded in proportion to the violence that it has subsequently inflicted on the Acholi population.

The insurgency had generally been confined to the region of northern Uganda (the Acholi “homeland”). However, since 2002, violence has spread beyond this area to other regions of Uganda. The LRA does not control any specific geographic area, although it has installed temporary settlements in the area of Juba, South Sudan, and undertakes

Conflict Summary

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has been engaged in an armed insurgency against the central government in northern Uganda since 1986. A series of peace initiatives taken over the years have remained unsuccessful: indeed, the conflict intensified in 2002. The Ugandan army has been allowed to pursue LRA into Sudan. The Sudanese government has reduced its support for the LRA and a number of senior rebel commanders have taken advantage of an amnesty, further weakening the LRA’s military capacity. Nevertheless, the LRA has proven capable of continuing its military actions.

185 Ibid.
186 Email from Cdr Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, Executive Director, New Sudan Mine Action Directorate, Received 27 October 2005 (2005).
188 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques p. 1016.
189 Ibid.
191 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques p. 1017.
Landmine Use Profile

There are clear indications that the LRA has been using landmines. According to the Report from the Inter-Agency Mine Action Assessment Mission to Uganda, systemic mine clearance remains difficult in the north due to the sporadic nature of LRA mine usage. According to an NGO, the use of AP and AV mines in northern Uganda has reportedly escalated since 1992, reaching its peak in 1997 and 2002. Nevertheless, to our knowledge the LRA has not confirmed mine use.

AP mines (PMD, Type 69, No. 4, T-79) and AV mines (mostly Type 72 but occasionally TM-66) are favored by the LRA; these are generally pressure-activated.

Some reports of LRA mine use that took place in 2003 indicate an offensive purpose in LRA’s mine use. For instance, the LRA was accused of having planted AP mines in Katakwi, which injured one “Arrow Group boy” (paramilitary). There have also been allegations that the LRA had planted AV mines in 2003. Allegations concerning AV mine use have sometimes been contradictory.

Several past incidents have apparently been designed specifically to target civilians, either to maim and kill, or to “close” certain areas and control the movement of the people therein. Examples of attacks on civilians are numerous, although there are relatively few recent incidents. For example, in Bungatira in July 2002, the LRA used landmines to

193 In late September 2005, there were reports that about 400 LRA fighters (including the Vice-Commander Otti) had crossed the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo: “Disarm LRA Rebels, Museveni Tells Kinshasa and Monuc,” IRIN 30 September 2005. Shortly thereafter, there were reports that the fighters were moving back to southern Sudan.
197 Lucima, Protracted Conflict, Elusive Peace: Initiatives to End the Violence in Northern Uganda, p. 19.
199 The Sudanese government is reported to have provided factory-made landmines and other arms to the LRA. Some sources say that it still provides the group with arms, an allegation which is denied by the Sudanese government. The LRA also obtains weapons from targeted raids on Ugandan military posts and northern Acholi villages.
201 There was one particular case in which sources claimed that the LRA had taken control of a road linking Lira with Soroti and laid AP mines to retain control. (Patrick Eluob Angonu, “Aagm - LRA Rebels Declare Full Scale War on Teso,” The Monitor 12 August 2003.) Elsewhere the army denies mine use by the LRA in the same situation: “They’re not controlling anything,” said Bantariza (army spokesperson). “It was us who closed the road in order to pursue them. There’s no evidence that they have planted land mines anywhere.” LRA Rebels Reportedly Kill 11 in North, The Monitor 12 August 2003.
threaten residents to leave their homes. In addition, there are records of mines being planted near villages, water sources and along paths. Reports have indicated that mines have at times also been laid in order to strike humanitarian workers (mining access roads for example). Other motivations for LRA mine use are said to include the defense of its bases, as well as a deterrent to pursuit by government forces in the event that cadres are forced to flee.

Although there is very little information on total mine-related casualties in Northern Uganda, they are reportedly most likely to be in the hundreds (including victims of old and new mine use and UXO). According to Landmine Monitor 2004, northern Uganda is highly contaminated with AP and AV mines, and UXO. A representative of AVSI has stated that, although the mine situation is grave, the UXO problem is more serious, particularly due to the legacy of battles in the Acholi areas of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, as well as Lango and Teso. Most mine casualties have occurred in these districts also.

There have been unconfirmed accusations (allegedly made by the Minister of State for Northern Uganda Rehabilitation, Grace Akello) that the LRA uses children to plant landmines. One media report has suggested that LRA members are also occasionally injured by mines.

The Landmine Monitor has indicated the presence of relatively large numbers of both AP and AV mines in the total stockpile of the LRA, although there are numerous examples of arms caches containing poorly maintained, old and deteriorating mines. Ugandan army forces continue to recover mines allegedly belonging to the LRA. In 2005 a local newspaper reported that, according to an army mine specialist, since 2001, "the army had recovered 693 landmines during operations against the LRA."

Other reports specify that stockpiles are normally located in remote areas, with the exact location known only by the commander of the group handling the stockpile. If the commander is killed or surrenders, the location of the stockpile may be lost.

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213 Email from Davide Naggi.
215 Email from Davide Naggi.
216 Ibid.
218 According to Arrow Group chief coordinator Musa Eceru: “He said one of the rebels whose legs were blown up by the anti-personnel was admitted to Soroti hospital.” As quoted in Nathan Etengu, “LRA Kill 10 Arrow Boys in Katakwi,” Ibid. 29 September 2003.
222 Email from Davide Naggi.
Sources Africa


Crisis Group, 2005.

Darfur Slides into Anarchy as Militias Bring in Landmines.” The Independent 6 November 2004.


Email from Davide Naggi, Association of Volunteers in International Service (AVSI), Gulu, Received 28 September 2005. 2005.

Email from Horn of Africa Expert, Received 17 October 2005. 2005.

Email from Cdr Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, Executive Director New Sudan Mine Action Directorate, Received 27 October 2005. 2005.


Email from Mohammad Sayid Aden, SNF Chairman, Received 25 August 2005. 2005.

Email from Phil Lewis, Program Manager of the Mine Action Coordination Cell, United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Received 17 October 2005. 2005.


Email from Raza Shah Khan, Received September 2004 2004.

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Email from NGO Staff Member, Received October 2005. 2005.

Email from the Congolese NGO Horizon Kiné, Received September 2005. 2005.

Email from the Oromo Liberation Front, Received 14 October 2005. 2005.


Inter-Agency Monthly Meeting Report, Peace and Human Rights Network, southwest office, Barbera, 2 October 2005


Interview with Colonel Ndkuruyo, Army Chief Engineer, June 2005, 2005.


—. “Senegambia’s Trafficking Hubs ” Jane’s Intelligence Review. 1 March (2004).


“Uganda: Army Accuses 100 LRA Captives as Hostilities Intensify.” IRIN 8 April 2005.

“UN Offices Attacked after Leaders of Congo’s Tribal Militia Detained.” AP 16 September 2003.


Conflict Summary

The origins of the current conflict in Afghanistan can be traced to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which began in late 1979. In response to the invasion a resistance formed. The struggle against the Soviet army continued until its retreat in 1989 and eventually led to the formation of the Taliban movement, which came to power in 1996. After the 9/11 attacks, a U.S.-led coalition attacked Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban regime for granting shelter to the presumed perpetrators of the attacks. By the end of 2001 large-scale fighting had ended, though conflict continued in the form of a guerrilla war, pitting various armed opposition forces (notably the Taliban) against the new coalition-supported authorities (composed mainly of Northern Alliance forces) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Taliban and other anti-government elements currently carry out frequent attacks, although there are also other, less formal, groupings that appear to be contributing to the violence. There are no visible signs of a political dialogue to resolve the conflict.

Group Profile

The Taliban movement emerged as an organized military force in 1994, allegedly with substantial backing from the Pakistani Interior Ministry. After seizing Kabul in 1996, the Taliban set up a government, which was never internationally recognized. This government remained in place until 2001. The current armed Taliban insurgents represent elements of the former regime.

The aim of the Taliban is to “liberate” Afghanistan from foreign troops and to reinstall a Sharia-governed state (based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law). Taliban leaders preach a radical form of Islam derived from the Deobandi tradition. It has been suggested that the group resembles more of a coalition of allies against common enemies than a single entity with common objectives.

Before its defeat, the Taliban controlled over 95 percent of Afghanistan. It currently operates in the southeastern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, along the Afghan-Pakistani border, where the control of the new government is weak. Nevertheless, the group has proven capable of launching attacks throughout the country.

The group is led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, called Amir al-Momineen (“commander of the faithful”). There is presently little information available on the decision-making process of the group or its command structure, although in 2003 it was suggested that Mullah Omar directed operations through a ten-man “leadership council.”

References:
3. They already existed but not as a military organization.
5. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates and Pakistan.
6. Which originated at the famous Dar ul-Ulum Deoband in British India.
8. Ibid.
Observers note that the group has never been very homogeneous, and after the military defeat by the coalition forces, this characteristic appears to have been reinforced. Jane’s Intelligence Review has argued that the Taliban should no longer be considered a single unified group, due to the creation of numerous factions and a divide between more moderate elements that wish to engage in the political process and more radical elements that wish to continue the armed struggle. Nevertheless, it is now believed that the Taliban has achieved a greater degree of organizational structure than it had in 2002.

Due to the fragmentation of its forces, it is difficult to estimate the number of active Taliban fighters, but in 2003 “the opposition forces” were estimated to number up to 2,000 fighters on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border.

There have been numerous reports indicating active arms transfers across the Afghan-Pakistani border, in both directions. According to Mondes Rebelles, the government of Saudi Arabia was an important financial and logistical sponsor of the group in the late 1990s. The Pakistani government has also been accused of supporting the group, although these accusations have been denied by Pakistan. During its period of formation in the early 1990s, the Taliban allegedly received support from large oil companies (Bridas, Unocal, Delta Oil).

According to some sources, the Taliban also is collaborating and coordinating its attacks with al-Qaeda and the Hezb-i-Islami.

Landmine Use Profile

In 1998 the Taliban publicly stated that AP mines are contrary to Islam and that it adhered to a total ban on the production, trade, stockpiling and use of landmines in Afghanistan. In recent years, the Taliban has planted considerable amounts of remotely-detoned mines, and claimed responsibility for the related mine incidents.

The mines employed are both handmade and factory-made and vary widely in size and strength. Some factory-made mines have also been modified, for instance, to increase the effect of the explosion. In addition, Human Rights Watch reported in 2003 that the Taliban were among those actors planting booby-traps; however, no examples of this were found.

Remote-controlled devices are planted in roads or along the roadside, mainly with the aim of targeting government vehicles or coalition forces. There are numerous examples of landmine incidents either claimed by the Taliban or attributed to the group by other actors [mainly the new government] during 2003, 2004 and 2005. Such incidents have involved the targeting of police officers, coalition soldiers, Afghan government officials, and national and international aid workers, including mine action personnel. Landmines have also been frequently used in order to cause disturbances, such as during the 2004 elections.

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14 Davis, “Afghan Security Deteriorates as Talib Regroup.”
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 331.
21 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 332.
22 Davis, “Afghan Security Deteriorates as Talib Regroup.” Opinions differ as to whether or not the Hezb-i-Islami should be considered a group separate from the Taliban.
25 However, according to ISAF, in 2004 there had been no significant use of factory-made landmines. Email from Captain Pete Gray, ISAF Headquarters Press Information Centre, Received October 2004 [2004].
31 Telephone Interview with Staff Member of International NGO based in Afghanistan, September 2005 [Kabul: 2005].
Most new mine use takes place in the south, where the Taliban operates. According to a representative of the Afghan government, targets are mainly military, but sometimes civilians are victimized.²³ During the period of the 2004 election, for instance, civilians close to the government, notably female election workers, were also directly targeted by landmine attacks. The Taliban has claimed responsibility for some attacks against civilians.²⁴ Nevertheless, humanitarian workers in Afghanistan have underlined that the Taliban’s mines overwhelmingly victimize soldiers.²⁵ Given that there are over 800 million square meters of old minefields in Afghanistan,²⁶ it is difficult to determine what impact the ongoing use of mines might have on the population.

It is most likely that the mines used by the Taliban primarily come from stocks from earlier conflicts.²⁷ Others have suggested that factory-made mines might be acquired from abroad, possibly via Pakistan.²⁸ As has been stated by ISAF, armed groups in Afghanistan have been inventive in the manufacture of improvised devices, which often are produced using explosives, UXOs and ammunition, all of which have been looted from different storage facilities.²⁹ The new Afghan authorities have suggested that the use of factory-made landmines as the basis for IEDs emerged in 2003.³⁰

The Afghan National Army and the coalition forces have frequently found arms caches containing landmines,³¹ sometimes allegedly belonging to the Taliban. Most recently, in June 2005, the Afghan authorities discovered 400 kilograms of explosives, rockets and remote control devices in what they described as a secret bomb factory in Khost province, in the Taliban area of operations in southeastern Afghanistan.³²

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Fact Box: Mine Use by Other Actors in Afghanistan

Media reports and other sources have frequently accused other actors, such as Northern Alliance warlords, al-Qaeda fighters and the Hezb-i-Islami, of planting new mines.³³ It has also been argued that many armed groups which used mines during the Soviet invasion still possess stockpiles.³⁴ Concerns have also been expressed over the considerable quantity of landmines remaining in the hands of private militias and warlords. Present day mine use occurs as a result of both military operations against the American-led coalition forces and ongoing factional inferfiting, where mines are used as a means of personal protection.³⁵ As Afghanistan is already heavily contaminated by mines (due to successive fighting since the 1970s), it is difficult to determine which mines have been recently planted and the overall impact of new mine use.³⁶

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²⁵ Telephone Interview with Staff Member of International NGO based in Afghanistan, September 2005
²⁷ Interview with Representatives of the Afghan Government, Geneva, June 2005, and Telephone Interview with Staff Member of International NGO based in Afghanistan, September 2005.
²⁸ Interview with Shohab Hakimi, Director Mine Detection and Dog Centre Afghanistan, June 2005.
²⁹ Email from Captain Pete Gray, ISAF Headquarters Press Information Centre, Received October 2004.
³⁰ Letter from Dr. Haider Reza, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan, Dated 1 November.
³¹ As reported for example in the Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 71.
³⁶ An example the difficulty in determining whether a mine has been newly planted to target troops is an incident which killed four American soldiers in April 2005. The investigation found that the explosion had been "caused by an anti-tank mine that had been left over from previous conflicts and most likely shifted during the recent heavy spring rains." Captain Mark Gough, “Canadians Assist Investigation into U.S. Mine Strike Incident,” Department of Defence Canada 25 April 2005.
**BURMA/MYANMAR**

Mine Ban Treaty: Non-signatory  
CCW Amended Protocol II: Non-Signatory

**Conflict Summary**

Burma/Myanmar became an independent state in 1948; however, the status of ethnic minorities in the country has never been resolved. As a result, the country has been plagued by civil war between the Burmese majority, represented since 1962 by a military junta (known today as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)), and the many ethnic minorities. In 2001, there were 31 armed Burmese NSAs in existence, 15 of which are either confirmed or alleged mine users. The groups identified as landmine users by the most recent Landmine Monitor are the following: Shan State Army; Karenni Army; Karen National Liberation Army; All Burma Students Democratic Front; People’s Defense Forces; Myiek-Dawei United Front; Wa National Army; Pao People’s Liberation Front; Chin National Army; All Burma Muslim Union; United Wa State Army; Democratic Karen Buddhist Army; New Mon State Party; the Hongsaawatoi Restoration Party; and “a cluster of smaller organizations in southern Karen State who field a few combatants under the banner of the DAB [Democratic Alliance of Burma] Column”. In this report, profiles are provided for those groups for which there were recent allegations and/or substantiated reports of mine use.

Since the 1990s, the SPDC has managed to procure cease-fire agreements with 10 armed opposition groups, and at least 19 still engage in armed conflict with the government. The four major armed opposition forces today are the Shan State Army South (SSA-S), the Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Chin National Front (CNF). The three largest groups currently operating under cease-fire arrangements with the SPDC are the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP).

**All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF)**

**Group Profile**

The All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) was formed in 1988 by representatives from some 18 different Burmese student movements. The student movement was born out of the pro-democracy uprising of 1988 against the military dictatorship. However, it has its roots in student movements involved in the struggle for the independence of Burma/Myanmar from colonial powers.

The ABSDF’s aims are the establishment of democracy, the observance of human rights, the restoration of peace and the transformation of Burma/Myanmar into a federal union.

During the 1990’s, the ABSDF fought alongside several ethnic armies including the KNU and the KNPP and claimed to have as many as 5,000 guerilla fighters throughout the country. The fall of Manerplaw (the KNU’s stronghold inside Karen State), weakened the ABSDF. As a consequence, it shifted its focus from armed opposition to passive resistance and political activism.

Today, some members of the ABSDF are still militarily active; mainly operating within other groups’ armies, but their number is largely unknown. The group’s current leader is Ko Than Khe who holds the position of Chairperson of the group’s Central Executive Committee.

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47 ASEAN and the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Appendix iii: Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia: Landmines and Peace Treaties (ASEAN, 2001).
49 Ibid.
50 ASEAN and the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Appendix iii: Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia: Landmines and Peace Treaties.
**Landmine Use Profile**

The ABSDF has been identified as a mine user by Landmine Monitor, but there is no specific recent information about AP mine use by the group. However, as the ABSDF is still active within groups such as the KNU, it is believed that it also participates in the mine laying activities of the latter. In 2002, a senior leader of the ABSDF fighting alongside the KNU stated that “land mines are the most important defensive weapons now because the KNU has less and less firing power”. In spring 2005, the government accused the ABSDF along with a number of other armed opposition groups of “exploding command-detonated mines at three places in Yangon [Rangoon] on 7 May 2005.” Other sources refer to the explosions as caused by bombs rather than mines.

The CNF's main aims are democracy, self-determination and the promotion of the interests of the people of "Chinland".

In 1994, the CNF declined an offer by the government to "exchange arms for peace", on the grounds that the regime had refused to include political issues in the talks. The government approached the Chin four times between 1994 and 2001. Following new efforts by the government to reach a cease-fire agreement in 2004, the process is now in a deadlock.

The fighting in Chin State is limited compared with fighting in many other parts of Burma/Myanmar. However, the government continues to launch military offensives against the CNF, which leads to sporadic clashes. Indian armed forces have attacked CNF camps located in India’s Mizoram State as part of an agreement between Burma/Myanmar and India.

Since 1997, the CNF has been led by President Colonel Thomas Thangno. The Chief of Staff of the CNA is Ral Hnin. Today there are approximately 500 combatants in the CNA; an increase from the estimated 200 at its launch in 1988. Little information is available on the decision making process of the group. What is known, is that important policy decisions are made by the Central Committee.

Many Chin soldiers received training from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Some sources also allege that they received support from the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), India’s external intelligence service.

The CNF has a significant support base among the Chin people. According to Global Security, the CNF’s

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**Chin National Front / Chin National Army (CNF/CNA)**

**Group Profile**

The Chin ethnic group (estimated at 1.5 million) is concentrated in the Arakan mountain range and the Chin Hills of Chin State. Ethnic Chins also reside in neighboring India and Bangladesh. The Chin National Front (CNF) was formed in March 1988 to fight for the political rights of the Chin ethnic group. The Chin National Army (CNA), the group’s armed wing, was founded the same year. Like many armed opposition groups in Burma/Myanmar today, the CNF’s military activities have become overshadowed by political activities.

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57 See Karen National Union / Karen National Liberation Army profile.
58 Aung Zaw, "The KNU: To Cease Fire, or Not to Cease Fire?", The Irrawaddy, 1 March 2002.
62 The CNF is part of the National Democratic Front (NDF), the Democratic Alliance of Burma, the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) and of the Un-represented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), while the CNA’s “exists solely for defensive purpose”, according to the groups homepage, The Chin National Front, 2005, The Chin National Front, Available: http://www.chinland.org/, 5 September 2005.
63 Ibid.
64 Chin National Front / Chin National Army.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
70 Balenci and Grange, Mondes Rebéles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques, p. 471.
support is primarily among “young educated Chins, who often furnish non-military support and information to the CNF/CNA”. Furthermore, the Chin diaspora is well organized and the CNF receives various kinds of support from Chins living abroad.

From 1988 to 1992, India appeared to have provided the CNF with indirect support. The policy changed in 1993, however, when the Indian government began collaborating with the Burmese army in its fight against the CNF. Although the situation changed again in 1997, there are still reports of ongoing harassment by Indian troops.

The CNF is actively encouraging tripartite dialogue, international cooperation and democratic transition. It is a member of the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC). The ENSCC is a working committee established by ethnic group leaders from Burma/Myanmar’s major NSAs in 2001 to rebuild relations between cease-fire groups through a “Tripartite Dialogue”.

Some sources suggest that the CNF/CNA may be involved in drugs and arms trafficking, but the origin of the group’s weapons and its potential “trade partners” is largely unknown.

Landmine Use Profile

The CNF has admitted to the use of mines and is counted among Burma’s NSA mine-users in the most recent Landmine Monitor report. The group decided temporarily to cease using mines in 2003, after concluding that its use of improvised mines also posed a danger to its own members, and is currently exploring the possibility of a total ban.

The group now uses far fewer IEDs than in the past, principally because their production is considered costly, but also because they do not particularly affect the group’s security. In terms of policy, the CNF claims to strictly follow the Geneva Conventions by seeking to minimize the indiscriminate effects of landmines, keeping records of their placement and removing the devices immediately at the end of the war.

The CNF decided to stop using mines in 2003, due to the dangers they posed to their members. Many accidents occurred when planting mines, and when those who laid the mines died it became dangerous for others to dispose of the devices.

The CNF claims to use only improvised mines, which are constructed from iron pipes filled with gelatin and metal fragments. It uses two different types of mines: electronic command-detonated mines and pressure mines activated with traditional batteries and with a lifespan of about six months. The origin of the materials used by the CNF for production of its IEDs is unknown. The group has denied using factory-made mines.

According to the CNF, the group uses mines primarily around its camps for defensive purposes and in ambushes when it receives information about the approach of enemy troops.

The CNF claims to have no stockpiles of mines, and it strictly forbids transfer of IEDs and the technology for producing them.

Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization/Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBO/DKBA)

The Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization/Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBO/DKBA) is a Buddhist-oriented group, which seceded from the KNU in December 1994. The group was formed by U Thazana, a Buddhist monk who acts as the spiritual leader of the group’s political wing, the DKBO. The group’s military wing, the DKBA, comprises Buddhist fighters unwilling to serve under the predominantly Christian KNU leadership. The DKBA was esti-
Landmine Use Profile

The DKBA is one of the 15 armed opposition groups using AP mines in Burma/Myanmar as identified by Landmine Monitor. According to former Landmine Monitor reports, DKBA members have admitted to landmine use. However, no official statements have been made regarding its landmine policy.

The DKBA uses IEDs and some factory-made mines provided by the Burmese Army. According to the Landmine Monitor report 2002, a former second commander of a DKBA battalion estimated that his soldiers had deployed 1,000 mines during the previous six years. The same source said that in 2002 the DKBA also controlled a timber concession area through the use of AP mines. Thai businessmen would obtain permission to log an area of forest from the DKBA and the DKBA would surround the concession area with mines, both in order to deter attacks upon its revenue base by the rival KNU, and to prevent the concessionaires from unilaterally enlarging the concession area.

More recent reports from the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) indicate that it is unclear whether the DKBA is still supplied with mines by the government. They also state that the DKBA “appears to have developed the capability to manufacture its own Claymore mines.” The improvised mines used by the DKBA are victim-activated, while the Claymore mines are “normally detonated electrically using a hand dynamo in order to spring an ambush, but may also be rigged to detonate with a tripwire.”

According to the KHRG, “the DKBA produces landmines similar to the ones used by the [Karen National Liberation Army] KNLA”, that is, consisting of “a length of piping stuffed with gunpowder or explosives and scrap metal or shotgun pellets and attached to a small detonator powered by a cheap battery”. Many of the mines are placed defensively

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around DKBA camps. However, there have also been reports that the DKBA has planted mines around villages, particularly in Pa’an District, in an attempt to restrict the movement of villagers. As explained by the KHRG: “The villagers are not told where the mines are, only that they have been placed ‘around’ the village, and many villagers have been killed or maimed by DKBA mines while going to their fields or watching over their cattle”.93 In a report published in May 2005, the KHRG also accused the DKBA, along with the government, of deploying landmines specifically targeting internally displaced persons.94

From the foregoing examples, it appears that the DKBA primarily uses mines for the following purposes: economic gain (e.g. timber concession areas); defense (e.g. around camps); and restriction of population movement (e.g. around villages). These conclusions are, however, based on reports from 2002 and earlier.

Karen State is heavily mined as a result of the widespread mine use by the government, KNU and DKBA forces.

It is unclear whether the DKBA has stockpiles of factory-made or improvised mines and whether they produce or obtain them on an ad hoc basis.

Karen State is heavily mined as a result of the widespread mine use by the government, KNU and DKBA forces.

The group operates in the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border area of Mon State and is still engaged in occasional fighting against both the government and against the MNLA. Recently, HRP members also suffered an attack on their headquarters from a joint KNLA-All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU) unit, “reportedly because the HRP had been collecting tax in Karen-controlled territory”.98 In late 2004, the group was approached by the government several times with the aim of signing a ceasefire agreement. These efforts were supported by the Thai government. However, until now, the group has not manifested an interest in such an agreement.99

The group's military and political leader is still the founder Colonel Pan Nyunt, but there is no information available about its operating structure. The MRA is believed to consist of about 100 armed fighters.100 In late 2002, a sizeable number of HRP members returned to the MNLA after the government intensified its attacks against the group and the Thai authorities closed an HRP office in Thailand101.

The group allegedly supports itself financially by levying taxes from villagers in Mon State,102 which

94 “Landmines” [Photo Set 2005-a- Section 11]
95 Sometimes the HRP is also referred to as “Hanthawaddy Restoration Party”
96 The NMSP/MNLA has signed a ceasefire agreement in June 1995. See also “New Mon State Party (NMSP) / Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA)” profile.
100 Chann, “Mon Splinter Group under Pressure.”

Burmese MM1 and MM2 mines lifted from a minefield by an NSA.
has led to various conflicts with other groups also operating in the area (see above). The HRP enjoys moderate support from Mon villagers in their operating areas, but this support seems to have decreased both because the MRA is sometimes perceived as just an additional group collecting taxes and because of government reprisal actions against villagers. Another reason for this evolution is that MRA factions have recently been accused of killing unarmed villagers, such as in April 2005, when eleven villagers were killed. The group’s Chairman, Nai Pan Nyunt, however, has countered this accusation by laying the blame on a faction of the HRP led by Captain Chan Dane.106

**Landmine Use Profile**

The Landmine Monitor identified the MRA as a mine user in 2002, in the context of the group’s fighting against the rivaling MNLA.105 Nevertheless, the group has not formulated any official statement confirming or denying its mine use.

According to a local source, the mine use was of a defensive nature, in order “to protect each of the groups’ [MRA and MNLA] positions”.106 However, the landmines were laid in populated areas, which made “arming and foraging exceedingly dangerous” and caused about 2,000 villagers to leave the region where the fighting was most intense and resettle in other districts of Mon State.107 Some villagers also tried to flee to neighboring Thailand, but were detained at the border by the Thai authorities and sent back as soon as the situation had improved slightly.108

The latest reported mine incident within the MRA’s operating area occurred in February 2004 and involved three porters and two soldiers of the Burmese army.109 It is not known whether the mines had been laid by government troops, by the MRA or by the MNLA.

Neither is it known whether the MRA produces its own mines or purchases them from other groups, yet the group is suspected of maintaining stockpiles of improvised mines.110

Karen National Union / Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA)

**Group Profile**

The Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA) was formed in February 1947 as a fusion of different political and cultural organizations representing the Karen ethnic minority. Its armed wing, the KNLA, was formed in April 1947. It reached the peak of its power in early 1949, when it controlled a vast area extending almost to Rangoon.111 In early 2004, the KNU concluded an informal ceasefire arrangement (known also as a “gentlemen’s agreement”) with the government. Even though ceasefire talks continued in 2005,112 the KNU leadership has stated that it considers that the 2004 agreement has been broken by government troops in different areas of Karen State.113

The principal aim traditionally pursued by the KNU was to implement the right of independence for the Karen people of Karen State, as recognized in the 1947 Constitution. However, when the KNU became a member of the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee (ENSCC) in 2001, it agreed to the concept of a federal Union of Burma.114

The group is considered by many as a Christian movement, but this description is only partly accurate: whilst 90 percent of the group’s elites are allegedly of the Christian faith, more than 70 percent of the its fighters are Buddhist.115 This asymmetry

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103 The villagers are sometimes made to pay taxes to as many as four different groups active in the region. (“the SPDC, MNLA, MRA and another splinter group led by Nai Hlein”) A seven-year-old ceasefire in Mon State is still holding, but just barely.) Tony Broadmoor, “Precarious Peace in Monland,” Ibid. February-March (2002).
108 Ibid.
111 Balenci and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques. p. 455.
112 “Rangoon to Talk with KNU,” The Irrawaddy March 2005. This was confirmed in an email from the KNU to Geneva Call in October 2005. In fact, different meetings between representatives of the government and the KNU took place between March and May 2005, but they were not conclusive, since no arrangement could be agreed upon. Email from the KNU, Received October 2005 (2005).
113 Tony Cheng, “No Happy Returns for Suu Kyi,” BBC News, 22 August 2005., also Email from the KNU, Received October 2005.
was the main factor behind the secession of the DKBO/DKBA from the KNU in 1994.

The KNU controlled large parts of Karen State around the capital of Manerplaw until 1995, and maintained district administrative structures until 1996. Between 1996 and 1997, the KNU abandoned the policy of controlling territory and maintaining administrative structures in favor of a strategy of guerrilla-style warfare. Today, the KNU operates predominantly from areas close to the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border, from which it leads attacks against the government and the DKBA.

Between 1975 and 2000, all KNLA soldiers were under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief Bo Mya, who was subsequently appointed as Defense Minister and, since 2000, Vice-President. In January 2000, Bo Mya was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by Saw Ba Thin Sein. Saw Ba Thin Sein was previously responsible for the group’s “diplomatic” activities and is regarded as more inclined to pursue peaceful negotiations. According to a KNU representative, “[T]he KNU’s decision-making structure is that of a one-party state, topped by a periodic party congress. Between congresses the party is led by a Central Committee and an Executive Committee.”

Following the loss of Manerplaw and Kawmoorah and successive attacks by the government and the DKBA, KNLA forces declined in number from an estimated 5,000 fighters in early 1995 (prior to the fall of Manerplaw) to about 3,000 in 2003.

Some observers have hinted that, due to a decline in popular support for the KNU owing to the war-weariness of the Karen people, the KNU would also be experiencing financial difficulties. As the KNU has refused to involve itself in drug trafficking, it allegedly seeks to earn revenue by taxing illegal wood exports on the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border.

According to the Landmine Monitor in 2003, “the most widespread use of mines by armed opposition groups [in Burma/Myanmar] was likely by the Karen National Liberation Army.” The KNLA’s mine use has been confirmed by the group itself on various occasions. However, in a recent communication to Geneva Call, a KNU representative stated that the KNU/KNLA would be willing and able to halt mine use and to remove all landmines planted by them within six months “when the SPDC military operations and offensive in Karen regions cease.”

Since the KNLA adopted guerrilla-style warfare in 1996-97, it has increased its use of landmines for both offensive and defensive purposes: “to protect base areas and supply lines, and to harass SPDC troops and restrict their movements and supplies by mining pathways and roads.” To that end, the KNLA lays mines in the jungle and along pathways to prevent ambushes from government and DKBA troops.

Most of the KNLA’s landmines are improvised, “typically consisting of a length of plastic piping stuffed with gunpowder or explosives and scrap metal or shotgun pellets, attached to a small detonator powered by a cheap dry cell alkaline battery.” It also possesses “American-made landmines and claymores bought on the Thai black market”, as well as other manufactured mines lifted from SPDC-minefields. The KNLA appears to possess large stockpiles of victim-activated IEDs as well as some manufactured AP and AV mines.

According to some sources, neither the KNLA, nor the other armed forces fighting in Karen state (i.e. the government and the DKBA) mark mined territory, nor do they remove their mines. This information was denied by KNU representatives in a

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117 Email from the KNU, Received October 2005.
118 Balencia and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, p. 458.
120 Balencia and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, p. 458.
121 Blaivoet, Dico Rebelles 2004 - Acteurs, Lieux, Mouvements, p. 446.
122 Balencia and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, p. 458.
124 For example: “Determined Resistance- an Interview with Saw Bo Mya, Gen,” The Irrawaddy 1 October 2003.
125 Email from the KNU, Received October 2005.
126 “Landmines” [Photo Set 2005-a- Section VI].
127 “Landmines” [Photo Set 2005-a- Section 11].
128 Email from the KNU, Received October 2005.
129 Balencia and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, p. 458.
130 Burma/Myanmar Report 2004- Special 5 Year Review.
131 “Landmines” [Photo Set 2005-a- Section 11].
recent email to Geneva Call. It states that “the KNU/KNLA lays landmines primarily around enemy camps and on paths and trails used by SPDC troops. They are removed when the enemy troops withdraw from the locality”. Even though KNLA troops claim to inform villagers about the location of their mines, it appears that this information is often either insufficient or not provided.

The presence of landmines, especially inside Karen State, but also elsewhere in Burma/Myanmar, is a major impediment to the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) to their homes. During the successive battles between the KNLA and the government and DKBA, more than 70’000 Karen refugees fled to neighboring Thailand and many sought refuge in other regions of Burma/Myanmar. Large parts of the area in which the KNU operates are considered to be heavily mined.

The impact of landmines on the civilian population in the Karen State is severe as mines are laid in inhabited regions - close to villages, water points, work places, etcetera. Some mountainous areas in Karen State have been declared “no go” areas because of the mining. Together with neighboring Kayah State, Karen appears to be the most heavily mine-infested state of Burma/Myanmar, especially in its eastern part (on the Thai border). The KNU suffers greatly from its own mine use, as well as from the government’s: mine-layers themselves are often injured and even killed by their own mines.

Group Profile

With the assistance of the KNU, the Karenni National Progressive Party/Karenni Army (KNPP/KA) was formed as an opposition party in 1957. Its aim is to fight for the right of self-determination of the Kayah (Karenni) State as granted by the 1947 constitution. According to a recent declaration the group is now prepared to accept a federal state, rather than independence.

In 1995, the KNPP signed a cease-fire agreement with the government which was soon abandoned due to frequent incursions by the Burmese army into KNPP-controlled areas. Today, the KNPP is still actively fighting the government within Karenni state. It attempted to re-enter cease-fire negotiations with the government in early 2004 and remains ready to do so. However, fighting was still ongoing in early 2005, owing to the launch of a major joint offensive against the KNPP by the government and the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), a Karenni cease-fire group, in January 2005.
The KNPP has been a member of the ENSCC since 1997.144 Prior to the joint offensive, the KNPP’s main efforts were directed towards achieving a tripartite dialogue. However, the group’s military activities have taken central stage since spring 2005.147 The group’s political wing, the KNPP, is headed by its president Hteh Bu Phe,148 while the military wing, the KA, is led by Chief-of-Staff General Be Htoo.149 The KA is currently said to comprise between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters.

The group enjoys widespread support among the Karenni people, but continuous fighting has weakened the group militarily and its constituency appears to be fatigued from decades of civil war. According to Mondes Rebelles, the group supports itself financially from the taxation of smuggled goods crossing the Thai-Burma/Myanmar border.150

Landmine Use Profile

According to the Landmine Monitor, the KA was one of “15 armed opposition groups that have used antipersonnel mines” in 2004.151 The KA has admitted to using mines in the past, but there are no recent statements confirming its current use of landmines. The government has accused the group of using mines and committing “terrorist attacks.” The group has acknowledged responsibility for one attack: the bombing of a hydroelectric power plant in April 2005.152 However, it denied involvement in a series of bomb explosions in May 2005 in the Burmese capital, Rangoon (Yangon), placing blame on “conflicts within the ruling junta.”153

Information on the KA’s landmine use is currently scarce. In a 2001 report by Nonviolence International Southeast Asia,154 the KNPP was identified as both a mine user and IED producer. The types of IEDs produced by the KNPP are believed to be similar to those used by the KNU.155 In fact, the KNU has provided significant support to various other rebel groups, in the form of training, weapons, ammunition, funds, food, and shelter. The KNPP is among the groups to have benefited from this support.

The mines used by the KNU and other NSAs are “typically consisting of a length of plastic piping stuffed with gunpowder or explosives and scrap metal or shotgun pellets, attached to a small detonator powered by a cheap dry cell alkaline battery.”156

The KNPP has used landmines primarily in a defensive manner to protect its camps and installations against incursions by government and KNPLF troops.

The most heavily-mined area in the region is said to be the hilly Karen-Karenni border zone,157 where unconfirmed sources claim that no less than 1,000 landmines have been planted by the government and the Karenni National Solidarity Organization (KNSO), a breakaway group from the KNPP, which has a cease-fire agreement with the government in the area south of Mawchi to the Karen border.158

As is the case with all mine-infested provinces in Burma/Myanmar, the civilian population is significantly affected by mine use, both by the government and NSAs inside the Karenni state. According to a 2002 survey conducted by Nonviolence International, most civilian mine survivors reported stepping on mines in the vicinity of their residence or work place.159

There are no recent reports of confirmed KA-laid mines in the Karenni State, but some sources indicate that either the KNPP, or its rival group the KNPLF, have planted mines in the area near the state capital Loikaw, where reportedly at least two civilians were victimized by abandoned landmines in March 2005.160 Other reports indicate that the KNSO planted significant numbers of copies of US-made

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144 Blaevoet, Dico Rebelles 2004 - Acteurs, Lieux, Mouvements, p. 446.
145 Murray, “Karenni Rebels Dig in for Last Stand.”
149 Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 938.
152 ASEAN and the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Appendix III: Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia: Landmines and Peace Treaties.
153 See Karen National Union (KNU)/Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) group profile
154 Photo Set 2005-a: Section 11 “Landmines”.
155 Murray, “Karenni Rebels Dig in for Last Stand.”
156 FBR: Landmines Placed in Karenni State, 14-17 April (Free Burma Rangers, 2005).
157 Michiyo Kato, Saw L.W., K. Kramer et al., Impact of Landmines in Burma (Nonviolence International South East Asia 2002).
M14 mines in the border area of the Karen state in mid-April 2005.161

The KNPP is believed to retain stockpiles of mines,162 but this information has not been reconfirmed.

New Mon State Party/Mon National Liberation Army (NMSP/MNLA)

Group Profile

When it signed a cease-fire agreement with the government in June 1995, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and its military wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA), had been fighting for almost forty years163 for an independent, joint Karen-Mon state in Southern Burma. The agreement followed the successive defeats of the KNU earlier that year.164 Under the cease-fire agreement, the NMSP was allowed to administer different areas inside Mon State, but some sources have claimed that government troops still exercise important influence inside the province165.

Despite its cease-fire status, the NMSP is a member of the Democratic Alliance of Burma, an umbrella organization formed to establish peace, human rights and democracy in Burma/Myanmar and of the ENSC.

Internally, the NMSP is led by the Executive and Central Committee, which is said to be composed of over thirty senior members. The current President, Nai Htaw Mon, replaced Nai Htin after his death in March 2005.166

In late 2001, a group led by former MNLA colonel, Nai Pan Nyunt, splintered from the NMSP/MNLA and formed the HRP and its armed wing, the MRA. This group then engaged in fighting against both the government and the MNLA.167

By the mid-1990s the MNLA consisted of approximately 8,000 soldiers with another 7,000 supporters.168 Today, the MNLA is said to be a small but well-equipped armed force estimated to comprise less than 2,000 soldiers.169

The group appears to enjoy significant support from the Mon population, although a source recently claimed that this support might be decreasing.170 In fact, many Mon people seem disappointed by the cease-fire agreement, as the government has failed to respond to any of their demands.

Landmine Use Profile

The Landmine Monitor 2003 reports that the MNLA used mines in its conflict with the HRP/MRA.171 Other sources also allege that “both the Burma Army and the Mon armed group [MNLA] use landmines”172 in the territory where the MNLA operates. The NMSP denied these allegations in September 2003,173 claiming not to have used mines since the cease-fire with the government in 1995.174 The HRP/MRA is also identified by the Landmine Monitor Report 2004 as having used mines [see above].175

The types of mines used by the MNLA inside Mon State are not known, but it is clear that the mines are victim-activated, pressure mines. The most recent reported mine incidents in Mon state occurred in February 2004; involving three porters and

161 FBR: Landmines Placed in Karen state, 14-17 April.
162 ASEAN and the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Appendix ii: Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia: Landmines and Peace Treaties.
163 The NMSP was founded in 1958, while the MNLA was created in 1971. Banya Hongsar, “Revolution, Cease-Fire and Democracy in Monland,” Kao Wao News Letter 22 September 2003. The Mon insurgency had originally been launched in 1948 by predecessor groups such as the Mon Freedom League (MFL), the Mon National Defence Organization (MND0) and the Mon People’s Front (MPF). Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelle: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques, p. 462.
164 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelle: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques, p. 462.
168 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelle: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques, p. 462.
169 Banya Hongsar, “Revolution, Cease-Fire and Democracy in Monland.”
170 Ibid.
171 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelle: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflicts & Violences Politiques, p. 462.
172 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
two soldiers of the Burmese Army in one case, and a “Buddhist novice” in the other. The identity of those responsible for laying the mines is not known.

It is also not known whether the MNLA produces its own IEDs and whether it has received material or technology from other groups or the government. The group is believed to maintain stockpiles of mines, although the quantity and nature of such stockpiled mines is not known.

**Rohingya Solidarity Organization/Rohingya Army (RSO/RA)**

**Group Profile**

The Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) is an organization which aims to defend the interests of the “Rohingya” minority. In 1974, the Rohingyas living inside Burma were denied citizenship by a government decision which, when enforced between 1977 and 1978, led to a flow of refugees to neighboring Bangladesh. The first political Rohingya organization was the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), created in 1974. In the early 1980s, “more radical elements” split from the RPF and formed the RSO. The RSO began its armed struggle against the government about ten years later, in response to renewed persecution of the Rohingyas. After an unsuccessful and short-lived merger with the rival Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), which led to the formation of the Arakan Rohingya National Organization (ARNO) in 1995, the group broke away again in 1998. The RSO retained its original name and ARIF maintained the name ARNO. This division has weakened the RSO.

The last recorded RSO aggression towards the government was in May 1994. Today, the RSO’s military action is largely against rival rebel group ARNO.

The RSO operates exclusively in the Bangladesh-Burma/Myanmar border area, where it maintains small, mobile camps. While the group appears to have enjoyed some latent support (or non-interference) from the Bangladeshi government, it has been suggested that Bangladesh clamped down on Rohingya activists, forcing them, in an attempt to improve that country’s relations with Burma/Myanmar, to abandon their military camps in January 2001.

The RSO has a president and an advisory board. The armed wing of the organization, the Rohingya Army (RAI), while controlled by the board, is sometimes opposed by its Shoora (Council), the student wing and militants. The RA is led by a Commander-in-Chief. The RSO is currently believed to have between three and four camps, consisting of approximately 150 troops.

The group appears to receive financial support from the following sources: Muslim countries (such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states); the Rohingya diaspora (comprised of about 200,000 people living mostly in the Gulf states and more than 400,000 in Pakistan); like-minded groups such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Kashmir); and Islamic extremist groups in Bangladesh.

**Landmine Use Profile**

The RSO has not issued any official statement regarding mine use. It is not listed in Landmine Monitor’s 2004 Burma/Myanmar report because its activities are currently limited to Bangladeshi territory, but there is substantiated evidence of RSO mine use.

The RSO uses mines to defend its camps and bases from theft and against the Bangladeshi army. Its

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176 “Mon State at War: Landmine Use by Both Parties.”
177 The term “Rohingya,” which means “people from Rohang” (Rohang being the Bengali name for Arakan) refers to the Muslims living in the Arakan state on the Bangladeshi border.
180 Lintner, “Religious Extremism and Nationalism in Bangladesh.”
181 Balenci and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, pp. 467-468.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 Balenci and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, p. 467.
Shan State Army South (SSA-S)

Group Profile

The Shans are one of Burma/Myanmar’s major ethnic groups. They have a total population of between 3.5 and 4 million people, living mainly in the north-eastern part of Burma/Myanmar. The Shan were given a specific province, Shan State, which is Burma/Myanmar’s largest state and “constitutes a kind of miniature-Burma, given the ethnic diversity of its population.” It has been suggested that the group originated as a criminal group, which then adopted a political discourse. 

The Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) was formed after the surrender in early 1996 of the Mong Tai Army (MTA), which had been actively fighting the government since the beginning of the 1990s. The group first used the name of an old insurgent group, the Shan United Revolutionary Army, before adopting its current name.

The original aim of the SSA-S was to obtain independence for the people living in Shan State. Today, it agrees to tripartite dialogue on the establishment of a federal State in Burma/Myanmar.

The SSA-S is not to be confused with the Shan State Army-North (also called Shan State Army), or the Shan State Army-Central (also known as Shan State National Army) which had each agreed to a ceasefire in previous years. In 1997, the SSA-S entered into a cooperation agreement with the two cease-fire

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188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebeldes: Guerillas, Milicias, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques, p. 444.
193 It has been suggested that the group originated as a criminal group, which then adopted a political discourse. Ibid. pp. 444-445.
194 A recent declaration made by exiled Shans concerning the independence of the province was largely criticized by the SSA-S and other Shan groups because of its potential to lead to retaliation against the civilian population by government troops. Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Junta Blasts Shan Independence; Attacks on Shan Continue”, The Irrawaddy 20 April 2005.
195 According to recent information, the SSA-N was forced to disarm by the SPDC in April 2005 “Palaung Rebels Surrender,” The Irrawaddy May 2005. Some of its troops however “merged and agreed to struggle for the restoration of sovereignty and rights of self-determination of the Shan State together” on 22 May 2005. Sai Wansai, Statement on Shan State National Army and Shan State Army Merger (2005).
groups. Today, it is the only armed group fighting the government in Shan State on a regular basis. According to recent information, the SSA-S fights mostly against the state-supported United Wa State Army (UWSA) which launched a massive attack on SSA-S positions.196

This inter-group conflict has recently become more intense, with estimates of more than 700 casualties on both sides between mid-March and mid-May 2005. The direct involvement of the government has been strongly suspected by the SSA-S.197 The SSA-S has lately been supported in its struggle by the SSA-N, which announced in May 2005 that it was breaking the cease-fire agreement concluded with the government and forming an alliance with the SSA-S.198

The SSA-S’s historical leader, Colonel Yawd Serk, founded the group in 1996. The decision-making process within the group remains unknown. The army’s political wing, known as the Restoration Council of Shan State, also headed by Colonel Yawd Serk, supports the tripartite dialogue process backed by the UN.

Since its creation, the SSA-S has always claimed to maintain a strong anti-drug policy,199 although some sources have suggested that the SSA-S is implicated in the drug trade.200 The SSA-S’s strong anti-drug trafficking stance has increased its antipathy towards the UWSA which is believed to be heavily involved in the opium and amphetamines trade.201 This has led to unofficial cooperation between the SSA-S and the Thai authorities.202

In 2004, the total number of SSA-S combatants was estimated at between 500 and 2,000,203 spread in small camps in the hilly region along the Northern Thailand-Burma/Myanmar border. This number appears to have increased in 2005; current estimates put the number of troops at between 4,000 and 6,000, of which 1,500 to 2,000 are located along the Thai-Shan State border.204 The SSA-S seems to enjoy the support of both the Shan community and, to a certain extent, the Thai administration, mainly because of its actions against drug-smugglers in the border region.205 The SSA-S’s weaponry consists mostly of arms recovered from the MTA or captured during combat against the government or rival groups.

Landmine Use Profile

The SSA-S is a substantiated, albeit sporadic, landmine user and has been for many years.206 Within Shan State, all major parties to the conflict (the SPDC, SSA-S and UWSA, as well as some smaller groups) are known to use mines.207

No recent information is available on the type of landmines that are used by the SSA-S. Older reports suggest that, in addition to handmade IEDs, the SSA-S may have recovered some of the factory-made mines that were produced by the MTA, which maintained large-scale AP and AV mine production workshops before its surrender in 1996. However, most MTA-produced mines were seized by the Burmese army when the MTA handed over its arms.208

According to a 2003 report, "unlike the conflict affected areas of Karen State, Mon State, and Tenasserim Division, Shan State ... had not seen extensive use of mine warfare, though localized mining was reported." 209 The same report also indicated that the most heavily mined areas were those between SSA-S-controlled territory and the territory of the Shan cease-fire groups, which it speculated was possibly "an attempt by the government to block communication and contact between the various Shan groups."210

198 Ibid.
199 See for example: Interview with Colonel Yawd Serk.
203 Ibid.
204 Email from a Burma/Myanmar Expert; Received October 2005 (2005).
205 Marshall, "Point of No Return;"
208 Andrew Selth, Landmines in Burma: The Military Dimension [Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2000].
210 Ibid.
The last reported incident in the SSA-S’s area of operation was a mine blast in the border area in November 2003, resulting in two civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{211} The SSA-S responded to the incident by declaring that “with years of fighting between us and the Burmese-Wa alliance, no one can tell whose landmine it really was that the villagers ran into.”\textsuperscript{212} Little is known about the number of landmine survivors or fatalities in southern Shan State, but between 2001 and 2002, 12 mine-related deaths and 33 injuries had been reported in the Thai-Burma border area.\textsuperscript{213}

It is not known whether the SSA-S currently maintains mine stockpiles, but a report dating back to 2001 suggested that this was case at the time.\textsuperscript{214}

\textbf{United Wa State Party/United Wa State Army (UWSP/UWSA)}

\textbf{Group Profile}

The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and its political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), emerged from the breakup of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1989. It has been described as being of “authoritarian [...] Marxist-Leninist” orientation, but with “democratic centralism” as its guiding principle.\textsuperscript{215} The UWSA signed a cease-fire agreement with the government the same year in which it was founded.

This cease-fire agreement has enabled the UWSA to control the area referred to as “Wa State”, which comprises the hilly Wa areas within ‘Special Region No 2’ inside Shan State, near the Chinese border.\textsuperscript{216} The agreement allows the UWSP/UWSA to maintain its own administrative structure and armed forces.\textsuperscript{217}

The group’s leader is Bao You-Xiang, who holds both the position of UWSA Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Wa State government. The second most powerful figure in the group was Li Zi-ru, the UWSA’s deputy Commander-in-Chief and its Chief-of-Staff.\textsuperscript{218} Li Zi-ru died of a heart attack in January 2005.\textsuperscript{219}

After a relatively calm period between late 2003 and early 2004,\textsuperscript{220} the UWSA, alongside government troops, resumed fighting against the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S).\textsuperscript{221} 2005 has seen clashes between the two groups, with the heaviest fighting taking place from March to May.

With estimates of around 20,000 combatants in 2004\textsuperscript{222}, the UWSA is said to be the most well-organized armed NSA in Burma, having “significantly expanded and rearmed since 1989.”\textsuperscript{223}

There are credible allegations that the group is involved in drug production and trafficking as well as other illicit activities.\textsuperscript{224} Apart from its occasional collaboration with the government, the UWSA is said to have links with the Chinese military intelligence\textsuperscript{225} and the DKBA.\textsuperscript{226}

\textbf{Landmine Use Profile}

While the UWSA has been identified as one of Burma’s mine-users in the Landmine Monitor Report,\textsuperscript{227} the group has not made an official statement confirming this to be the case.

It is not known to what extent the UWSA makes use of landmines, and whether it produces the mines itself or purchases them along with other weaponry.

Although not to the same degree as Karen State, Shan State (where the UWSA is fighting, supported by the government) is still a mine-affected province, as are large parts of Eastern Burma.\textsuperscript{228}

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\textsuperscript{211} Landmines Kill Two on the Border; \\
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{213} Risser, Running the Gauntlet: The Impact of Internal Displacement in Southern Shan State. \\
\textsuperscript{214} ASEAN and the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines. Appendix III: Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia: Landmines and Peace Treaties. \\
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{219} “Deputy Chief of Uwsa Dies of a Heart Attack,” The Irrawaddy 11 January 2005. \\
\textsuperscript{220} Anthony Davis, “Thai Drugs Smuggling Networks Reform,” \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Review} December (2004). \\
\textsuperscript{222} Blaevoet, Dico Rebelle 2004 - Acteurs, Lieux, Mouvements. \\
\textsuperscript{223} Davis, “The Wa Challenge Regional Stability in Southeast Asia.” \\
\textsuperscript{224} Drug Intelligence Brief - Burma Country Brief and Marshall and Davis, “Soldiers of Fortune.” \\
\textsuperscript{225} Davis, “The Wa Challenge Regional Stability in Southeast Asia.” \\
\textsuperscript{226} Davis, “Thai Drugs Smuggling Networks Reform.” \\
\textsuperscript{227} Landmine Monitor 2004. \\
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid. \\
\end{flushleft}
presence of mines inside UWSA-controlled territory constitutes a hazard for internally displaced persons, who are often prevented from returning to their homes after fighting ends due to the presence of landmines in the vicinity of their villages.\(^{229}\)

Identification of the culprits behind specific mine incidents is problematic in a context where all parties to the conflict are known to use landmines. As noted by an SSA-S officer in relation to a mine incident on the Burmese-Thai border in late 2003, often, “no one can tell whose mine it really was.”\(^{230}\) In earlier reports, however, the UWSA has clearly been identified as an active mine user and as holding stockpiles of AP mines\(^{231}\), and there has been no indication that the group would have halted its mine use.

INDIA (NON-KASHMIR)

Mine Ban Treaty: Non-signatory

CCW Amended Protocol II: Party

Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M)

Conflict Summary

Across India there is a significant number of communist groups, known collectively as “Naxalites”\(^{232}\) or Naxals. They follow various formulations of communist ideology, usually claiming adherence to the thinking of ideologues such as Marx, Lenin and Mao. The Naxalites have been engaged in military struggle with the Indian state since the late 1960s.\(^{233}\) In September 2004, two of the largest Naxalite groups, the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), merged to form the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M). The group is currently highly active, targeting Indian forces.

Group Profile

The PWG was founded in Andhra Pradesh in 1980 by Kondapally Sitarammiah.\(^{234}\) Citing “peasant revolution” as its goal, the PWG sought control of rural areas in order to subject them to land reform. This goal was pursued on political and military tracks, with military functions eventually being assigned to a specialized wing known as the People’s Guerrilla army.\(^{235}\)

The MCC was founded around the time, and in the locality, of the Darjeeling peasant uprising of May 1967.\(^{236}\) The MCC emerged from the Communist Party of India-Maoist after the suppression of the Darjeeling rebellion.\(^{237}\) Like the PWG, the MCC had its own military wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.\(^{238}\)

The ideological affinity between the PWG and MCC was one reason for their merger.\(^{239}\) After a limited period of internal debate over doctrinal issues, the new CPI-M declared its adherence to a fusion of PWG Marxist-Leninism with MCC Maoism.\(^{240}\) The CPI-M’s current stated objective is to control an area of territory to be governed according to Maoist precepts.\(^{241}\) The CPI-M allegedly has \textit{de facto} control over parts of Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh as well as a presence in Bihar and the tribal areas of Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Orissa.

Little information is available on the organizational structure of the CPI-M. It seems, however, that the former General Secretary of the PWG Central Committee, Muppalaxman Rao (alias Ganapathi), became the General Secretary of the CPI-M, and reports have speculated that the CPI-M has retained the organizational hierarchy of the PWG and MCC (i.e. a Central Committee, Regional Bureaus, Zonal

\(^{229}\) Guinard, \textit{Shan State in Turmoil: Independence, Civil War, What Next?}

\(^{230}\) Landmines Kill Two on the Border.

\(^{231}\) ASEAN and the Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines. Appendix Iii: Non-State Actors in Southeast Asia: Landmines and Peace Treaties.


\(^{234}\) Ibid.


\(^{236}\) The Communist Party was at this time part of the United Front Government of West Bengal, and was held accountable for its role in suppressing the peasants of West Bengal. Ibid.


\(^{239}\) Maoist Communist Centre.

\(^{240}\) Ibid.
The group’s mines are both remote-detonated and victim-activated. For example, a remote-controlled mine was detonated in January 2005 against a group of police officers near Bhimbandh in Munger district. Similarly, eight police officers were injured in July 2005 when CPI-M cadres detonated three landmines at Mathav village in the Udipi district. In September 2005 a mine was triggered in order to target a police vehicle near Motu in the Malkangiri district. Although the CPI-M predominantly uses remote-detonated mines, the reported presence of large mine fields in Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere indicates that the group may also employ victim-activated devices. Most mine-related incidents have thus far taken place in Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh.

Reports have pointed to a particular CPI-M focus on attacks against state targets, including law enforcement officers and military personnel. These often occur as part of an ambush, with the mine being detonated under a transport vehicle of the target. In the past, this has been done by connecting a series of mines on either side of a road through the use of a cable.

The frequency with which police and security forces are attacked suggests that the CPI-M does not specifically target civilians, although there have been incidents where members of the public have been injured and even killed.

Media reports suggest that explosive materials used by the CPI-M are usually captured rather than purchased, often from police stations or coal mining facilities. However, it has been suggested that training resources (related to instruction in advanced mine technology) have been procured from China, Cuba and Algeria in the past. The PWG was...

Landmine Use Profile

The CPI-M is a frequent landmine user, even though the group rarely claims responsibility for its attacks. Indeed, security forces generally attribute responsibility for attacks to the CPI-M based on the areas in which the incidents occur and on the style of the attack. Since January 2004, it has been estimated that the group and its predecessors have triggered 220 landmine blasts, while 104 of its mines have been removed and diffused.

According to ministry officials, CPI-M has been successful in targeting troops using factory-made landmines as well as IEDs. Indeed, both Claymore mines and the necessary equipment needed to manufacture IEDs have been recovered by troops from CPI-M encampments.

243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.

According to ministry officials, CPI-M has been removed and diffused. This occurred on April 27 when suspected CPI-M members triggered a Claymore mine targeting the police chief of Prakasam district (Andhra Pradesh). Mahesh Chandra Laddha, in the Ongole town. Two civilians were killed and nine others sustained injuries in the blast. Incidents Involving Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). 2005, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Available: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/CPI_M_TIMELINE.htm, 24 October 2005.


allegedly involved in supplying other Naxalite groups in West Bengal and Nepal (CPN-M) with know-how and technology and other materials for making IEDs. PWC also appears to have been responsible for the training of the MCC in this field. Recent discoveries on the Indo-Nepali border indicate possible exchanges of technology and know-how between the CPI-M and CPN-M.

**All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)**

**Conflict Summary**

The hilly state of Tripura lies in north-eastern India. Since the 1980s, members of native tribes have clashed with non-tribal Bengalis, largely due to the threat posed to the former by the latter group's rapid settlement of the area. Several insurgent groups operate in the area. Some have signaled their readiness to negotiate a settlement, whereas others, including the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), have shown their intention to fight on.

**Group Profile**

The ATTF was founded in July 1990 (with the original name of the All Tripura Tribal Force) under the leadership of Ranjit Debbarma, whose original group, the Tripura National Volunteers, left him disillusioned after they agreed to a truce with the government.

The ATTF demands the restoration or donation of land to tribal members. Observers claim that the ATTF, in order to reach this goal, seeks the expulsion and disenfranchisement of all Bengali-speaking immigrant settlers entering Tripura after 1956, and the independence of all tribal areas in Tripura.

The group has grown significantly since its origins of small-scale tribal radicalism in North and South Tripura, largely due to the recruitment of tribal youth and increases in the ATTF’s military resources. Even so, high numbers of cadres were lost in 1994 following a government amnesty. More recently, some ATTF cadres have surrendered their arms and renounced the insurgency. The ATTF’s current numbers are estimated to lie somewhere between 400 and 600 members, divided into two regiments. These remaining members have sought to revitalize the ATTF and are still an active force in the Tripura conflict.

Ranjit Debbarma remains the group’s President. The Vice President is Chitta Debbarma (alias Bikash Kobi). According to the group’s constitution, decisions are taken in a Central Committee able to delegate authority to specialized “departments”. However, the President retains ultimate control and discretion as to ATTF policy.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the Tripura Peoples’ Democratic Front (TPDF), the political wing of the ATTF, controls the remote areas of Assam through a parallel government.

Some members of the tribal community support the redress of inequalities between Bengali-speaking groups and members of native tribes addressed by the ATTF.

The ATTF is alleged to have links to other north-eastern Indian groups; such as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang), the People’s Lib-
Landmine Use Profile

No information on the ATTF’s landmine policy is available, although there were several reports of alleged landmine use prior to 2005.

Where mines have been used in the past, it seems that they were intended to supplement ATTF guerilla methods rather than as a core tactical weapon in their own right. Although the targets of the group regularly include civilians, landmines have been reserved for premeditated attacks against security forces. The mines used were generally triggered at a distance. No information was found as to whether the mines used by the ATTF are factory-made or IEDs.

One example of an alleged landmine attack by the ATTF took place in August 2004. A mine was detonated remotely while a police team passed an ambush site in Barkathal, West Tripura. A similar approach was used the year before, in July 2003. On this occasion, alleged ATTF cadres had planted a high-powered mine just outside a Central Reserve Police Force camp at Baramaidan, west Tripura. A 50 meter fuse, hidden under muddy undergrowth, was lit by concealed ATTF cadres. Another landmine was detonated using a remote-controlled device in January 2004. Again, a remote mechanism was used to detonate the device as a precursor to an ATTF ambush on security forces in the Chaplingcherra border outpost in South Tripura district.

The ATTF has been found to possess IEDs, including mines. Use has taken place primarily in both West and South Tripura. The source of supply of mines to the ATTF is not known. It is also not known whether the ATTF maintains stocks of landmines.

Conflict Summary

Many members of the Bodo ethnic group, based principally in the state of Assam in North Eastern India, consider themselves to be the indigenous population of the region. Usually Hindu or Christian, the Bodos make up approximately ten percent of the 26 million people of Assam. Influxes of non-Bodo immigrants over several decades, coupled with a sense of political marginalization, have fostered Bodo nationalist sentiment. From this ideology sprang the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), a militant group seeking self-determination for the Bodos. The NDFB is currently pledged to a year-long cease-fire, which began on 1 June 2005. The agreement includes an end to Indian counterinsurgency operations, as well as a demilitarization of the NDFB.

Group Profile

The NDFB was founded sometime between 1986 and 1988 as the Bodo Security Force (BSF) and adopted its current name in 1994. Despite the change of name, the group has consistently advocated a “sovereign Bodoland” to be governed according to democratic socialist principles.

The NDFB operates in the areas north and northwest of the river Brahmaputra. In 2004, the group was active in the districts of Naibari, Barpeta, Dhubri, Sonitpur, Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Chirang and Karbi Anglong. Furthermore, due to its proximity to the border, the NDFB regularly crosses into Bhutan. However, according to Jane’s Foreign Report, after a counterinsurgency operation by Bhutanese forces in late 2003, the group lost its camps in that country. Nevertheless, there have been indications that the NDFB is seeking to re-establish its lost Bhutanese bases.

274 Militancy
280 Also know as the National Democratic Front of Boroland.
282 Sources differ on a foundation date. Ibid.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
286 The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).
Reports indicate that the Indian security forces have been successful in arresting, or obtaining the surrender of, many NDFB members. Although the NDFB’s chairman and founder, Ranjan Daimary (also known as, D R Nabla) remains at large, the group’s Vice President, Dhiren Boro, was detained in Gangtok/Sikkim in January 2003 and its General Secretary, B Swmkhwr (alias Govinda Basumatary), was arrested on 25 November 2002. The group’s Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Bijoy Boro, is also in the custody of the Assam police.

The group’s remaining strength is estimated to be between 700 and 2,000 fighters, most of whom are based in camps in Burma and Bangladesh, while some are based in temporary camps in Arunachal Pradesh and in Meghalaya (Garo hills region). According to Global Security, the NDFB obtains its weapons and ammunition from the Burmese Chin National Front. It also allegedly has links to the United Liberation Front of Assam, the Kamatapur Liberation Organization, the Achik National Volunteers Council, and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang.

Landmine Use Profile

The relative infrequency of NDFB mine use in the period covered by this report means that it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding the group’s use of landmines. There have been substantiated, although sporadic, allegations of landmine use by the NDFB, as reported by the Landmine Monitor. Although the NDFB’s landmine policy is not known, the group has expressed interest in discussing a ban on AP mines.

Tactically, the group uses landmines as one of a number of explosive devices (also including improvised bombs and grenades). According to media reports, in late 2004 three alleged NDFB militants were killed when an explosive device they were planting exploded in northern Assam’s Darrang district. Past landmine use by the group points to a preference for remote-controlled IEDs, although the use of victim-activated devices cannot be ruled out. Targets tended to be military or otherwise government-related; landmines proved useful in enabling NDFB forces to attack such forces, before melting away.

No information is currently available regarding sources of IED material and stockpiles held by the NDFB.

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

Conflict Summary

Since Indian independence, various militant groups have emerged in Assam, often along ethnic lines, in pursuit of goals that frequently involve succession or autonomy from the Indian state. This insurgency has found support in the reality of rural poverty and the view that the region’s economic problems are the result of exploitation by New Delhi. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is one such group whose militancy was derived from such perceptions. Despite the beginnings of a peace process with the Indian government, the ULFA remains militarily active.

Group Profile

The ULFA was formed in 1979 with the aim of establishing an independent, socialist state of Assam. The group considered revolutionary armed struggle to be the means by which to drive out Indian forces...
and sympathizers, and to achieve national self-
determination for the people of the Assam region.302
The group operates across Assam, but is also known
to have had bases in Bhutan. Its camps in Bhutan
were lost after a counterinsurgency operation by the
Bhutanese forces in late 2003.303

The group’s Chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, leads the
political wing of the ULFA. Indian government
security forces have arrested several of his deputies,
including the Vice-Chairman, Pradip Gogoi, and the
General Secretary, Anup Chetia.304 The military wing,
the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF), is led by Paresh
Baruah. Reports disagree as to who heads the
movement as a whole, and there is evidence of pro-
Rajkhowa and pro-Baruah factions having formed
within the ULFA.305 Indeed, it would appear that,
although decisions are taken centrally within the
“Central Unit”, they are made separately by its
military and civil tracks.306 Decisions, once taken,
are passed to district and regional commanders who
then implement them.307

Despite losses in its leadership, the ULFA remains a
potent military force. It is capable of fielding up to
2,000 combatants, divided into three battalions.308
According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the ULFA
obtains weapons through arms traders in Thai-
lan.309 Global Security has identified the territory of
Bangladesh as another source of supplies, particu-
larly through the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of
Assam and the Muslim United Liberation Front of
Assam. There have also been claims (often from the
Indian government) that Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) not only has provided training,
weapons and explosives, but that it also now has a
significant administrative stake in the group.310 In
addition, funding has been allegedly traced to private
enterprises established by the group, often located
in Bangladesh.311

Landmine Use Profile

The 2004 Landmine Monitor has substantiated that
the ULFA is a mine user,312 and the group itself has
sometimes claimed responsibility for mine attacks,
although rarely in cases where civilian casualties
have also been sustained. It appears that the ULFA
uses both factory and handmade devices in defense
of its camps, as well as for offensive purposes.313
Factory-made mines used by the ULFA primarily
consist of pressure-activated mines, while hand-
made mines are generally remote-activated. The
South Asia Terrorism Portal has claimed that the
group is in possession of improvised and manufac-
tured “bombs and landmines” as well as RDX
explosives.314

There have been a rise in the number of remote-
controlled IEDs being used in the north-eastern
states in general.315 The ULFA has used these
devices as a precursor to ambush, whereby guerrilla
fighters engage the target after the mine has been
detonated. One example of this occurred in Talap in
Eastern Assam in October 2004, where a mine was
triggered in an attempt to demobilize an army troop
carrier.316 There have also been examples of the
ULFA using landmines in order to attack public and
private infrastructure in Assam. In January 2004, a
ULFA high-explosive mine was detonated at a crude
oil installation belonging to the state-owned Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation near Kunwarpur.317 In
addition to offensive use, the Landmine Monitor has
reported that it is possible that the ULFA has mined
the areas around its camps in Bhutan.318

No information has been found concerning possible
ULFA stockpiles.

302 Ibid.
303 “India’s Counterinsurgent Policy.”
304 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) - Terrorist Group of Assam.
306 Bobby Sarangthem, United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), IPCS Database on Armed Groups in South Asia (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Pune).
307 Ibid.
308 Anthony Davis and Rahul Bedi, “Pressure from India Leads to Bhutan Insurgent Crackdown,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 1 February (2001).
309 Ibid.
312 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) - Terrorist Group of Assam.
314 Ibid.
315 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) - Terrorist Group of Assam.
316 Explosive Remnants of War, p. 82.
317 Assam: A Tempest of Terror, 4 October 2004, Dak Bangla Intelligence Scan, Available: http://dakbangla.blogspot.com/2004/10/assam-
INDIA (KASHMIR)

Conflict Situation

The Kashmiri conflict is one of the most intractable disputes in contemporary international politics, not least due to the division of the territory between three major powers: India (controlling almost two thirds), Pakistan (controlling approximately one-third), and China (controlling the remaining portion). The current conflict can only be understood in its historical context. When India became independent in 1947, Pakistan was simultaneously founded as a new state containing a population of predominantly Muslims. Kashmir, as an independent principality, was urged to annex itself to one of the two new states. With a largely Muslim population, its Maharaja was expected to assign his territory to Pakistan. However, due to several reasons (unrelated to the wishes of the population, for example, as expressed in a referendum), he chose accession to the Indian Union. The Pakistani authorities disputed this claim and developed a military presence in Northern Kashmir, where they have held de facto control ever since. This dispute has led to three Indo-Pakistan wars and has proved fertile ground for the development of a variety of insurgents. Due to this conflict the province is blighted by mines laid by the Pakistani and Indian governments along their disputed border.

Several insurgent groups in the region are known to be current or former mine users. Four of the largest NSAs active in Kashmir are the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Toiba. The Landmine Monitor has identified each of these groups as a landmine user. Yet because mines are planted by different actors in the same territory, and insurgent groups frequently fail to claim their attacks, there is little information on the specific mine use of these respective NSAs. For this reason this section only provides a profile for the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), a group that has mine incidents clearly attributed to it.


Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

Group Profile

The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM, Party of the Mujahideen) was formed in the Kashmir Valley sometime between the end of 1989 and early 1990. Reports suggest that it was initially established as the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), an Islamist organization allegedly under the patronage of the Pakistani ISI, as a means of countering the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (a group seeking independence for Kashmir, contrary to the wishes of the Pakistani authorities). To this end, the HM has made the unification of Kashmir and Jammu with Pakistan its priority, but it also urges the (re)construction of these areas on the basis of its particular understanding of Islam.

As is the case with many Kashmiri insurgent groups, the HM has been subject to internal divisions. In 1990, differences over the group’s attitude towards Jel led to a split between those affiliating themselves to the Jel (led by Syed Salahuddin), and those following Hilal Ahmed Mir. This split has resulted in episodes of internal conflict and a struggle for supremacy within the HM. Despite such divisions, the group has demonstrated a high operational capacity and is one of the most active groups in Jammu and Kashmir today.

Salahuddin is the current Supreme Commander of the organization. The Chief Operational Commander is Ghazi Nasiruddin, although the Indian army has claimed that he was killed in January 2004. Saleem Hasmi is the current spokesman for the group, working alongside the group’s news agency, Kashmir Press International. The administrative and military branches of the HM are believed to be controlled through a top-down structure in which the Jel (particularly the Supreme Commander and his advisors) makes decisions centrally, before transmitting them to the commanders of the regional divisions.
Although it is headquartered at Muzaffarabad in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, the HM operates exclusively throughout Jammu and Kashmir. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the HM is organized into five divisions covering Srinagar, Kupwara-Bandipora-Baramulla, Anantnag and Pulwama districts, Doda and Udhampur districts, and Rajouri and Poonch districts.

The HM seems to have support in the Kashmir Valley, as well as in the Poonch, Doda and Rajouri districts, and in parts of the Udhampur district (in Jammu). The HM has also been linked to the Pakistani government (through the ISI). It is also alleged to enjoy support from external support groups, such as the Kashmir American Council and the World Kashmir Freedom Movement in the U.S.

The HM is estimated to have 1,500 current members, of which there is a mix of local and foreign fighters. From the origins of the group to the present day, their weaponry has been reportedly provided by the ISI.

Landmine Use Profile

Reports have suggested that HM has favored a strategy of using landmines either as a precursor to guerrilla attacks, or on their own to cause physical and psychological damage to its targets. The group has publicly pledged that civilians would be spared from attacks when possible, although this pledge was not made specifically in relation to landmines.

HM has claimed responsibility for many of the major landmine incidents taking place in Jammu and Kashmir. Recent years have thus seen a number of mine attacks reliably linked to the HM. In May 2004, HM claimed responsibility for a mine attack on a bus transporting soldiers and their families. HM also claimed responsibility for a September 2004 incident where a bus was targeted by a mine near the town of Dodo. The pattern of mine use suggests the use of command-detonated improvised devices targeting military vehicles. Although such a strategy would tend to minimize the number of civilian casualties, civilians traveling in such vehicles, including the families of soldiers, have been victimized.

It is not known where HM cadres obtain their mines or where they have learned mine production techniques.

Fact Box: Unconfirmed Use by Lashkar-e-Toiba

The Landmine Monitor has reported allegations against the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) since early 2003 at Arnia in Jammu province and Sengalid in Udhampur districts. However, these reports could not be substantiated. Earlier reports have also indicated landmine use by the LeT, but this use generally has not been acknowledged by the LeT. Further, there have been allegations that the LeT’s cadres have received training in mine use, often at camps run by the Harkat-um-Mujahideen.

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It is not known where HM cadres obtain their mines or where they have learned mine production techniques.
INDONESIA

Mine Ban Treaty: Signatory
CCW Additional Protocol II: Non-signatory

Aceh Sumatara National Liberation Front/Free Aceh Movement (ASNLF/GAM)

Conflict Summary

The armed conflict in Aceh province has continued for three decades, pitting the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front/Free Aceh Movement (ASNLF/GAM) against the central Indonesian government. The conflict was triggered by the province’s declaration of independence in the mid 1970s.

A tentative peace emerged in August 2005, bringing about the establishment of ‘self-government’ in Aceh, in exchange for an end to military activities and disarmament of the ASNLF/GAM. In mid to late 2005, the Indonesian government began the withdrawal of its troops from the region and the ASNLF/GAM began disarming its members, raising hopes for a permanent end to the conflict.

Group Profile

The ASNLF/GAM was established in 1976, with the aim of liberating the Acehnese territory from Indonesia. After a failed rebellion in the 1950’s the conflict reemerged in 1976, when Hasan di Tiro and his supporters declared Aceh an independent state. Di Tiro has been leading the ASNLF/GAM from exile in Sweden ever since.

ASNLF/GAM has been fighting for self-determination for Aceh and a return to the independence that the province enjoyed prior to its incorporation into post-colonial Indonesia. This demand has been fuelled by the belief that the Indonesian government has been exploiting the significant natural resources of the province without sharing them fairly with the Acehnese people.

Aside from Di Tiro, the leadership of ASNLF/GAM includes Dr. Zaini Abdullah (Foreign Minister) and Mr. Malik Mahmud (Prime Minister), both members in the “Achehnese government in exile”. The military wing (formerly known as the Achehnese National Armed Forces) currently goes under the name of GAM. However, the ASNLF is often referred to as GAM. It was the leadership of ASNLF/GAM headed by Mr. Malik that signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Indonesia in Helsinki on August 15.

The ASNLF/GAM finds its support among the Acehenese population and the diaspora. The number of armed combatants of the group has been estimated at between 3,000 and 5,000. It appears that the group obtains its weapons from looting government arms reserves or collecting discarded arms in the wake of battles. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the group has also purchased arms from dealers in southern Thailand. The same source revealed that the ASNLF/GAM also suggested that it has a base of support within the Indonesian army which supplied it with weaponry.

Landmine Use Profile

GAM has admitted to mine use against the Indonesian army where mines have provided a tactical advantage in its guerrilla war. It has stated that the mines have been purely cable or radio-detonated, and that they are used exclusively to ambush military vehicles. The group has assured Geneva Call that it does not use victim-activated devices, since these could kill civilians.
The Landmine Monitor (2003 and 2004) states that there were several ASNLF/GAM-related landmine incidents and casualties in Aceh in 2003. Nevertheless, there have been very few reported incidents since then. Landmine Monitor has reported allegations that the group has employed improvised victim-activated mines.352 However, the triggering mechanism is not clearly identified in the available incidents. The mines do seem to have been placed with the intention of attacking military personnel rather than civilians.353 This was true for example in May 2003, when an IED killed a soldier in the north Aceh village of Darussalam, and in June of the same year when five government troops died in a landmine blast in Ale Gedong Village, Geumpang, Pidie, Aceh.354

Nevertheless, there have been intermittent examples of civilian casualties in mine blasts in Aceh attributed to the ASNLF/GAM by media reports. In one case, according to local media, two men died when traveling the Medan-Banda Aceh road in the Gampog Meunasah Krueng, Pueudawa sub-district, in September 2003.355 It is not clear if this mine had been planted by the ASNLF/GAM, or if the civilians were traveling with military personnel. The Landmine Monitor also noted media reports in late 2003 that accused the ASNLF/GAM of having set a booby-trap in a flag at a school in Desa Kampung Melayu, Langsa.356

Again in 2003 soldiers discovered and defused four alleged GAM landmines, each weighing 35 kilograms, in the Peureulak area of East Aceh.357 No further information has been found concerning these mines, but considering their size, it is likely that they had been planted to target a vehicle.

The ASNLF denies having stockpiles of mines, clearly stating, “[o]n the Acehnese military side [TNA/GAM], we do not possess a single landmine.”358

### NEPAL

**Mine Ban Treaty:** Non-signatory  
**CCW Additional Protocol II:** Non-signatory

#### Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M)

**Conflict Summary**

The conflict between the government and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), or “Maoists” began in 1996 when the group declared a “People’s War”. There have been two failed attempts at negotiating a resolution to the conflict, the most recent negotiations lasting from January until August 2003.

**Group Profile**

The origins of the CPN-M date back to the establishment of the Communist Party of Nepal in 1949. However, the armed struggle only started in 1996,359 after the group had been excluded from the general elections in 1994.360 The CPN-M declared its intention to take up arms following the failure of the Nepalese Government to respond to the CPN-M’s demands related to “nationalism, democracy and livelihood”, including the abolition of royal privileges and the creation of a new constitution.361

The group has a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, which has been given an interpretation specific to the situation in Nepal (called the Prachanda Path, after its Supreme Commander).362 Its principal aim is the abolition of the Nepalese monarchy and its...
replacement with a democratic popular (communist) republic.  

The extent of territory controlled by the CPN-M is contested. Estimates vary from approximately 40% to 80%. Most sources believe that in some districts (Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan and Kalikot) the government is present only in the district capitals, with the remaining territory being governed by the CPN-M. In some cases, the CPN-M runs administrations in parallel with those of the state. In addition, the CPN-M allegedly carries out operations of varying degrees in the remaining 75 districts of Nepal.

The CPN-M’s decision-making process is dominated by a Standing Committee consisting of ten members. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, immediately beneath the Standing Committee in the structural hierarchy is the Politburo, followed by the Central Committee, which is then followed by the regional bureaus, sub-regional bureaus, district committees, area committees, and cell committees. The Standing Committee and the Politburo are responsible for the core formulation of political and military strategies. The military wing reportedly has six guerrilla battalions, which are under the control of their respective chief commanders, all of whom are members of the Central Committee. Although the CPN-M is led by the Standing Committee, Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” (alias Comrade Prachanda), the “Supreme Commander”, maintains substantial influence as he holds key positions in the political wing, the United People’s Front (UPF) and the military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The PLA usually operates in small units of 100 to 150 fighters. There is a chain of command, although local commanders have some level of autonomy. The number of the CPN-M’s armed combatants has been estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 active cadres, supported by 10,000 to 15,000 militias, with a growing military strength. In addition to its armed cadres and militias, the CPN-M is estimated to have “33,000 hard core followers, and 200,000 sympathizers” throughout Nepal. The CPN-M largely depends on the rural population for food, shelter and information.

It is alleged that 85% of the CPN-M’s weaponry has been looted from government forces. Other support (e.g. weapons, training, political and financial) is alleged to have come from the People’s War Group and Maoist Communist Centre (now CPI-M), the ULFA, and the Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (a body that links various Maoist groups).

**Landmine Use Profile**

The CPN-M leadership has confirmed landmine use, particularly for offensive purposes. When the cease-fire negotiations broke down in August 2003, CPN-M mine use resumed. A 2004 report stated that more than 35% of all casualties among the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) were estimated to have been caused by landmines. The CPN-M frequently uses command-detonated mines to target vehicles. These mines are increasingly triggered by remote-control rather than by wires that can be detected.

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365 Nepal Terrorist Groups - CPN-M.


367 Nepal Terrorist Groups - CPN-M.

368 Ibid.

369 Ibid.

370 Comrade Prachanda is Chairman of Central Committee and member of the Standing Committee, as well as Supreme Commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

371 “Nepal’s ‘People’s War’ Reaches Stalemate.”

372 “Nepal’s Agony Deepens.”

373 Nepal Terrorist Groups - CPN-M.

374 As quoted in Ibid.


376 Nepal Terrorist Groups - CPN-M.

377 In addition, there have been reports of that the CPN-M maintains links with other NSAs in India’s North-East (Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, Gurkha National Liberation Front and Gurkha Liberation Organization), although the nature of these links is not known. Ibid.


379 “Nepal’s Agony Deepens.”

The group also uses victim-activated triggering mechanisms (for example by pressure) as well as booby-traps. For example, earlier this year a woman was killed by an explosive device that had been hidden in trees and had been deployed to block a road during a strike.

Evidence suggests that the CPN-M has the capacity and resources to produce significant quantities of victim and remote-activated improved mines. To a lesser extent the CPN-M also has access to factory-made Chinese, Indian and Russian AP mines and Claymore mines. Television images have shown government mines confiscated from the CPN-M.

In its offensive mine use, the CPN-M primarily targets state agents, for example by ambushing security forces and mining roads in order to limit the army’s mobility. Mines are generally planted on unpaved in order to make them difficult to detect. Mines have also been used defensively to deny the army access to CPN-M areas. As a result, mines have been planted in areas that are also frequented by civilians, such as farmlands, roadsides, schools, playgrounds, and in villages. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the CPN-M also uses mines to target specific non-combatants. The mine situation is less clear in the rural western areas under CPN-M control.

After nine years of conflict, there have been reports of mine incidents attributed to the CPN-M in all 75 districts, as compared to only four districts in 1999. Most reported incidents indicate a very widespread use of command-detonated AV mines. These mines, planted to limit the army’s mobility, also restrict the movements of the civilian population. In addition, one of the greatest threats to civilians, and especially children, is a type of CPN-M handmade grenade called a “socket bomb”.

CPN-M members have been victimized by government mines, and also by their own mines, while producing, planting, and transporting them. Members allegedly carry mines in regular backpacks, or in “fanny packs” around their waists. There are allegations that the CPN-M also uses civilian forced and paid labor to transport and stockpile mines and other explosive devices. Moreover, in 2004 and 2005 there have been accusations that the CPN-M has used children to produce and plant landmines.

Accidents involving children undertaking training in mine production have been reported.

Materials used by the CPN-M to make IEDs, include “gunpowder, detonator, gelatin, fuse wire, pieces of iron, iron pipe, pitches, pressure cookers, sockets, pieces of glass, electric wire, batteries and even ballpoint pens,” as well as gas cylinders, rubber and metal pipes, buckets and pressure-cookers. Iron

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381 For example in early 2005 one person was killed when he mistakenly pulled the wire connected to explosives planted near a bridge. “Civilian Killed in Blast; Maoists Gun Down Security Man in Chitwan,” nepalnews.com 8 January 2005.


385 Explosive Remnants of War, p. 122.


392 For more consequences for the civilian population, see Focus Case “Nepal: The Impact on the Civilian Population of NSA Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines”.


395 Interview with the Hospital Directory of the Bharatpur Hospital, Nepal, July 2005 (2005).


397 The Growing Threat.

398 Explosive Remnants of War, p. 122.
tubes are obtained by cutting pieces from electricity poles and water pipes (both new and in use) thereby depriving people of electricity and water services. Pressure-cookers are confiscated from civilians, especially since the government has restricted their sale.\textsuperscript{399} According to army sources, most of the explosives used by the CPN-M are homemade,\textsuperscript{400} but the group also acquires considerable amounts of explosives from road construction projects in India.\textsuperscript{401} In addition, much of the explosives are looted from the government,\textsuperscript{402} mainly from storage facilities.\textsuperscript{403} Other explosives are allegedly acquired from Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{404}

The know-how, and possibly also the materials, for making IEDs could have been acquired through the CPN-M’s link with the CPI-M. Such links appear to have consisted in information sharing about arms training, IED production and guerrilla warfare techniques.\textsuperscript{405}

Most mines appear to be made as needed; however, stockpiles are allegedly also maintained in bags buried in the ground. According to reports of people who have discovered such caches, there can be as many as 200 to 300 mines stored in different stockpiles in such a manner. There is no information available about the lifespan of these mine stocks.\textsuperscript{406}

\textsuperscript{399} Interview with a Resident from Ramechhap District, Nepal, July 2005.
\textsuperscript{401} Hill, “Royal Nepalese Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency Role.” and Khadka, “Landmine Use Rising in Nepal.” See also Explosive Remnants of War, p. 122. According to other media reports the Maoists also get explosives from Bangladesh, since explosives believed to be destined for them were confiscated by the Bangladesh Defence Committee in 2003. “Confiscated Weapons-Media in Nepal,” 4 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{402} Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 656.
\textsuperscript{403} Explosive Remnants of War, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{404} In 2003 explosives believed to be destined for the CPN-M were confiscated by the Bangladesh Defense Committee. “Confiscated Weapons-Media in Nepal.”
\textsuperscript{405} Indian security forces allegedly overran a joint Nepalese-Indian Maoist training centre located on the Indian side of the border in the Bagaha district [connected with the Chitwan and Parsa districts] of Nepal. According to media reports, the training centre contained both [unspecified] landmines and huge quantities of explosives. “Maoist Training Center Destroyed.”
\textsuperscript{406} The Growing Threat.
The Impact on the Civilian Population of NSA Use of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines: the Case of Nepal

The Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) is not a frequent user of victim-activated mines (whether factory-made or handmade) according to available information. Yet, the group’s mine use still has a significant impact on the civilian population. To a great extent, this impact is due to the CPN-M’s use of improvised AV mines triggered at a distance by wire or remote-control.

The Madi Incident

There have been several cases where the CPN-M has targeted civilian as well as military transport. The most significant incident took place at Madi in Chitwan district in June 2005 (the Madi incident), when a command-detonated landmine was triggered by the CPN-M under a crowded passenger bus, killing 38 people (35 of whom were civilians) and wounding over 70. Despite a statement by the CPN-M’s Supreme Commander, Prachanda, the following day, describing the incident as a “grave mistake”, another passenger bus was targeted two days later, killing two civilians.

In the Madi incident, the bus had left Bagai Post at 6 a.m., carrying about twice as many passengers as normal (i.e. some 150 passengers) due to cancelled transportation the previous day. A majority of the passengers were civilians, including several children, but at least 12 were soldiers. Women and children were seated mainly inside the bus, while many of the men were traveling on the roof. The bus was blasted by a 20 kilogram metal bucket IED at a river crossing. A considerable number of the casualties consisted of those seated inside the bus; i.e. women and children.

The CPN-M responded to the news of the Madi incident with an immediate statement expressing its condolences and restating its policy not to target civilians. According to a report delivered by the CPN-M to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the group claimed that the army frequently used civilians as human shields. Nevertheless, the Madi incident was judged by the CPN-M as a grave mistake, sentencing those responsible (five individuals) to be sent to a labor camp.

In the conflict in Nepal, as in many current conflicts, there seems to be a pronounced blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians. With regards to the Madi incident, both parties to the conflict failed to protect the civilian population according to the principles of international humanitarian law. In an investigative report, the OHCHR found the CPN-M to be “responsible for the killing of civilians and to have been in violation of its international humanitarian law obligations.” While attributing the primary responsibility for the civilian deaths to the CPN-M, the OHCHR also found that the army had been in breach of its international obligations by failing to take appropriate precautions “to protect the civilian population and civilian objectives under its control against the effects of attacks”. It appears that at the time of the Madi incident, 12 soldiers in civilian clothes were traveling on the bus. It is not clear how many of them were armed, but there is no doubt that some of them were carrying weapons. Reports indicate that the army has a practice of using civilian buses for military purposes on a daily basis, “sometimes in large numbers, in both uniform and civilian clothes and with weapons”.

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607 See CPN-M profile.
608 IEDs of significant size that can cause major damage to a vehicle.
609 It has been suggested that the CPN-M’s use of command-detonation may be a practical, rather than a humanitarian consideration. Given the intense traffic of heavy vehicles such as trucks and buses on Nepalese roads, it would be close to impossible to ensure that a vehicle-activated mine would not be triggered by another vehicle. (Interviews Nepal, Chitwan, Dhading and Kathmandu, July 2005.) A second reason for not using vehicle-activated mines may be to avoid creating anger among the civilian population.
610 “Maoists Continue Targeting Passenger Bus,” Kantipur online, 10 June 2005.
613 More specifically, the mine had been buried in the unpaved road and covered with sand. A 200 metre wire was attached to the mine, leading to a tree, where it was triggered by a person supervising the situation. The mine had been planted close to a river, in a spot that the vehicles had to pass. Ibid.
614 As quoted in Attacks against Public Transportation in Chitwan and Kabhrepanchok Districts.
615 According to the OHCHR, the CPN-M cooperated in its investigation of the incident, for instance by delivering to the OHCHR a report of the findings of an internal investigation. Ibid.
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid.
618 The CPN-M has estimated that the number of soldiers on the vehicle was higher, with 19 soldiers killed. Ibid.
in spite of warnings from the CPN-M that this may result in such vehicles being targeted. Nevertheless, the civilian losses sustained in the Madi incident must be considered excessive (and therefore disproportionate) when compared with the military advantage gained from killing 12 soldiers.

Positive Long-term Consequences of the Madi Incident?

It appears that following the Madi incident, local and international pressure may have had an impact on the CPN-M, specifically with regards to its mine use policy. Many different local, regional and international organizations, in addition to the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, made public statements condemning the incident. The CPN-M appears to have decreased its activities in the area and, with the exception of another incident that occurred only a few days after Prachanda’s statement, fewer public transport vehicles have been targeted. This indicates that media and local community pressure, coupled with adverse international attention, can be mobilized to pressure the CPN-M to change its landmine use practice.

Impact of CPN-M Mine Use

In addition to the loss of lives in incidents such as the Madi incident, many people are not only injured, but also traumatized and in need of rehabilitation. This places a tremendous strain on health care services, which are unable to cope with the influx of patients and their specialized needs. There are also economic implications for such services, which are particularly problematic, given that many communities in Nepal are already disadvantaged in terms of development, schools, hospitals and other community services.

The Madi incident also provides an example of how mines other than AP mines (for example, AV mines) can and do endanger the lives of civilians. In addition to the direct physical danger that they pose, AV mines contribute to restricting the mobility of civilians and delaying development efforts. As a result of the deployment of road mines in the Nepalese conflict, many civilians are afraid to travel by road, and do so only in cases of necessity. Economic life is also affected, because businesses are unable to obtain supplies and farmers are unable to transport their produce to market. AV mines also cause direct and indirect damage to the infrastructure, both due to the blasts themselves, and the reluctance to undertake maintenance provoked by the fear of mines. In many areas the free movement of people is hindered because of the actual presence (or fear) of landmines. In others, landmines and other explosive devices allegedly have contributed to the increasing number of internally displaced people. Farming and other use of the land has also been negatively affected, as has the provision of services such as electricity and water.

Thus, mines that are planted on roads, with the aim of limiting the army’s mobility, also adversely affect the civilian population. In addition, one of the greatest threats to civilians, and especially children, are a type of CPN-M handmade grenade called “socket bombs”. There are frequent reports of children being victimized by socket bombs that have failed to explode.

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420 Attacks against Public Transportation in Chitwan and Kabhrepalanchok Districts
421 Interviews Nepal, Chitwan, Dhading and Kathmandu, July 2005
422 Ibid.
423 Interview with the Hospital Directory of the Bharatpur Hospital, Nepal, July 2005
424 Ibid.
426 IEDs planted on roads reportedly pose an important threat to civilians on roads to Kabhre, Sindhupalchok and Dhading, Explosive Remnants of War, p. 122
427 See for example Caught in the Middle: Mounting Violations against Children in Nepal’s Armed Conflict (Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, 2005).
Armed opposition against the successive Philippine governments since the country’s independence in 1946 is a complex phenomenon. There are several different groups fighting for various objectives, including: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MLF) - the largest insurgent group in the country, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDF).

During its founding phase, the ASG was reportedly funded by al-Qaeda. Following the death of Abdurajak Janjalani, fragmentation of the group accelerated between 1999 and 2001, and resulted in Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) remaining as the largest insurgent group in the country, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was founded by Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani sometime between 1990 and 1991 as a result of the dissatisfaction of some of the Moro National Liberation Front’s (MNLF) more radical elements with the peace process between the government and the MNLF.

The objective of the ASG is the formation of a Muslim state in southern Philippines, an objective that it considered the MNLF had neglected during the peace negotiations.

The original leader of the group was the founder, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, better known as Abu Sayyaf. His brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, took over the leadership in 1998 following Abu Sayyaf’s death.

According to Philippine military and defence officials, the number of active ASG members has declined from a peak of around 1,200 to only 300 in 2004. Other sources estimate the number of fighters to be between 200 to 500 members. Mondes Rebelles reports that despite its small size, the ASG has little organizational structure, with a limited chain of command and direction from Khadaffy Janjalani, and functions rather as a network of several smaller groups.

The ASG does not control any territory. Its bases can be found on the Southern islands of Jolo, Basilan and Mindanao, while its main area of operation is on the Jolo island of Sulu Province. It also carries out operations in Tawi-Tawi, Tapul, Basilan, Zamboanga, and the capital, Manila.

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a growing use of kidnap-for-ransom operations as a source of funding.440

Observers have argued that due to its limited size, the group depends on the support of local NSAs such as the MILF.441 The MILF leadership, however, denies any relations with the ASG. In addition, Philippine and Western intelligence analysts are convinced that the ASG’s entrenchment in central Mindanao has facilitated the resumption of a training relationship with elements of Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyya (JI).442 The group has previously claimed to have received arms from elements in the Philippine Army.443

**Landmine Use Profile**

There are substantiated allegations that the ASG has been using mines. However, there is no information pointing to a formal landmine policy.

Government sources and media reports have repeatedly alleged the ASG’s involvement in mine incidents during 2003, 2004, and 2005. In April 2005, two soldiers were killed and five others wounded in a landmine blast blamed on the ASG. The accident occurred when a military truck drove over the mine on a highway near Indana.444 According to the army, another incident took place on 26 May 2005, when soldiers were targeted by a landmine while travelling in a vehicle in the same area. The mine, triggered by “unidentified suspects”, killed two soldiers and wounded several others.445

According to the military, soldiers have conducted mine-clearing operations in Barangay Kulya-Kulya following reports that rebels, some of whom were allegedly ASG members, laid AP mines in the area before fleeing their camp.446 The army further stated that landmines had been planted along highways leading to evacuation centres. These same highways allegedly led to the positions of NSAs (possibly the ASG and the Misuari Breakaway Group of the MNLF).447

The ASG appears to use both AV and AP mines. No specific information is available concerning the triggering-mechanisms used, although it appears that some mines are victim-activated, while others used to target vehicles could be command-detonated. When specified, most mines used by the ASG appear to be handmade. However, according to the Landmine Monitor 2001, the ASG is also believed to have had limited access to factory-made AP mines.448

The ASG is alleged to use mines both for defensive protection of camps and as offensive weapons against military vehicles. According to police and military sources, the ASG has also been utilizing landmines to deter or slow down pursuing government soldiers.449 The main target of its mine use is thus the military.450 However, there have also been incidents involving civilians. In July 2003 two civilians451 were wounded in separate incidents on the southern island of Lugus, after having triggered mines allegedly planted by the ASG.452

Even though no account of the total number of mine casualties in the Philippines exists, it does appear that there are direct consequences of mine use to the population. It is difficult to determine the long-term effect of mines used for defensive purposes. And, although it is not clear that the ASG is responsible, in February 2005 mines were used in a manner which posed problems for refugees in Sulu. The mines had been placed on the routes to refugee evacuation centres, with the result that relief goods had to be transported via other routes, mainly by sea, delaying their delivery.

The Philippine army has claimed that some ASG members have been trained by JI.464 Such training

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441 Davis, “Philippines Fears New Wave of Attacks by Abu Sayyaf Group.”
442 Alonto, Sulu Fighting Exposes Filipino Government Claims to Want Peace in Mindanao, Special Report.
447 The six evacuation centres are located in the Sulu towns of Panglima Estino, Luuk, Jolo and Kalingalan Calauang. Rene Acosta and Fernan Marasigan, “Routes to Refugee Sites Mined.”
450 Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 400.
452 “Abu Sayyaf Deters Troops with Landmine.”
would most likely include the transfer of explosive-related know-how from JI to the ASG.

It is unclear if the ASG keeps stockpiles of mines. According to the Landmine Monitor 2002, one unconfirmed report stated that “the ASG has built up an inventory of some 3,000 homemade landmines.”

The MILF is an Islamic revolutionary movement seeking the creation of an independent Islamic state in southern Philippines (comprising Mindanao Island, Palawan, Basilan, the Sulu archipelago, and the neighboring islands), although it is possible that this objective has been modified into a demand for strong local governance that will permit the Bangsamoro people self-determination over their political future. Ideologically, the MILF has stated that its ultimate objective is to eradicate all forms of oppression, exploitation, and injustice in order to pave the way for the establishment of a just and orderly society.

The MILF operates primarily on the island of Mindanao. Most of the MILF’s forces are deployed in four provinces of Mindanao: Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato. However, there are also considerable numbers of MILF forces in the Zamboanga Peninsula and Basilan, as well as some in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan.

Today, the MILF is headed by Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim. The former MILF Chairman and founder, Salamat Hashim, died in 2003. The MILF has established a parallel “government” with three separate branches: a legislative branch (the Majlish Al-Shoorah), an executive branch (consisting of the Chairman and Heads of Department of the Central Committee), and a judicial branch (the Islamic Supreme Court). The MILF’s military branch is the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), which consists of six divisions.

The MILF claims to have 70,000 armed fighters across the island. However, according to the Philippines Army intelligence, as of 2003, the MILF had 12,000 members with 9,000 firearms. The MILF has wide support from the Muslim community in Mindanao and neighboring islands in the south.

In terms of links to other groups, there have been allegations that the MILF has official links with groups such as Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). This has been denied by the MILF’s Chairman as well as by the government’s Office of the Presidential Advisor to the Peace Process. Allegations of official links with the ASG have also denied by the MILF. Nevertheless, there may be some individual (as compared to official) links between members of the groups.

The MILF signed the Deed of Commitment in March 2000 and renewed its commitment in 2002. It has informed Geneva Call that, “the MILF leadership did issue an order banning production and use of AP mines and victim-activated IEDs to all members” of its forces.

However, allegations were made of new mine use up until 2004. The Landmine Monitor has reported that “before the escalation of fighting in 2003 there were two other landmine incidents involving the MILF.”

Group Profile

The MILF, led by Salamat Hashim, broke away from the MNLF in 1977, over a disagreement in running the organization after the signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement by the MNLF and the Philippine government.

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References:

3. This territorial demarcation corresponds to what the MILF calls the “Moroland”.
4. Understanding the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Questions and Answers [MILF Central Committee, 1996] and Email from the MILF, Received October 2005 [2005].
6. Profile of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF Central Committee, 2000].
8. Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Furthermore, between April 2003 and March 2004, two more incidents were attributed to the MILF by the armed forces. The armed forces further reported to have found “live landmines close to bunkers and trenches around former MILF camps.” The MILF has denied these allegations, requesting an independent, international mechanism for monitoring and verification of allegations lodged against them.

The MILF has the capacity to produce landmines and has done so in the past, producing both AP and AV mines. The landmines have been of three types: improvised AP mines (Cartridge 60 mm High Explosive), improvised AP mines (steel ammo-box), and improvised AV mines (plastic container). Mortar rounds have also been used to produce improvised landmines.

There have been no reports indicating that the MILF has traded or purchased landmines. However, in 2004 media reported Philippine government allegations of the MILF training NPA members in the manufacture of explosive devices, including landmines. The MILF’s Chairman, has denied these allegations, stating that the MILF remains committed to the mine ban that it accepted by signing the Deed of Commitment.

In accordance with its Deed of Commitment obligation, the MILF has reported that it has no more stockpiles since signing the agreement.

### Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP)

**Group Profile**

The CPP/NPA/NDFP was formed in 1969 following waves of popular uprising in the midst of demands for land reform.

The CPP/NPA/NDFP has “Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought” as its “theoretical guide”. Its aims are national democratic revolution and land reform, and the establishment of a new, communist rule. The NPA is the armed wing of the CPP and the NDFP. The NDFP is the umbrella that includes both the CPP and the NPA as component organizations.

The CPP/NPA/NDFP is primarily based in rural areas all over the Philippines. Traditional NPA areas of operation are the northern region of Luzon Island, the interior of Samara and Panay Islands (Visayas), and the mountainous region of Mindanao. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the CPP/NPA/NDFP also has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centres in the Philippines.

Jose Maria Sison, now living in exile in the Netherlands, founded the NPA in 1969 and now functions as their Chief Political Consultant. The NPA is controlled by the CPP’s Central Committee, which consists of 26 members, and its politburo of eight members. The CPP’s Central Committee, the National Command of the NPA and the NDFP’s National Council are all based in the Philippines where policies and decisions are made. Some sources

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466 Ibid.
471 Balencie and Grange, Mondes Rebelles: Guerillas, Milices, Groupes Terroristes, Encyclopédie Des Acteurs, Conflits & Violences Politiques p. 575.
allege that Sison is the overall leader of both the political and military wing of the organization, but this is categorically denied by the NDFP.475

The NPA currently has a force of around 10,000 members, in comparison with the 25,000 to 30,000 of earlier years.476 The Philippine military has estimated the number of NPA combatants to be slightly lower, at 8,500 combatants with 6,200 firearms.477 However, according to Mondes Rebelles, the NPA maintains a widespread national presence, with representatives in close to 2,000 rural regions.478

The group allegedly has enjoyed broad support from rural communities (especially during the rule of Ferdinand Marcos), from which it collects financial support by levying “revolutionary taxes”.479 From the beginning of the insurgency until 1976 the group’s principal external support was allegedly from China. New financial sources were found in the 1980s and support currently comes from supporters in the Philippines, Europe and elsewhere.480

In a letter to Geneva Call, the NDFP has stated that the NPA has no external sources of weapons and produces its own firearms and explosives, with the most significant parts of its weaponry being those seized from the Philippine army.481 In addition, as a mobile guerrilla force possessing limited numbers of weapons, the NDFP has claimed that “the NPA takes good care of its weapons and do not leave them behind in abandoned camps for the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to capture.”482

### Landmine Use Profile

The CPP/NPA/NDFP has admitted to mine use. In a letter to Geneva Call the NDFP notes that it uses landmines, but solely non-victim-activated types: “[t]he CPP strictly prohibits the use of self-detonating (noncommand-detonated) landmines and allows only the use of command-detonated landmines aimed at specific legitimate military targets [military vehicle and troops].”483 The detonation of mines is said to take place “upon sight of the enemy vehicle or military target”, thus ensuring that “civilians and other non-military targets are not harmed.”484

In 1998 the NDFP and the Philippine government signed a joint humanitarian statement, the “Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law” (known as the CARHRIHL), recognizing the need for respect for human rights and humanitarian law, including the right of the Philippine people not to be subjected to the use of landmines.485 The NDFP has also declared, in a written statement directed to the Government of Switzerland and to the ICRC, that it will follow the Geneva Conventions.

In response to a questionnaire issued by the Landmine Monitor researcher for the Philippines in April 2001, the NPA admitted to use of improvised, command-detonated mines in ambushes.486 The CPP/NPA/NDFP stated that AP mines are indiscriminate and continue to kill after the conflict is over.487 However, committing themselves to the ban was not advisable “as long as threatened communities are forced to resort to the use of arms to defend themselves against overwhelming superior reactionary military forces and providing themselves with improvised weapons like homemade mines is one of the too few options available to them.”488

The NPA has used landmines repeatedly in 2003, 2004 and 2005. It has admitted to using improvised command-detonated AV mines, and according to the

478 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 292.
480 Loveman, Non-State Actors in the Philippines, and Group Profile: New People’s Army.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
487 Ibid.
488 Letter to Geneva Call from the National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Committee, Dated 27 October 2005.
Landmine Monitor 2003, it has also admitted to using command-detonated AP mines.\textsuperscript{488} While army and media reports accuse the NPA of using or possessing AP mines,\textsuperscript{489} there has been no independent confirmation of NPA use of victim-activated mines. The Philippine army reported in early 2005 that AP and handmade Claymore mines had been found in abandoned NPA camps. In addition, conceivable quantities of detonation cords or wires were found, which may suggest the use of “command-wired” triggering mechanisms.\textsuperscript{490} In response to such allegations, the NDFP has denied that the NPA deploys mines other than command-detonated ones.\textsuperscript{491} The NDFP has instead accused the government of receiving Claymore and other sophisticated landmines from the U.S. government, and of using them against the NPA.\textsuperscript{492} The CPP/NPA/NDFP has also accused the army of planting “self-detonating” AP mines in Barrio Dicamay Uno in Jones, a forested area in which fighting took place.\textsuperscript{493} None of these allegations have been independently verified, although Geneva Call sent a letter to the Philippine government strongly recommending that it investigate the allegations.

The NPA appears to use mainly handmade mines, but there is little specific information as to how they are made. The use of factory-made mines appears to be rare and is probably limited to Claymore mines confiscitated from the government.

The rationale for NPA mine use is that, as a “regular mobile or guerrilla force” it deploys command-detonated mines around its camps. The reason given for the use of command-detonated (rather than victim-activated) mines is that the former do not endanger the safety of NPA members.\textsuperscript{495} In 2005 there have been several cases of AV mines being used by the NPA for defensive purposes, while the army was searching for or following NPA rebels.\textsuperscript{496} The NPA also uses command-detonated AV mines in offensive operations targeting military vehicles and troops,\textsuperscript{497} and for ambushes.\textsuperscript{498}

The NPA has allegedly been responsible for the death or injury of civilians in mine incidents involving soldiers. However, there is insufficient information as to what the civilians were doing at the location of the blast.\textsuperscript{499} According to media reports, NPA members are vulnerable to their own mines. It was reported in May 2004 that ten rebels were killed and six wounded while trying to plant a landmine.\textsuperscript{500}

The NDFP has claimed that the NPA produces only limited quantities of firearms and explosives, using “very crude, manual and decentralized” production methods, and that the supply of explosives and other materials is “very limited and irregular.”\textsuperscript{501} The Philippine police confirm that the NPA produces improvised mines, including improvised Claymore mines.\textsuperscript{502} Recent recoveries by the army indicate that the NPA has access to material for crafting their own mines and other weapons.\textsuperscript{503} The Philippine army

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\textsuperscript{488} Landmine Monitor 2003, p. 398.

\textsuperscript{489} In Davao Oriental in August 2003 a truck with five Army engineers hit what was mentioned as an AP mine, allegedly planted by the NPA. Rigoberto Sanchez, who is, according to the Inquirer News Service, the spokesperson of the NPA’s Merardo Arce Command, said that they were the ones who had targeted the engineers. However, the victims died, which indicates that it could rather have been question of an AV mine. Anthony Allada and Ferdinand Zuasola, “Army Slams NPA for Attack on 5 Engineers,” Army News Service 21 August 2003.


\textsuperscript{491} Letter to Geneva Call from the National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Committee, Dated 14 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{492} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{494} Email from “Ka Julian,” NPA, to Fred Lubang, 2001.

\textsuperscript{495} Letter to Geneva Call from the National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Committee, Dated 14 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{496} For example, three soldiers were killed and three wounded in a mine blast in the northern Philippines. The army blamed the NPA for the blast. (Mike U. Crismundo, “Gov’T Soldier Dies in Blast,” Manila Bulletin April 14 2005.) According to police sources, the soldiers were pursuing the NPA when their vehicle was blasted. Villamor Visaya Jr., “3 Soldiers Killed in Landmine Blast in Isabela,” Inquirer News Service 12 April 2005. In early April 2005 the military accused the NPA of having used IEDs in Suriaga del Sur, alleging that the group planted improvised landmines on “the barangay and provincial roads in Suriaga del Sur in an attempt to stop the hunt.” (Mike U. Crismundo, “1 NPA Rebel Slain, 5 Gov’T Soldiers Hurt in Fierce Fight,” Manila Bulletin Online, Available: http://news.inq7.net/breaking/index.php?id=243455, 5 April 2005.)

\textsuperscript{497} Letter to Geneva Call from the National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Committee, Dated 14 May 2005.


\textsuperscript{500} Letter to Geneva Call from the National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights Committee, Dated 14 May 2005.

\textsuperscript{501} In April 2005 the army reported finding an underground tunnel used by the NPA which had to be cleared of planted bombs and landmines. The tunnel allegedly contained “bomb-making rooms” and materials for making bombs, including “explosive ingredients, rolls of detonating cords, wires and blasting materials, capacitors, ignition switches, bomb timers, four rolls of electrical wires, 40 kilograms of ammonium sulfate, one gallon acid solution, several bottles of ferric chloride, epoxy, icon battery packs and antennas, landmine sputters, electrical grid, electric drill, drilling set, bolt cutters, clamps, soldering iron, weighing scale and several sticks of dynamite.” The seized camp reportedly belonged to the NPA Front Committee 4-A. Crismundo, “Gov’T Troops Overrun Big NPA Camp inside Tunnel.”

\textsuperscript{502} Army raids have included the recovery in late March 2005 of 346 hand grenades main charges, 11 hand grenades, a hand grenades hammer, 244 non electric blasting caps and 2 containers of TNT claymore mines, 5 packs of hand grenade safety pins, a sack of hand grenade safety levers, 70 electrical blasting caps, a can of black power and a roll of detonating cords. And in early May 2005 the army “discovered an underground tunnel w/c being used by the CPP/NPA as bomb factory and Command Center. Recovered truckloads of explosives during clearing operations. C-4 explosives; 30 rolls detonating cords; 3 rolls of commercial detonating cord, 4 rds Ammunition of B40 Grenades launcher, 30 home made hand grenade w/o blasting cap.” Chronology of Landmining Incidents Perpetrated by CTs (2002-15 Jul 2005).
Fact Box: Baluchistan and FATA/Warziristan, Pakistan

There have been frequent media reports during 2003-2005 of new landmine use by local groups in Pakistan (non Kashmir). According to reports, 87 people were victimized by AV mines and 17 by AP mines between June 2003 and July 2004 (including both old and new landmines). Of a total number of 142 victims, over 50% were civilians. Two areas of the country stand out in the statistics: Baluchistan and the Federal Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA)/Waziristan. Of these, over 50 incidents took place in Baluchistan and 40 in FATA. As information concerning responsibility for new mine use is scarce, it is impossible to produce comprehensive NSA profiles.

Baluchistan

Since 2002 the security situation of Baluchistan has degraded, due to the revival of the Baluchi nationalist movement, which has been fuelled by resistance to large-scale government projects in the resource-rich area. The main Baluchi armed actor is the Baluchistan Liberation Army which, according to Mondes Rebelles, has claimed responsibility for most “bomb” attacks in the province during 2004. Nevertheless, there do not appear to have been any clear allegations of mine use by the Baluchistan Liberation Army. Mine use in Baluchistan normally involves targeted deployment of AV mines against state agents. Such use has been reported in 2003, 2004, and 2005. For example, five soldiers were killed in their jeep in a landmine incident in June 2004. Civilians have also been victimized in incidents that appear to have been caused by new mine use; in a landmine explosion in May 2005, three women and two children were killed, while six others were injured. The victims were travelling in Quetta District, Baluchistan, when their vehicle hit a landmine planted in the middle of road.

FATA/Waziristan

Waziristan is one of seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. These areas have seen an increase in Pakistani military operations since 2003, the official reason being that many Taliban and al-Qaeda members fleeing from Afghanistan are alleged to have taken refuge in these regions, especially Waziristan. Sectors of the population of the FATA and Waziristan allegedly support these predominantly foreign elements. There have been frequent attacks against army and paramilitary troops, especially in Wanna (South Waziristan Agency), where “remote control bomb attacks have now become a matter of daily routine.” According to observers, these landmine attacks target soldiers and militia. Observers have stated that the main purpose of the use of landmines is “to frustrate the attacks of army and militia.” Mines are reportedly both victim-activated and command-detonated.

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504 “Philippine Army Commander: Moro Rebels Train Communists in Bombmaking”.
505 Email from “Ka Julian”, NPA, to Fred Lubang, 2001.
506 This section largely owes its existence to Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director of the Sustainable Peace and Development Organization, who kindly provided information.
507 Explosive Remnants of War, p. 132.
508 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 345.
509 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Received September 2004 (2004).
510 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 345.
511 As reported by the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Incident Report, June 1, 2005 (2005).
512 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 345.
513 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Received September 2004
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid.
516 Ibid.

Fact Box: Insurgency in Southern Thailand

Separatist insurgents are currently operating in the Muslim-majority southern Thai provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. Although there is a history of violence in the region, its intensity has increased since early January 2004, causing an estimated 840 deaths. Several groups, mostly of Malay origin, are active in the region, all striving for independence, and some for the establishment of an Islamic state. The most significant of these are the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate, the Pemuda, the Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani and the small New Pattani United Liberation Organization. Despite a tendency among commentators to characterize these groups as “jihadists” seeking Islamic revolution, the International Crisis Group has argued that local issues, including widespread poverty and repressive government policies, have also contributed to the insurgency.

Roadside IED attacks are increasingly used as a prelude to guerrilla ambushes. Indeed, it appears that IEDs have become a staple in the operations of these insurgents, whether in a rural setting (where their use bears similarities to landmine deployment), or in urban areas (where they are used in a more bomb-like manner, triggered by timers). As the insurgency develops, the use of IEDs is likely to become more prolific. It is not yet clear which groups are responsible for specific attacks.

The primary targets of attacks have been Thai security forces. For example, one major incident in April 2004 consisted of synchronized insurgent attacks on police and army checkpoints across Pattani, Yala and Songkhla. Attacks have occasionally involved landmines or landmine-like IEDs, particularly where they are aimed at security personnel. In June 2004, a police team on a road near Lubobatu in Narathiwat triggered what appears to have been a victim-activated landmine. Similar devices have been set-off remotely using mobile telephones. Despite such modern technology, command-detonated IEDs that are activated through an electric wire have also been deployed. Civilians, notably teachers, have been targeted in this manner.

520 Ibid.
522 Another methodology frequently employed by the Thai insurgents involves the concealing of remote-controlled IEDs on motorcycles. Foresight: The Terrorism Threat Frequent Intelligence Report for Business and Commerce, Issue 5, May (Hazard Management Solutions, 2005).
523 Thailand Islamic Insurgency.
524 See for example, “Fiscal Fantasies Leave Rural Thais in Fear” Asia Times 25 September 2004.
527 Indeed, a police truck in Narathiwat’s Sungi Padi district barely missed a large IED concealed in the road that was set up to be detonated in a remote-controlled fashion. An example of command-wired detonation occurred in February 2005, when the armed escort of a group of teachers was attacked with a roadside IED in Narathiwat’s Sri Sakhorn district. Davis, “Thai Militants Adopt New Bombing Tactics.”
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Abkhazia

**Conflict Summary**

Abkhazia has been seeking independence from Georgia since 1992. This has resulted in continuing disagreement over the political status of the territory, and has led to armed conflict. Other actors, such as Georgian armed groups known as the White Legion and the Forest Brothers, have also been involved. These groups are allegedly connected to the Georgian government, although Georgia has denied these allegations.

The Abkhazian region is currently controlled by a non-internationally recognized government, which has maintained a *de facto* independence since 1994. Despite the cease-fire agreement in 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia have failed to agree on measures to prevent armed clashes on the border, or to ease the return of refugees. The situation remains influenced by Russian-Georgian rivalry, and can be described as one of “no war, no peace”. In April 2005 tentative talks were held between Abkhazian and Georgian representatives.

**Group Profile**

Abkhazia formally requested independence from Georgia, and closer ties to Russia, in 1993. The ethnic Abkhazians, supported by members of other ethnic groups present in Abkhazia, fought Georgia for the extended autonomy or sovereignty that they had long sought during the Soviet era.

Sergei Bagapsh, the Abkhazian President, has said that relations with Tbilisi must be sorted out through negotiations between two sovereign states. He has pledged to build on integration with Russia and rules out compromise with the Georgian authorities on sovereignty. The Abkhazian territory is heavily mined.

The non-internationally recognized Abkhazian government has a leadership structure similar to that of a state. It is led by Sergei Bagapsh, who has been President since January 2005, and by Prime Minister Aleksandr Ankvab. Sergei Shamba is the Abkhazian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ICRC has previously described the Abkhazian military structure as unstable, due to a lack of discipline that develops from long-standing civil and military institutions. In addition, the ICRC has stated that it is possible that this lack of stability contributed to a breakdown in observance of the rules of war during the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

The Abkhazian military strength is estimated at 1,500 troops. During the active conflict, the Abkhazian forces relied on volunteers, both Abkhazian and from other ethnic groups, and on foreign fighters. It is believed that the Abkhazian troops receive considerable assistance from the Russian military, for example, the provision of jet fighters and the training of pilots by Russian personnel. Abkhazia has the capacity to conduct large-scale military operations.

**Landmine Use Profile**

During the active phases of the Abkhaz conflict both parties were accused of having employed landmines. Abkhazian authorities acknowledged for the first time that Abkhazian soldiers were using landmines.
in the Kodor Valley in October 2001 and in mid-2002.\textsuperscript{13} However, Abkhazia has denied more recent landmine use (2003, 2004 and 2005).\textsuperscript{14} Aside from certain reports of mine use in 2003, there have been no further allegations of mine use by Abkhazian armed forces during the rest of 2003,\textsuperscript{15} 2004 and 2005. According to Abkhazia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abkhazia would consider joining a ban on AP mines only if there were a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Georgia. However, the Abkhazian Vice President has stated that it is difficult to embrace a ban owing to the problems caused by new uses of other explosive devices by individuals determined to create an atmosphere of fear and instability.\textsuperscript{16}

Mines used have been of Soviet manufacture.\textsuperscript{17} On 25 March 2003, a 100-person Abkhazian unit from Gudauta allegedly mined its position in the 24-kilometer area under the responsibility of Russian peacekeeping forces in the Gal region. Abkhazia’s Minister of Defense denied this claim as a “provocative falsification.” There was no independent confirmation of the mine-laying.\textsuperscript{18}

Abkhazia has claimed that it has used landmines for defensive purposes in observation posts in the forest around the Gal and Kodor Valley regions.\textsuperscript{19} Previous mine use has included heavy road-mining. Mines were also laid in the flat fertile valleys to add to the natural obstacles formed by rivers.\textsuperscript{20}

During the conflict of 1992 and 1993, an unknown number of AV mines and AP mines were laid across Abkhazia. Mines can be found throughout southern and central Abkhazia but the major concentrations are in Sukhumi, the Abkhazian capital.\textsuperscript{21} The Gali area is also especially affected, as both major and secondary roads have been mined.\textsuperscript{22}

Abkhazia has stated that its soldiers dig up and remove the mines they have planted once they move on.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, it is difficult for outside observers to confirm whether this is always the case. On the whole, mines and UXO from the earlier conflict have led to the abandonment of homes, agricultural land, orchards and industrial estates. Mines will also become an obstacle to the repatriation of some 300,000 displaced persons.\textsuperscript{24}

As reported by the Landmine Monitor, Abkhazia is not believed to have produced nor exported AP mines. Abkhazian forces maintain a stockpile of AP mines, although its size and composition remains unknown.\textsuperscript{25} However, as mentioned above, most mines used in the conflict were of Soviet manufacture.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{center}
\textbf{South Ossetia}
\end{center}

\textbf{Conflict Summary}

In 1989, the Georgian region of South Ossetia declared itself part of the Russian-Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and in 1990, declared its sovereignty. In response, in December 1990, Georgia abolished South Ossetia’s autonomous status. Fighting broke out in January 1991, resulting in large-scale displacement of the population.\textsuperscript{27} During a cease-fire in July 1992, a peacekeeping force comprising Georgians, Ossetians and Russians was established.

Little progress has been made since then in bringing Ossetians and Georgians closer together, and the two parties have remained in a situation of “no peace, no war”.\textsuperscript{28} However, in July and August 2004, due to some renewed military activity, this stalemate

17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 Mines were planted in Sukhumi in large numbers along the south bank of the Gumista River (the northern front of the Georgian forces throughout most of the war). Mines were also placed on the northern bank of the Inguri river (the present de facto frontier and the southern front of the Abkhazian forces since the end of the fighting) and along the M27 corridor, the main supply route for the Georgians during the war. Richard Boule, Knights in Armored Vehicles: The Halo Trust in the Caucasus, Mine Action Information Center, Available: http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/4.1/ halo.htm, 21 October 2005.
22 Profile: Georgia.
24 Email from Narine Berikashvili, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Georgia, Received 14 October (2005).
27 Most Georgians living in South Ossetia left the republic for Georgia proper. Over 100,000 Ossetian fled from Georgia and South Ossetia to North Ossetia.
threatened to erupt into a full-scale war. A new cease-fire has been in place since August 2004, although sporadic shootings still take place.

**Group Profile**

South Ossetia continues to call for either independence or integration into Russia. Internal political debate focuses on whether South Ossetia should join the Russian Federation, probably in some form of union with North Ossetia, or whether it should renegotiate an autonomous status within Georgia.

South Ossetia maintains a de facto government and has a similar (although less stable) structure to Abkhazia. Currently both sides are believed to maintain minefields in the triangular area between the Georgian capital and South Ossetia. The village of Sarabuk is known to be mined. Mines have also been found in the South Ossetian settlement of Dzha, in the area of Kemerti settlement (controlled by the Georgians) and in the Tskhinvali area.

As a separatist entity, South Ossetia has been a presidential republic since 1996, when the former head of government was elected President. South Ossetia has a multiparty system. The President (currently Eduard Kokoety) appoints a Prime Minister as leader of a cabinet of approximately 12 members, with responsibility for conducting the government. The President is also Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Igor Sanakoyev was approved as Prime Minister in September 2003 and is the formal leader of the government. However, observers have argued that the size of South Ossetia and the scope of its government are so limited that the Prime Minister is effectively subordinated to the President’s authority.

South Ossetia maintains a force of about 1,500 security and police special forces (OMON troops), which are under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. The OMON are in charge of maintaining public order and are organized like a light infantry. Security duties are also undertaken by Russian forces. There are also irregular troops, or regular troops with insufficient identification, making it difficult to determine the side to which such irregular troops belong.

The South Ossetian forces are estimated to have 30 armored vehicles, plus a number of modern artillery pieces. Georgia has stated that South Ossetia keeps reserve equipment in North Ossetia. Georgia has also accused Russia of providing armored personnel carriers, tanks and other military equipment, fuel and training to the South Ossetians. South Ossetia has allegedly also benefited from financial assistance and volunteers entering from North Ossetia. In fact, most of the South Ossetian military equipment is believed to be transported through the Roki tunnel linking North and South Ossetia.

**Landmine Use Profile**

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has stated that both Georgian and South Ossetian forces laid mines during the fighting in summer 2004. Since both parties allegedly have been using booby-traps and factory-made mines, it is difficult to attribute responsibility for mine incidents. There are allegations of frequent deployment

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 28.
27 Ibid.
29 Narine Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict [International Campaign to ban Landmines, 2004], p. 1.
30 Both the president and the parliament are elected for five-year terms, with legislative elections half way through presidential term. The parliament has 34 seats, four of which are reserved for the Georgian population (which has largely boycotted all elections). Of the remaining seats half are elected directly among the local constituency and half through proportional representation, South Ossetia.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 South Ossetia.
36 South Ossetia.
37 Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 2.
39 Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 2.
40 Landmine Monitor 2004. For more information on landmine use allegations against the Georgian government, please see the Landmine Monitor.
of AP and also AV mines.\textsuperscript{47} The existence of mined territories near Tskhinvali, to which only the South-Ossetian side has access, substantiates the mine use allegations against South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{48} Although South Ossetia does not confirm mine use, it does not deny the existence of mined territories.\textsuperscript{49}

South Ossetia has allegedly used booby-traps made from grenades, as well as factory-made AP mines.\textsuperscript{50} The mines used were either victim-activated or command-detonated.\textsuperscript{51}

According to the OSCE (as reported in the Landmine Monitor 2004),\textsuperscript{52} the parties have been using mines for defensive purposes, to target enemy combatants and to defend territory. Both military facilities and the areas surrounding villages have been mined. For instance, in 2004 a joint Ossetian-Georgian peacekeeping group discovered that the village of Sarabuk had been mined.\textsuperscript{53} According to observers, explosive devices have also allegedly been used in an offensive manner; i.e. to intentionally injure Georgian civilians and facilities. Civilians have been victimized by mines. In 2004, one individual was injured by a mine while collecting firewood in the forest. Peacekeepers have also been injured or killed by landmines. In August 2004, as a result of a mine explosion near the village of Kehvi (in the Dzhaba area), Ossetian members of the peacekeeping forces died.\textsuperscript{54} In June 2005, one Russian peacekeeper was killed and two Georgian policemen were injured by a landmine in the conflict zone.\textsuperscript{55} Military personnel are reported to comprise only 10% of those injured by mines; the remainder are peacekeepers and civilians.\textsuperscript{56}

As to mine production, the South Ossetians are believed to produce booby-traps made out of trip-wired grenades.\textsuperscript{57} It is possible that South Ossetia has access to powerful explosives: in Dzhaba in March 2002, aside from 23 anti-tank mines, 20 kilograms of tetryl and 43 kilograms of ammonite prepared for explosion were discovered.\textsuperscript{58} However, it is not known to whom this material belonged.\textsuperscript{59}

As in the case of Abkhazia, there are strong allegations that Russia provides South Ossetia with weapons, although no specific details are available regarding the origin or stockpiling of mines. During a military confrontation in 1992, an engineering-sapper foundation was plundered and it is believed that over 3,000 mines disappeared in the zone of the conflict.\textsuperscript{60} The fate of these mines is not known.

## MACEDONIA

**Mine Ban Treaty:** Party

**CCW Amended Protocol II:** Party

### Albanian National Army (ANA)

**Conflict Summary**

Although the exact origins of the Albanian National Army (ANA) remain unclear, the group first emerged in the late 1990s-early 2000s as part of a wider struggle by ethnic Albanian militants in Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia) and Serbia-Montenegro. The ANA has claimed responsibility for attacks on the security forces of Macedonia, and of Serbia-Montenegro, as well as attacks on ethnic Serbian targets and international forces in the UN administered province of Kosovo. Recently there has been paramilitary activity linked to ethnic Albanian combatants in Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo; although the extent to which they are organized under one group remains unclear.\textsuperscript{62}

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\textsuperscript{47} Interview with Narine Berikashvili, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Georgia, Geneva, June 2005.

\textsuperscript{48} Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Narine Berikashvili, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Georgia, Geneva, June 2005.

\textsuperscript{51} Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{52} Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 968.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{55} Georgia (South Ossetia) 1990-.

\textsuperscript{56} Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict.

\textsuperscript{57} Interview with Narine Berikashvili, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Georgia, Geneva, June 2005.

\textsuperscript{58} Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{59} Email from Narine Berikashvili, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Georgia, Received 14 October.

\textsuperscript{60} Berikashvili, Problem of Explosives and Weapons in the Zone of Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{61} Mother tongue name: Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare (AKSh)

Group Profile

The ANA is an armed group about which information is often contradictory and therefore of questionable reliability.\(^6^4\) According to some specialists, the ANA was founded in December 1999 by a faction of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that was dissatisfied with the decision of its leadership to officially disband after the 1999 conflict in Kosovo.\(^6^5\) The group's creation remains unknown, but some analysts believe that the fighters were former members of armed groups.\(^6^5\)

The aims of the group are also contested, but they seem to involve a unification of all ethnic Albanian populations or an improvement in the situation of these populations.\(^6^4\) Others have argued that the ANA is simply a group of criminals and traffickers attempting to conceal its activities behind a political agenda.\(^6^7\)

The group operates in various countries, principally in Macedonia,\(^6^8\) south Serbia and Kosovo. All of these countries and territories are known to be mined from former conflicts.\(^6^9\) It remains unclear whether ANA is principally a Macedonian phenomenon, or whether it is beginning to focus its operations on Kosovo, using the Presevo Valley as a base.\(^7^0\)

Macedonian security forces, as well as former National Liberation Army (NLA) commanders, have agreed that the ANA is poorly organized, largely based in Kosovo and not a serious threat to Macedonia.\(^7^1\) The actual number of ANA armed combatants remains unknown. Former NLA commanders disparaged the ANA as having only about 20 members, while Macedonian security forces have estimated it to have between 100 and 150.\(^7^2\) According to unconfirmed Serbian sources, the number of combatants may be substantially higher.\(^7^3\)

The ANA apparently comprises former radical members and combatants of the KLA, the NLA and the Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvedgja and Bujanovac (UCPMB), respectively.\(^7^4\) The group is said to consist of elements of the Kosovo Protection Corps, a UN-formed civilian body composed of former KLA combatants. The ANA does not seem to have much popular support in its main areas of operation.

The persons in control of the ANA and its decision-making processes remain uncertain. The Front for Albanian National Unity (FBKSH) is allegedly the political wing of the ANA.\(^7^5\) The leaders of the FBKSH, and thus presumably also of the ANA\(^7^6\) are considered to be: Gafurr Adili\(^7^7\) (also known as Valdavet Vardari), under arrest since 2003; Spiro Butko (also known as Vigan Gradica); and Idajet Beqiri (also known as Alban Vjosa).\(^7^8\) Idajet Beqiri, who is also currently under arrest, has been described on an ANA website as the General Secretary of the FBKSH. He is also the leader of the Party for National Unity in Albania, which is thought to be very close to the ANA.\(^7^9\) The ANA appears to operate as a small clandestine group; the general characteristics

\(^{6^2}\) For a long time the ANA has been regarded as a “virtual” guerrilla group that existed entirely in cyberspace. Interview with Hans Rissel, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Macedonia and ANA Expert, June 2005 (Geneva: 2005).

\(^{6^3}\) Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability? (Tirana/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p. 6. However, some analysts suppose that the ANA first appeared in Macedonia in February 2000 with the release of a communiqué claiming responsibility for a 13 January 2000 attack in Arachinovo that killed four Macedonian police officers. Rissel and Paes, “Macedonia Two Years after Ohrid- a Successful Example of International Conflict Resolution?,” Südosteuropa Zeitschrift Heft 4-6 (2003).

\(^{6^4}\) The KLA, the National Liberation Army (NLA), and the Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvedgja and Bujanovac (UCPMB).

\(^{6^5}\) The nature such improvements would take is unclear, but could include an abandonment of the Ohrid Agreement, and an independent Kosovo, autonomy or international control of the Presevo Valley, federalization of Macedonia, the autonomy of the Albanian region in Montenegro and the creation of improved conditions of the Albanian minority (See for example Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflicts Terrorisme Et Contestsations, pp. 1572-1573., Jeff Bieley, Albanian Factions Clash, Mala Recica, Macedonia: Institute for War and Peace, 2002), and M. Mijailovic, Serbian Paper Outlines Alleged Albanian Guerrilla to Destabilize Region (Blic, Belgrade: 2005).) According to others, the ultimate goal would be nothing less than the creation of a Greater Albania encompassing parts of Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Northern Greece. Paes, “Macedonia Two Years after Ohrid- a Successful Example of International Conflict Resolution?.”


\(^{6^7}\) Interview with Hans Rissel, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Macedonia and ANA Expert, June 2005.

\(^{6^8}\) Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 546.

\(^{6^9}\) Allegedly there are ANA commanders in Kosovo [in Podujevo and in Prizren], in Montenegro [in Rozaj and Ulcinj] and in Macedonia (Tetovo, Debar, Lipovo and Skopje) and even in Greece.

\(^{7^0}\) Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?, p. 7.

\(^{7^1}\) Ibid.

\(^{7^2}\) According to this source, Kosovo would be divided into seven operational zones, Montenegro into three, Macedonia into five and Greece into two, each zone numbering 200-700 combatants. M. Mijailovic, Serbian Paper Outlines Alleged Albanian Guerrilla to Destabilize Region.

\(^{7^3}\) AKSh-ANA: Qui Soutient La Nouvelle Guérilla Albanaise?

\(^{7^4}\) Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?, p. 7.

\(^{7^5}\) The National Committee for the Liberation and Defense of Albanian Lands (KKCMTSH) had formally merged with the Tirana-based Party of National Unity (PUK) to form the FBKSH. Ibid.

\(^{7^6}\) Paes, “Macedonia Two Years after Ohrid- a Successful Example of International Conflict Resolution?.”

\(^{7^7}\) Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?, p. 8.

of these groups are that they are difficult to delineate and prone to splintering. It remains unclear whether the ANA fighters have a proper structure of command.80

The ANA allegedly seeks political and financial support in neighboring states and among the Albanian diaspora in Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, Greece and other countries.81 There are strong allegations of links between the Albanian militants in Macedonia with the former KLA, UCPMB and NLA structures.82 The International Crisis Group (ICG) has also indicated that members of Albanian military and intelligence services would sympathize and assist the insurgents based in Presevo and in Macedonia.83

According to the ICG, weapons originating from arms caches in Albania can easily enter into Kosovo and Macedonia. Borders remain porous and only some progress has been made at slowing the flows of weapons to and from northern Macedonia.84

Landmine Use Profile

The ANA has claimed responsibility for several mine incidents; however it is unclear which incidents the group has actually caused. The group has made no known statements regarding a mine use policy.

It seems that the ANA uses AV mines, and possibly also AP mines. The strategy behind the ANA’s mine use seems to be mainly offensive, targeting soldiers or officers of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Mines have also been used in a defensive way, when trying to deter police and military movements in the border areas and close to weapons caches.85 Mine use has also targeted infrastructure.

On 18 April 2003 ANA claimed responsibility for detonating a mine on a railway bridge in Loziste in northern Kosovo, which killed the three men who had planted it.86 Allegedly the suspects were members of the Kosovo Protection Corps.87 Other mine or IED incidents have taken place in Kosovo in 2005, but it is not clear that these are linked to ANA.88

In 2002 incidents involving use of AV mines but also one AP mine took place in Serbia-Montenegro. In 2003 alleged new landmine use continued to be reported. In February 2003 the ANA claimed responsibility for an AV incident89 that killed one man and wounded two in the Bujanovac municipality.90 However, as underlined by the Landmine Monitor, it remains unclear if all or any of these incidents represent new use or result from earlier deployment.91

Ethnic Albanian insurgents have been known to employ landmines.92 For example, during and after the Kosovo conflict, parts of southern Serbia were mined by Albanian insurgents in attacks on Serb security forces.93 The majority of contamination in Kosovo occurred in 1999 and was caused by the Yugoslav armed forces, the KLA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).94

Nothing is known regarding mine production by the ANA, although IEDs have been used as bombs. In general, weapons reach Kosovo and Macedonia from caches in Albania. In Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo, AP and AV mines continue to be discovered in caches.95 Most but not all of these weapons are of Chinese origin which, according to observers, indicates that they are most likely from Albania’s stockpiles.96 It is not clear whether the ANA controls such arms caches.97

80 Barnett, “Kosovo and Macedonia: Flag-Ends or Freedom Fighters?.”
83 Ibid., p. 13.
84 Ibid.
89 Ibid. p. 711.
90 Ibid. p. 546.
91 Ibid. p. 715.
92 Ibid. p. 1208.
93 A total of 40 AP mines and six AV mines were discovered during 2003 in Serbia-Montenegro (Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja). Six hidden weapons caches were discovered including four Chinese AP mines. In Kosovo, weapons caches including landmines continued to be discovered by the Kosovo force on a regular basis: in February 2003, 224 grenades and mines were seized; in March, 198 grenades and mines; in July, 27 grenades and mines and in November, 230 grenades and mines. Ibid. pp. 714 and 1208.
94 Albania produced guns under Chinese license. Since licensed production of Chinese weapons is widespread, however, it is possible that the weapons may have originated elsewhere.
RUSSIA

Mine Ban Treaty: Non-signatory
CCW Amended Protocol II: Party

Chechen Insurgents

Conflict summary

The most recent conflict between the Chechen insurgents and Russian troops began in September 1991. After the fall of the former Soviet Union, inhabitants of several territories in the south of the new Russian federation declared their independence, including the Chechens, who declared the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Russia responded by sending troops, and fighting persisted until 1996, when Russia agreed to withdraw its troops in return for the insurgents disarming; however, there was no agreement on the question of Chechen independence. When Chechen rebels invaded the nearby region of Dagestan in 1999, Russian troops were once again sent into Chechnya. The conditions have deteriorated ever since.

Group profile

Since the declaration of independence in 1991, Chechen insurgents have been fighting for self-determination for the region. However, according to Ilyas Akhmadov (who was appointed Foreign Minister of Chechnya in 1999), “it is a mistake to represent this war only as a war for independence - independence is not a goal in itself, but a guarantee of the survival of the Chechen nation.”

The Chechen insurgents have been described by observers as a loose confederation of groups which combine independent with joint actions. According to Mondes Rebelles, this should not be taken to suggest ineffectiveness, or a totally decentralized manner of decision-making. Chechen groups are known to follow the traditional values of Chechen society, which could be described as a kind of patriarchal-egalitarian democracy with a strong collective decision-making process. According to Akhmadov, the Chechen resistance has a clear command structure. The former leader, Aslan Maskhadov, was the elected President during the “autonomous period” from 1996 to 1999 and until recently, also headed the political leadership. Maskhadov was killed by Russian security forces in March 2005, and Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev has since succeeded him. Sadulayev has been described by Jane’s Intelligence Review as a more radical Islamist, as more distant from the realities of the guerrilla war on the ground and as having less real authority over the fighters than Maskhadov.

According to estimates, there has been a significant decrease in the military strength of the Chechen insurgents since the first years of the war, from close to 45,000 combatants (of which 15,000 were “regular” militaries and 30,000 were “reservists” or armed civilians) to 6,000 in 2003, a number which, according to official Russian statistics, included approximately 2,000 foreign fighters.

According to Ilyas Akhmadov, Chechen resistance is organized into units, based on the structure of the former army of the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”. The Chechen army units were transformed into guerrilla units following the fall of Grozny in February 2000. In addition to the armed resistance formerly controlled by Maskhadov there are two other factions; namely, groups preferring more radical methods of fighting (their main leader being Shamil Basayev), and small temporary formations (motivated by revenge). Even though the majority

9 The information on the groups in Chechnya which have been using landmines is insufficient. Incidents are often referred to as being caused by “insurgents”. As it has not been possible to construct separate profiles for the groups operating in Chechnya, this report treats the Chechen “insurgents” as a collective entity.
102 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 446.
104 Ibid.
106 Makarenko, “Chechen Militants Threaten Increased Terrorism.”
107 As quoted in J. Daly, “Chechnya Revisited: War or Peace,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (2003).
109 Ibid.
of fighters are radical nationalists who are not united primarily by religion, the primary bond for the members of other radical groups is their Islamic identity.

The Chechen insurgents currently operate mainly in the districts of Vedeno, Nozhai-Yurt and Shali, in other parts of Russia (Dagestan and Ingushetia) and in Georgia. There are allegedly strong links between resistance units in other north Caucasus regions like Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardinno-Balkaria.  

**Landmine Use Profile**

Observers have stated that the mine use in Chechnya has increased considerably when compared with the 2001 to 2002 period. Both parties to the Chechen conflict are known to continue deploying significant numbers of landmines.

The Chechen insurgents have not made any statement of adherence to a landmine ban. They have, on the contrary, underlined the difficulty or impossibility of adhering to any such ban. The former President of the Chechen Republic said in an interview in March 2000 that the decision to use mines is one made by junior commanders, and that their use would only increase as the war continued.

The Chechen rebels normally use AV mines and command-detonated improvised AV mines rather than factory-made AP mines, although AP mines have also been employed. There have been unconfirmed allegations of the use of trip-wired mines. Both parties to the conflict use the same types of factory-made mines (mainly Soviet-manufactured) since these have been abundantly available as a legacy of the Soviet era. Russia allegedly has evidence that Chechen rebels have used Italian-made plastic landmines. The insurgents have also deployed booby-traps, which are triggered by the victim. According to the Landmine Monitor, the past year’s increase in the use of improvised mines can be attributed to a reduction in Soviet stocks in combination with the ready availability of IED material.

The purposes of mine use by the Chechen insurgents are both offensive and defensive. Offensive use is generally the targeting of vehicles. Mines are sometimes detonated in sequence; the first halting the vehicle, and the second occurring once reinforcement and/or sappers have arrived. Defensive use includes planting mines around camps and on tracks leading to them, as well as delaying pursuing troops. Infrastructure such as railroads, electric supply lines and other economic targets have also been targeted by mines. Booby-traps have also been used, probably to create a climate of fear among the soldiers. Kristina Davis has suggested that it would not make sense for the Chechen forces to plant indiscriminate devices, since the rebels are dependent on local support. This would lead them to predominantly use command-operated IED or AT mines, rather than victim-activated AP mines.

Landmines have been an integral part of the conflict for both parties. Rebel mines have been planted mostly on roads. Mines used for defensive purposes have not been mapped. According to a UN report, between June 2002 and June 2004 there were a total of 444 civilian casualties, with more than half of...

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110 See the Fact Box on Dagestan.
111 Akhmadov, “Chechen Resistance: Myth and Reality”.
113 One Chechen parliamentarian has noted that “any questions pertaining to the antipersonnel mine ban, which may be put by a sovereign state in peacetime to the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, are unacceptable at the present time.” As quoted in Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 1186.
114 As quoted in ibid. p. 1186.
115 There have been reports of devices triggered by radio signals transmitted to a walkie-talkie. “Sappers of Federal Troops Avert Act of Terror in Chechen Capital,” Itar-Tass 22 July 2003.
117 In the Shali district two trip-wire mines were found at a roadside in a village (Chiri-Yurt). A soldier was wounded when demining them. “Gunmen Kill Russian Marine in Chechnya,” Itar-Tass 4 August 2003.
120 Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 1188.
121 The majority of Russian military mine casualties in 2003 were caused by landmines exploding under regular or armored vehicles. Ibid.
124 Davis, “Chechnya: Reconstruction Amidst the War.”
those in Grozny.\(^{126}\) According to UNICEF, since the beginning of the conflict in 1994, mines, booby-traps and UXO have resulted in at least 3,130 civilian victims, of which 674 were children.\(^{127}\) Many individuals were victimized while collecting wood, food and water or when traveling. The most heavily mined areas are those in which rebels continue to put up resistance,\(^{128}\) notably in the south and in Grozny.\(^{129}\) Civilians living in these villages and towns are seriously affected by mines. Apart from the direct effects (i.e. injury and death), mines result in agricultural land being unusable,\(^ {130}\) cattle being killed,\(^ {131}\) and an increase in the social and economic vulnerability of the local population. In addition, there are (unconfirmed) allegations that insurgents have paid civilians, including children, to plant mines.\(^ {132}\) Landmines sometimes injure the Chechen insurgents themselves (e.g. when they are planting mines).\(^ {133}\)

After two decades of war, weapons in Chechnya are plentiful. There is allegedly extensive arms traffic between the two parties, with trade in Russian-made weapons, including landmines and small arms.\(^ {134}\) Improvised mines frequently appear to be made from UXO (e.g. mortars).\(^ {135}\) Other IEDs appear to be filled with scraps of metal to increase their lethality.\(^ {136}\) As to booby-traps, mines have allegedly been hidden in clocks, cigarette lighters, mobile phones, children’s toys, piles of trash\(^ {137}\) and beer cans.\(^ {138}\) Unconfirmed sources have alleged that insurgents are taught how to make landmines, including how to make remote controls from ordinary objects, such as radios.\(^ {140}\)

It is probable that Chechen groups keep reserves of mines. Stocks appear to be spread out, and their size and content are difficult to determine. Some indications are given by the continuously discovered arms caches, allegedly belonging to the rebels, containing mines and material for IED production. In Grozny and Vedeno districts, Russia said it had found 13 arms caches which contained, among other things, some 10 kilos of explosives, 49 mines and shells.\(^ {141}\)

"[T]he mine and UXO contamination is ever present at various degrees all over Chechnya. Mines are often laid around military positions, in the forests, on the outskirts of villages, in abandoned areas, on tracks, along the roads, around strategic places, etc. Booby-traps and UXOs can be found everywhere, especially in the former battle areas as well as in abandoned and destroyed zones."

UNICEF, “Children in light of the mine and unexploded ordnances presence...”\(^ {142}\)

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\(^{126}\) More specifically, between 1 January and June 2004 there were no less than 45 new incidents, with a total number of 80 victims reported. Of these, 24 were estimated to have been caused by AP mines, 24 by AT mines and six by booby-traps.


\(^{128}\) Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 1190.

\(^{129}\) Groznsky district and Grozny have shown to be the most contaminated areas. Children in Light of the Mine and Unexploded Ordnances Presence, Chechnya, RI: Survey on Knowledge, Attitude, Practices.


\(^{131}\) Landmine Monitor 2004, p. 1190.

\(^{132}\) “Mine Warfare Shows No Signs of Abating in Chechnya.”


\(^{137}\) “Mine Warfare Shows No Signs of Abating in Chechnya.”

\(^{138}\) “Russian Sapper Wounded by Bomb Blast in Grozny,” Interfax 28 July 2003.

\(^{139}\) “Mine Warfare Shows No Signs of Abating in Chechnya.”


\(^{142}\) Children in Light of the Mine and Unexploded Ordnances Presence, Chechnya, RI: Survey on Knowledge, Attitude, Practices p. 10.
Fact Box: New Use of Remote-Controlled Devices in Dagestan

Violence broke out in Dagestan, a Russian Republic neighbouring Chechnya, in August 1999, when an Islamic body declared an independent state in parts of Dagestan and Chechnya. Chechen fighters crossed into Dagestan in support of the rebellion. After fierce clashes with Russian forces, the fighting ended within a few weeks. Nevertheless, 2005 has seen an increased use of command-detonated explosive devices by rebels in Dagestan, with observers putting this “large-scale guerilla warfare” on the same level of intensity as the Chechen conflict. The Dagestan conflict has been interpreted by many observers as a spill-over of the Chechen conflict. Indeed, contacts between the rebel groups are reportedly strong. The main insurgent group operating in Dagestan nowadays is believed to be the Shariat Jamaat, and this group has claimed responsibility for some of the recent attacks.

Since the end of June 2005, rebel attacks in Dagestan have become more frequent and more intense. From 25 to 30 June, no less than eight remote-controlled devices went off, apparently targeting police and security personnel exclusively. To our knowledge, there have been no reports of the use of victim-activated explosive devices. Examples of recent attacks include those that occurred on 1 July 2005, when a very powerful explosive device was detonated alongside a convoy of soldiers, resulting in 42 dead and 142 wounded, and on 25 June 2005, when a police car in Makhachkala was blasted. The mine that caused the blast, a so-called “roadside bomb”, was hidden on the side of the street. The device was handmade and, according to the Russian police, contained nuts, bolts and nails. Another explosion went off when the police responding to the attack arrived. Infrastructure, notably trains and pipelines carrying natural gas from Russia to Azerbaijan, have also been targeted. In the latter case, gas exports were temporarily interrupted.

143 After the end of the reporting period, a similar development has taken place in Ingushetia, with increased use of remote-controlled explosive devices.
146 However, unlike Chechnya, where ethnic Chechen nationalism has been the main factor in anti-Russian resistance, in Dagestan there are no less than 34 ethnic groups. Despite this, the various rebel groups active in Dagestan appear to have united “under principles of Islamic equality”. Sebastian Smith, Another Muslim Uprising Brewing in Dagestan, 7 August 2005, The Dawn, Available: http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/07/int14.htm, 10 October 2005.
147 Smirnov, From Chechnya to Dagestan: Basaev’s Second Front.
151 Galeotti, “Dagestan Reaching ‘Critical Level’.”
152 Arrests over Dagestan Bombing, 25 June 2005, BBC.
153 Ruchala, Dagestan: Militant Leader Bites the Dust.
156 Smirnov, Attacks Increase in Dagestan, but Officials Remain Silent.
Transfer of Landmines

The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of AP mines. A large number of states (146) have signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, with the result that trade in AP mines has decreased substantially throughout the world. Indeed, amongst the achievements registered in the Landmine Monitor 2004, is that “the trade in antipersonnel mines has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade.” However, given that landmine incidents continue to plague many countries, with quite devastating results, it is clear that even this low level of trafficking should be eradicated.

Although it is difficult to identify the routes and mechanisms by which the illicit trade in mines occurs, various data and studies give credence to its existence and prevalence. The international press reports periodically on mine seizures in a variety of countries, thus demonstrating that mines continue to be traded despite the existing de facto international ban. However, information about how mines arrive at their final destination is scarce, and only on rare occasions is such information sufficiently reliable to provide an accurate picture of the processes involved in the trade in mines.

In this respect, the report recently published by Amnesty International about arms transfers to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) constitutes a telling example. It reveals several sources that have provided landmines to this country. Aside from the legal transfers made to government forces by a variety of states (China, Czech Republic, Zimbabwe) the study identifies transfers of arms and landmines to the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma) by Rwanda, facilitated by Rwandan military authorities and business leaders. A Congolese NGO affirms that the territories of Burundi, Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe also constitute potential supply sources of mines, which are produced in countries such as China, North Korea, Russia, the U.S., Belgium, France, the former Yugoslavia, Germany, Switzerland and Bulgaria. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to estimate the number of mines transferred or details concerning their transportation or delivery.

Press reports sometimes refer to black markets as sources of landmines. However, few details are available about the location of black markets or their manner of operation. The most researchers know is that mines tend to arrive on black markets from the excess stockpiles of countries, and that groups from conflict-ridden countries take advantage of their availability.

NGOs concerned with the mine issue have long expressed alarm at stockpiles of mines that have not been destroyed and are frequently kept in very insecure locations, particularly in the countries of the former Soviet Union which inherited large quantities of mines. The same concerns have been expressed as regards “failed” states such as Somalia (see Focus Case on “Stockpiles of Landmines under the Control of NSAs: the Case of Somalia”). Concerns have also been raised regarding the policies of the U.S. and the Russian Federation (being two of the largest mine producers) towards the Mine Ban Treaty. In the U.S., there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the law banning the transfer of all AP mines will be renewed when it expires in October 2008 and whether the Bush administration will decide to begin transferring self-destructing AP mines, which are not considered

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157 This section was written by Ruxandra Stoicescu.
158 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the “Mine Ban Treaty”).
159 Landmine Monitor 2004. p. 11.
162 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Amnesty from the Congolese NGO Horizonte Kiné, Received September 2005 [2005]. It is not clear whether the acquisitions were legal or from the black market.
166 Amnesty mentions the presence of landmines among other weapons. It is not clear where the mines came from. Democratic Republic of Congo: Arming the East, and Email from the Congolese NGO Horizonte Kiné, Received September 2005.
167 The best known cases are the Cambodian and Thai black markets, which seem to have supplied mines to various NSAs, including in Burma/Myanmar. See Human Rights Watch World Report. Cambodia, 2000, Human Rights Watch, Available: http://www.hrw.org/ww2k/asia-02.htm, Myanmar’s Forgotten Minefields, 2000, Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 2005.
168 In the past decade reports drawn by the UN and various NGOs have pointed to the fact that ammunition, arms and explosives have been taken from existent stockpiles and illicitly transferred to different conflict areas. Ukraine, Transdniester and Albania are but a few countries whose stockpiles have fed into global arms transfers. See Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions against UNITA, 2000, UN Security Council, Available: http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/angolareport_eng.htm, 4 October 2005.
dangerous to civilians. Similar questions exist in relation to Russia’s policies. Russia’s five-year moratorium on the transfer of non-detectable and non-self-destructing mines expired in 2002, but authorities have affirmed that it is still respected.

The U.S. and Russia are but two examples of a relatively unclear legal climate surrounding bans on transfer of mines. States that are significant mine producers frequently maintain an ambiguous attitude towards the complete ban on landmines, observing the Mine Ban Treaty in a de facto sense, but failing to ratify it. The unclear legal climate results in a permissive environment for the development of illicit trade and it is the legal climate that should be clarified in order that other reforms may then take place.

In conclusion, as a first step in resolving the legal uncertainties, it is important that further resources are devoted to researching the means and routes by which mines are trafficked. To this end, more attention should be paid to the discovery of mines with other types of weapons. Often, field research on small arms and light weapons will uncover arsenals comprising a variety of arms, including mines. However, insufficient attention is paid to the number and provenance of the mines because of poor issue linkage (the focus falling too narrowly on small arms) and because it is the effects of mines, rather than their supply, that is often the focus of the mine issue. If reports such as the Amnesty International report on the DRC can identify the types of ammunition and the quantities transferred to a country, there is no reason to believe similar information could not also be obtained on mines.

**TURKEY**

**Mine Ban Treaty:** Party

**CCW Amended Protocol II:** Party

*Kurdistan People’s Congress / Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kongra-Gel / PKK)*

**Conflict Summary**

The so-called “Kurdish Question” is at the heart of this conflict. The Kurdistan People’s Congress / Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kongra-Gel/PKK) advocates recognition of the fundamental rights of the Kurdish people and has been fighting against the Turkish government since 1984. Despite a cessation of hostilities being in operation from 1999, armed opposition to Ankara restarted in 2004.

In conclusion, as a first step in resolving the legal uncertainties, it is important that further resources are devoted to researching the means and routes by which mines are trafficked. To this end, more attention should be paid to the discovery of mines with other types of weapons. Often, field research on small arms and light weapons will uncover arsenals comprising a variety of arms, including mines. However, insufficient attention is paid to the number and provenance of the mines because of poor issue linkage (the focus falling too narrowly on small arms) and because it is the effects of mines, rather than their supply, that is often the focus of the mine issue. If reports such as the Amnesty International report on the DRC can identify the types of ammunition and the quantities transferred to a country, there is no reason to believe similar information could not also be obtained on mines.

**Group Profile**

The Kongra-Gel/PKK was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan. Since then, the organization has drawn its primary support from amongst the ethnic Kurds of south-eastern Turkey (as well as those in the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Syria and Iran). The Kongra-Gel/PKK’s original aim, independence, was altered to self-determination in 1999. The struggle for autonomy is rooted in a belief that the Kurdish people are a distinct nation that has been oppressed by the Turkish government. Today, the Kongra-Gel/PKK advocates the creation of a confederated Kurdish system (without political autonomy) within the boundaries of those states currently counting Kurds amongst their populations.

The Kongra-Gel/PKK was formerly led by the movement’s Presidency, Executive Council and General Assembly, with the President controlling the organization and its operations. Before his capture in 1999, Öcalan had made the Presidency one with his personal control, having undisputed authority over all elements of the Kongra-Gel/PKK. After his arrest however, the organization began a period of self-

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170 The Kongra-Gel/PKK was known as KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) from 2001.


172 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received September 2005 (2005).
reflection and internal readjustment. This culminated in the development of a new structure in which the Kongra-Gel/PKK forms the lynchpin of a variety of Kurdish organizations, and in which a chief goal is the maintenance of doctrinal unity and direction. This new arrangement is layered and the Kongra-Gel/PKK retains its own internal structure, the Kurdistan Democratic Federation, consisting primarily of the Presidency and Executive Council. Finally, the Kongra-Gel/PKK’s armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces (Hezen Parastina Gel or, HPG), is relatively autonomous of the Kongra-Gel/PKK, although many of its members are also in the Kongra-Gel/PKK. HPG acts according to Kongra-Gel/PKK strategy. The decisions taken by the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra-Gel), and co-operates freely with “brother parties” in other Kurdish areas, such as Iran. The period over which the new arrangements were to be implemented also generated differences of opinion within the Kongra-Gel/PKK, bringing about some internal division.

In 1997 the Kongra-Gel/PKK consisted of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 combatants. After the arrest of Öcalan however, many fighters allegedly fled to Iraqi Kurdistan. Nevertheless, the Kongra-Gel/PKK’s military strength is still believed to be considerable: according to estimates provided by Jane’s Intelligence Review, there are 5,000 armed Kongra-Gel/PKK cadres based in the area bordering Iran and in the region controlled by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in northern Iraq, as well as in Iran. In addition, Turkish security forces estimate that there are 1,500 to 1,800 Kongra-Gel/PKK cadres inside Turkey, and a further 500 to 1,000 militants in neighboring Syria.

The Kongra-Gel/PKK has thousands of supporters in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq and across Europe – a constituency that is able to provide funding and propaganda for the organization. Previously, unconfirmed reports had suggested that the then-Kongra-Gel/PKK received support from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Greece. Other states alleged to have aided the Kongra-Gel/PKK are Cyprus and Armenia. Since 1991, aid in the form of safe-havens for Kongra-Gel/PKK fighters has also periodically been provided by NSAs in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Landmine Use Profile

In a letter to Geneva Call the President of the Kongra-Gel, Zubeyir Aydar, stated that the HPG has banned AP mines and expressed their willingness to collaborate with Geneva Call.

The Kongra-Gel/PKK has admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but strictly denies any use of explosives that could be activated by a victim or a vehicle. The mines used, according to the Kongra-Gel/PKK, are modified AV mines. Reports from the early 2000s have suggested that the Kongra-Gel/PKK used primarily commercially-manufactured mines, such as Italian-made mines.

173 At its April 2005 Congress, the Kongra-Gel/PKK declared itself part of the Kurdish Democratic Federation – a variety of Kurdish groups and organizations declaring their affiliation to a pan-Kurd confederation. The Kongra-Gel/PKK provides the latter with its chief philosophical and ideological leadership. The PKK gives general orientation to the Kongra-Gel, which is the organization that takes and implements decisions within the Kurdish Democratic Federation. Currently, Kongra-Gel/PKK claims to control at least 32 local administrations across Turkey, including the largest in Diyarbakir Municipality. Ibid.

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid.

176 At the beginning of 2004, a group left the Kongra-Gel/PKK and founded a new organization advocating peaceful struggle for the Kurdish cause and the democratization of the Kongra-Gel/PKK itself. Led by Nizamettin Tas, it also opposes the PKK’s federalist objectives. Ibid.


181 Letter to Geneva Call from Zubeyir Aydar, President of the Kongra-Gel, Dated 24 October 2005.

182 The HPG has admitted to sporadic AP mine use until 1999. Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.

The Kongra-Gel/PKK has stated that it uses mines in self-defense, when attacked by the Turkish army. However, judging from current incidents, commander-detonated mines appear to be utilized also in ambushes. There have been a few reported cases of victim-activated mines; however, it is contested whether the Kongra-Gel/PKK was responsible for these.

The Kongra-Gel/PKK has used landmines to target military personnel traveling on roads. Only during the first seven months of 2004, according to the Landmine Monitor, the Turkish government cited at least 77 military casualties (17 killed and 60 injured) due to mines.

There were also numerous incidents involving mines in the first half of 2005. In May 2005, four soldiers were killed in a mountainous area of Siirt province when their vehicle hit an alleged Kongra-Gel/PKK landmine in the road. In June 2005, two Turkish civil servants were killed when their truck hit an alleged Kongra-Gel/PKK mine. A taxi driver in Tunceli was severely wounded after his vehicle hit a remote-controlled mine. In early July 2005, a cargo train was derailed in Erzurum by a remote-controlled mine that some government sources linked to the Kongra-Gel/PKK.

The areas of operation of the Kongra-Gel/PKK are heavily mined. The Kongra-Gel/PKK has estimated that it has "hundreds of combatant and civilian victims of antipersonnel mines laid by the Turkish army in our mountains and in the areas where we have bases". In addition, Kongra-Gel/PKK members have allegedly been victimized when trying to plant mines.

The Kongra-Gel/PKK has the capacity to produce landmines and has done so in the past. It also has the ability to manufacture explosives. At present, commercially-manufactured landmines are readily available from Iraq, so there would be no need for production within the Kongra-Gel/PKK. Nevertheless, the group has revealed that its units deploy explosives that are extracted from UXO/ERW and that are then used to modify devices. Recent reports from the Turkish government allege that the Kongra-Gel/PKK is introducing considerable quantities of CV explosives into Turkey from Iraq. The Kongra-Gel/PKK has stated that it has not transferred mines to other actors.

According to questionable data, the Kongra-Gel/PKK had huge stockpiles of mines in the late 1990s. Some newspaper sources have stated that approximately 14,000 to 15,000 (assumed) Kongra-Gel/PKK mines were captured in 1999, the majority of which were allegedly Italian-made AP mines. The Kongra-Gel/PKK itself has denied having stockpiles. In addition the Kongra-Gel/PKK has affirmed that it has conducted both humanitarian and military demining.

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184 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.
185 Allegations concerning the use of landmines by NSAs in Turkey should be approached with caution. As underlined by the Landmine Monitor 1999, it is very difficult in some situations to determine the organization responsible for planting mines and indeed, whether particular landmines are newly-placed, since there is a "large unknown and unmapped number of mines" on Turkish territory. Landmine Monitor Report 1999, (United States of America: Human Rights Watch, 1999) p. 823. The Turkish government has repeatedly attributed incidents involving AP mines to the Kongra-Gel/PKK, and the organization has denied responsibility for such actions. The Kongra-Gel/PKK has also accused the Turkish government and paramilitaries of using landmines. (Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.) Independent monitoring has proven difficult.

191 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.
193 Telephone Interview with Mehmet Balci, Former Landmine Monitor Researcher for Turkey and Geneva Call Staff, October 2004.
194 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.
196 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.
197 As quoted in the Landmine Monitor 2000, pp. 849-850.
198 Ibid.
199 Email from the Kongra-Gel/PKK, Received October 2005.
200 Ibid.
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COLOMBIA

Mine Ban Treaty: Party
CCW Amended Protocol II: Party

Conflict Summary

Colombia has been at war for almost 41 years. The conflict has its roots in a struggle over land distribution and the inclusion of marginalized sections of society into Colombia’s political and economic development. During the four decades of conflict, many guerrilla and paramilitary groups have appeared and disappeared. Today the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de la Liberación Nacional, ELN) are the main groups. The conflict continues despite efforts to restart negotiations.

Other actors in the Colombian conflict are the different paramilitary groups, many of which are gathered under the umbrella of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). Some paramilitary groups are currently negotiating with the government and some have begun demobilizing.

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Group Profile

Inspired by the Cuban Revolution and liberation theology, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de la Liberación Nacional, ELN) is Colombia’s second largest guerrilla group. It was founded in 1960, although it did not take up arms until 1964. Its political goals have varied over the last forty years. The ELN’s initial aim was to transform the capitalist political system into a socialist one. However, gradually, there has been a decreased emphasis on the creation of a socialist state, in favor of a popular democracy for all Colombians, as a way to further socio-economic transformation. The group has also advocated a more important role for the provinces with respect to Bogotá.

The ELN’s main geographical areas of influence are in the states of North Santander, Santander, South Bolivar, Cesar, Antioquia, Arauca and Nariño.

The group is led by its five-member Central Command (Comando Central del ELN, Cocel, which is the executive body. Decisions are taken by the National Direction, the larger coordinating body of the ELN, which includes regional military commands and specialized branches, such as women’s movements. The ELN is a well-organized, highly decentralized group for which political issues are considered to override military considerations. Nevertheless, the ELN does not have a political wing; it is more akin to an armed political party.

The number of combatants is currently estimated to be between 3,000 and 4,500. There is a clear structure of command, where the troops are controlled by the Cocel, the National Direction, the Regional Directions and the locally-based Fronts.

The support base of the ELN is mainly rural people living in remote areas. The group’s financial resources come from levying a “revolutionary tax” and collecting ransom money from retenciones (kidnappings). The Colombian government estimates that the group is only marginally involved in drug trafficking, involvement that the group has always denied.

Landmine Use Profile

The ELN acknowledges landmine manufacture and use, stating that landmines are a necessary weapon

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1. The section on Colombia was prepared by the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines.
2. Many priests, including Camilo Torres, an icon of the Liberation Theology in Latin America, were and are in the ranks of the ELN. For a number of years, the top leader was Manuel Perez, a Spanish priest.
3. The National Direction has 21 members.
of defense against government troops and paramilitary groups. In addition, the ELN claims that, as a guerilla group with limited financial resources, it is unable to give up using landmines completely (the cost of producing a mine varies between one and three U.S. dollars).

Nevertheless, the ELN has agreed to enter into dialogue with local communities and humanitarian actors on the landmine issue. It has warned the local populations of the locations of AP mines and of areas to avoid. Such notification has taken place verbally and through the use of signs and road banners. In 2003 the ELN said to Geneva Call that, although it could not adhere to the Deed of Commitment, it would start taking measures to reduce the impact of landmines on civilians and begin a pilot program of mine action. In June 2004, the ELN proposed a humanitarian agreement, including restrictions on the use of landmines and explosives, to the government, which reacted positively to the initiative. However, the government conditioned its agreement on a general cessation of hostilities by the ELN, a condition that the group considered unacceptable.

According to media reports, civilian organizations and NGOs, all military units of the ELN are involved in landmine use. There are numerous reports of landmine use near schools, soccer fields, rural roads, and other areas where the ELN suspects that the army might set up a temporary base. The ELN has stated that it uses mines in a defensive manner (e.g. to stop governmental and paramilitary troops from entering certain areas) rather than indiscriminately. The ELN has also said that it warns communities about where its mines have been planted. According to guerrilla and community members however, there is limited information in the form of maps or other documents showing where mines have been placed.

The ELN uses mainly handmade mines. It has been alleged that the ELN produces IEDs very frequently and that all combatants know how to make mines. The ELN produces, among other types, a special type of landmine known as *quiebrapata* (triggered by victim-activation) and makes mines *tipo sombrero chino* that are activated by the victim or by remote-control, thus sharing the double activation possibility of Claymore mines.

There is no information about the acquisition of factory-made mines by the ELN, or their transfer to the ELN from other groups. In order to produce mines, the ELN uses explosives that can be acquired on the local markets (e.g. fertilizers which are transformed into explosives) or purchases dynamite on the black market. The ELN allegedly also has access to explosives by buying from individuals linked to the armed forces (acting in their personal capacity). The containers used are numerous, but include vehicles, electricity poles, and even dolls. Production takes place in their camps.

Not much information is available regarding stockpiles of mines kept by the ELN. It is generally believed that the ELN does not keep many mines stockpiled. When government forces discover arms caches, they do not often contain mines. However, mines are sometimes produced in large quantities at the same time for particular purposes (for example to create a mine field) and it is possible that they are then stockpiled for short periods of time.

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**The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**

**Group Profile**

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were founded in 1964. The group had its roots in the communist self-defense groups which were formed to protect peasants from powerful landowners as a response to the displacement of peasants in the 1940s and 1950s.

There have been two major rounds of peace talks between the FARC and the government, the most recent having broken down in 2002. Currently the government of President Alvaro Uribe has modified its position regarding dialogue with the FARC; from total reluctance to a willingness to begin negotiations, provided certain conditions are met by the FARC.

The group follows a Marxist-Leninist ideology, with special adaptation to rural Colombia.
the FARC’s traditional goal is to overthrow the Colombian government and replace it with a Communist system, their aims have been modified. The FARC currently claim to fight for a peace with social justice, in a society that includes the marginalized sectors of the political process, as well as land reform.

The FARC operate all over Colombia, except for the San Andres Island located in the Caribbean Sea. Although the FARC do not have control over territory, there are vast areas that are under their influence. Parts of their areas of operation are mined. In addition to the more permanent camps, the FARC have mobile units that operate nationally.

The FARC are the largest NSA in Colombia and have a presence in the majority of towns. It consists of 13-member commands, which are primarily composed of rural people. Its estimated military force is 13,000 combatants and around 15,000 armed militias.

The FARC’s historical leader is Pedro Antonio (alias Marín Manuel Marulanda Velez). The organization is led by a seven-member national command, called the Secretariat. The Secretariat is elected from the “Estado Mayor Central”. Two key members of the Secretariat are the FARC spokesperson Raul Reyes and Ivan Marquez. There is a clear command structure within the FARC, with commanders reporting to the different levels in the military hierarchy.

The FARC have had a political wing, the Bolivian Movement for a New Colombia (Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia) since 2002. The political wing has its own political and social organizations but has little visibility due to the mainly military character of the organization.

The group’s main areas of support are the rural areas. Its sources of financial support are believed to be drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping. Despite their significant financial resources, the FARC have retained the capacity to produce their own weapons, including automatic weapons, explosives, rifles and mines.

### Landmine Use Profile

The FARC have increased their landmine use since the breakdown of the peace negotiations in 2002. Although there are no recent official statements, in former years the FARC have publicly admitted to mine use, while stating that their mine use is conditioned by “high respect and care for the civilian population”. The last official statement concerning admitted mine use took place in 1999, although locally and regionally-based commanders have confirmed present mine use.

Observers agree that the FARC do not use any particular type of mine, and that the devices used depend on the “creativity” of the combatants. Currently all mines appear to be handmade, although factory-made mines have been employed in the past. Mines are frequently victim-activated, but they are also employed against vehicles. There are also allegations that the FARC plant booby-traps.

According to media reports, the FARC use landmines defensively and to control populations. In the former case, landmines are planted as a defense barrier against the advance of military and paramilitary troops. Since this is an integral part of their strategy, the FARC supply each of their fighters with a few handmade mines. The FARC are known to mine the access areas to the permanent camps. The mobile units also use mines to prevent the progress of armed forces. In the latter case, mines are placed on roads in order to hinder displaced populations from returning to conflict areas, enabling the group to determine who should and who should not be allowed to go back to his or her home regions. Used in this way, landmines become a means of controlling not just territory, but the population itself. In addition, there are allegations that the FARC use mines to protect coca fields. However, it is difficult to determine if mines are planted in order to prevent individuals from collecting coca leaves or to avoid military encounters in these areas.

Mines are primarily planted in rural areas, especially in roads or connecting routes between areas. In...
some cases, the mines are placed in areas where it is expected the army will be based (e.g. schools, playing fields or plots of land).

The FARC’s mines are made from everyday materials (e.g. plastic, cans, and syringes). Some of the handmade mines reportedly contain very low levels of metal, which make them difficult to detect. According to the army, the FARC also mix coffee into the explosives, in order to confuse mine dogs. The FARC are known to be able to produce explosives out of fertilizers, but they have also looted explosives from the armed forces. There is no information concerning stockpiling of mines by the FARC. However, there have been media reports documenting government captures of alleged FARC mines.

Impact of NSA Mine Use in Colombia: Civilians and NSAs

According to the Colombian Mine Observatory (Observatorio de Minas Antipersonal), 31 of the 32 departments of Colombia have reported landmine incidents; the only department that remains completely unaffected is the San Andres Island. As reported by the Mine Observatory, the total number of mine victims in Colombia between 1990 and October 2005 was no less than 4,163, of which around 40% were civilians. It is evident that the presence of mines in the ground has a significant effect on the population, in addition to the consequences of the conflict itself. This has been confirmed in some preliminary reports. Some major consequences of the presence of mines include:

➢ Direct impact: The targeted individuals are mostly soldiers; nevertheless, many civilians, notably peasants and other individuals who live in the rural areas, also have been injured and killed.

➢ Land denial/forced displacement: Mines have been responsible for confining populations, relocating roads and obstructing the transportation of food and other materials. It has been reported that the inhabitants of Sonsón municipality, Antioquia, cannot leave their villages because all of the roads are mined. Landmines are also suspected of having been placed in areas vital to peasants, thus hindering them from harvesting, bringing water, attending school, or using sports fields or roads.

Not only the civilian population, but also the NSA fighters themselves are victimized by their own mines while making, planting or removing them. Not surprisingly, there are no exact estimates of the numbers of NSA mine victims. Various sources suggest that the numbers are considerable. In some cases, NSA-victims may receive medical treatment in a civilian hospital, but they are also treated in hospitals and rehabilitation centers in their camps, when available. There is no reliable information on the number of mine victims among the ELN and FARC fighters. According to discussions with communities in the more conflict-affected areas, some of these groups’ mine victims sustain minor injuries, while others die due to lack of medical care.

It should be noted that the number of deaths and injuries sustained by the Colombian army and the paramilitaries is even greater. According to estimates, there are approximately one hundred acknowledged paramilitary victims. Paramilitary groups are also strongly suspected of landmine use, although they have always denied this.

20 Conducted jointly by the CCMC and the Survey Action Center.
Insurgent actions, and the government responses that they have elicited, constitute the source of conflict in Peru. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) has been the most active of the two rebel groups (the other being Tupac Amaru). Despite the arrest of its founder and several leading members, the surviving core of members has recently declared its intention to resume high profile military operations.

The revived SL appears to operate under the central leadership of “Comandante Artemio,” who heads a Central Committee that remains loyal to the wishes of Guzmán, as communicated from prison. There are a number of factions within the wider SL movement, most significantly Proseguir la Lucha Armada (or “Onward with the Armed Resistance”). Proseguir is centered in and around the Ene and Apurímac valleys in the eastern Andes, and is said to consist of SL cadres from other units who have regrouped.

The SL is currently said to lack widespread popular support. There are signs, however, that this situation is changing as SL assumes a growing role as “protector” of the coca industry, which is vital to the rural Peruvian economy.

Several media sources have pointed to possible connections between the SL and the Colombian FARC. It is also believed that the SL has learned military strategies and financial strategies [e.g. kidnappings] from FARC. Due to the reorganization within SL, there is little information available on the

23 Also Partido Comunista Perúano/Peruvian Communist Party.
26 Ibid.
28 Sendero Luminoso Perú.
31 Declaraciones De C. Artemio (2005).
36 McDermott, “The Shining Path Glimmers Again.”
current cadre strength, although one report has put this at between 400 and 500 armed fighters in 2003.37

Landmine Use Profile

Based on media reports since the summer of 2003, the SL appears to be a sporadic user of landmines.38 There were no allegations that the SL was using landmines in 2002,39 2001 or 2000. The Peruvian government has denied mine use by NSAs in Peru. It seems that IEDs have been found, but it is unclear whether these were being put to use as landmines.40 According to media reports, official sources have indicated that booby traps (i.e. victim-activated explosive devices) have been used.41

In June and July 2003, there were reports of mine use in the Huanta province, although without confirmation from the SL itself.42 These attacks apparently targeted military personnel. In one instance, a government soldier was maimed after stepping on a mine planted in an area in Pampa Aurora, Ayacucho department, Huanta province, near to which his patrol had recently engaged the SL (Proseguir) cadres.43 According to a report, the SL has used dynamite to build basic AV mines in the past. The report also notes that it is possible that incidents of IEDs have remained unreported due to the “remoteness” of the conflict.44

Media reports in 2002 stated that FARC fighters had been sighted in the Peruvian jungle carrying landmines with them.45 Although the commencement of the SL’s recent mine use occurred after reports of FARC presence in Peru, according to the Landmine Monitor Researcher for Colombia, there have been no outspoken allegations that FARC has transferred mines or knowledge about making mines to the SL.46 Even though alleged mine use by the SL has remained largely unconfirmed, it still has had an impact on the civilian population in the Sivia area. A local newspaper reported in June 2003 that peasants were refraining from collecting coffee beans and fruit during harvest time (in the area where an alleged mine killed two guides and a number of soldiers) for fear of stepping on mines.

No information is available on transfer, production, or stockpiling of landmines by the SL.

40 Email from Gustavo Laurie, Geneva Liaison Officer, UNMAS, Received 26 June 2005 (2005).
41 “Poblabores De Sivia Piden Desactivar Las Minas Dejadas Por Los Senderistas,” El Comercio 13 June 2003.
46 Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Colombia, Received October 2004 (2004).
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Declaraciones De C. Artemio. 2005.


Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Colombia, Received October 2004. 2004.

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ALGERIA

Mine Ban Treaty: Party
CCW Amended Protocol II: Non-signatory

Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)

Conflict Summary

The Algerian civil war erupted after the cancellation of the legislative elections in 1992, which were won by the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). The conflict has been conducted between the police and security forces on the one side, and Islamic militants, namely the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut), the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Armé Islamique, GIA) and more recently, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC), on the other. The GSPC rejected a peace offer from President Bouteflika in 1999, and in the early 2000s, the GSPC stepped up its attacks.

Group Profile

The GSPC was formed in 1998 by 600 members of the GIA, one of the two armed wings of the FIS. It was created by Hassan Hattab, a former GIA commander, allegedly due in part to the GSPC’s opposition to the GIA’s practice of collective civilian massacres in favor of military actions targeting security forces. The ideology of the GSPC is based on the militant Wahhabi branch of Sunni Islam, and the group aims at the overthrow of the government and the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria. The GSPC is now considered to have overshadowed the GIA regarding the effectiveness of their actions.

Although the conflict is largely concentrated in the north (Kabylia) and in the east (around Tebessa) of Algeria, the GSPC also operates in rural areas in the southeast, where government control over the territory is weaker. Since summer 2001, the GSPC has also begun launching occasional bomb attacks in several towns, such as the capital, Algiers. The GSPC also operates and recruits in numerous bordering countries, such as Mali, Chad, Niger, Libya and Mauritania. In addition, it is believed that the GSPC has cells in Canada and in Western Europe.

Nabil Sahraoui seized leadership of the GSPC in 2003 and, following his death in a battle with government forces in 2004, was replaced by Abou Moussaab Abdelouadoud, the group’s current “national emir”. The succession of Abou Moussaab Abdelouadoud has been interpreted by observers as a sign that the more violent part of the movement has seized power. The GSPC lost another important leader in 2004 when Amari Saifi (Abderrezak “El-Parah”), the group’s second commander and regional leader of the Southern Command, was killed.

2 Also known as Salafist Group for Call and Combat.
6 Knights, “Algerian Operations Compress Islamist Insurgency.”
7 Balencie and Orange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 106.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
13 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 106.
14 Blanche, “Al-Qaeda’s African Mode.”
18 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations 103.
20 The Southern Command was allegedly formed by fighters that had split from the main body of the GSPC and joined remnants of another group, the Muktar-al-Muktar. Knights, “Algerian Operations Compress Islamist Insurgency.”
captured by the rebel Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad, and later handed over to the Algerian authorities.

According to analysts, recent splits within the GSPC are part of a trend which, during the last few years, has seen the group disaggregating into looser associations of brigades. The internal structure of the group can thus be described as a collection of local militias, rather than an organization with a clear command structure. In spite of this, the GSPC is currently considered to be the most effective remaining armed group inside Algeria.

According to observers, many GSPC members were former army officers, and had received military training. Although difficult to estimate, the number of the GSPC’s armed combatants seems to be decreasing slightly. In 2003, the GSPC had between 540 and 600 fighters, while in 2005, the estimated number was between 300 and 500.

In 2004, the GSPC openly stated that it sympathized with al-Qaeda; however, the issue of potential links between the GSPC and al-Qaeda remains a subject of controversy.

The GSPC receives funds from hostage taking and smuggling activities, which allows it to purchase advanced weaponry. According to the Small Arms Survey, much of the GSPC’s weaponry is bought in neighboring countries such as Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Chad. Elements within the Malian security forces would be an additional source of weapons.

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According to the International Institute for Security Studies (IISS), the GSPC also receives weapons, money and military equipment (including ammunition, uniforms, and time-fuses) externally from supporters in Europe, as well as from countries such as the Sudan and Iran.

**Landmine Use Profile**

The Algerian government has repeatedly referred to use of handmade mines by “terrorist groups” in the northern parts of the country, in which the GSPC operates. In addition, there have been several cases of use of improvised mines by the GSPC. To our knowledge, the GSPC has not claimed responsibility for the attacks and has made no statements specifically relating to mine use.

Some of the allegations of GSPC mine use concern booby-traps and the planting of mine fields. The devices in these cases are believed to be victim-activated. No information has been obtained about possible use by GSPC of factory-made mines.

According to media reports, the GSPC uses mines for ambushes, “nuisance” (booby-traps), and base protection. There have been several recent incidents of remote-controlled IEDs targeting soldiers and municipal guards in Algeria, where IEDs are planted under the pavement, and detonated as a military convoy passes. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, by the end of 2003 the GSPC had been accused of performing 98 of the 188 recorded attacks on the security forces, counting numerous uses of roadside bombs.

As mentioned above, there have also been examples of alleged booby-trap use by the GSPC, including one episode in February 2003, when the army was searching for 32 European hostages held by the GSPC and the hostages’ cars were found booby-trapped.

In addition to using mines offensively, the GSPC also allegedly uses minefields for the protection of camps. For instance,

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22 Knights, “Algerian Operations Compress Islamist Insurgency.”

23 Historical Background.


28 More details can be found in *Islamisme, Violence Et Réformes En Algérie: Tourner La Page*.


30 Ibid.

31 Algeria (GIA and GSPC) 1992-, Latest Military Developments. That Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad provide financial and logistic support has been underlined by U.S. Department of State. Report on Terrorism.

32 According to one report provided by the GICHD, Algeria has claimed that the areas mined by “terrorists” are located mainly in the north of the country, and that the mines used are handmade and correspond to the definition given in Art. 2.2 of the Convention. *Progress in Implementing Article 5: An Overview of the Mine-Affected States Parties’ Problems, Plans Progress and Priorities for Assistance, Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies* 14 May 2003, 2003, Available: http://www.gichd.ch/, Accessed 8 October 2005.


34 Knights, “Algerian Operations Compress Islamist Insurgency.”

35 Ibid.
the area of Babor in Kabilya, one of the insurgents’ bases, is heavily mined.\textsuperscript{36} According to analysts, some bases have included up to 800 improvised mines, and are “crosscut by unmapped trails and cave systems used by the guerrillas”.\textsuperscript{37} Such devices would appear to be victim-activated.

The GSPC reportedly has the capability to produce IEDs and purportedly possesses bomb-making facilities.\textsuperscript{38} It is unclear what the IEDs are made of. However, one booby-trap allegedly planted by the GSPC was based on acetylene gas cylinders,\textsuperscript{39} and one IED was made out of a mortar shell.\textsuperscript{40}

No specific information has been found regarding the transfer of landmines or IED material to the GSPC. No information is available on potential stockpiles of mines or IEDs by the GSPC.

\textbf{ISRAEL/OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES}

\textbf{Mine Ban Treaty:} Non-signatory

\textbf{CCW Amended Protocol II:} Party

\textbf{Conflict Summary}

Since the 1960s several Palestinian groups are fighting against Israel for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The principal armed Palestinian groups are al-Fatah (and its special armed wings, the al-Aqsa Martyr’s brigades and Tanzim), Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

Hamas/\textit{Islamic Resistance Movement}

\textbf{Group Profile}

Hamas (\textit{Harakat al-Mugawama al-Islamiya}, or \textit{Islamic Resistance Movement})\textsuperscript{41} is one of the largest, best-organized and most influential radical Islamic movements operating in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Hamas grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in Egypt. Hamas was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in December 1987, following the eruption of the first Intifada.

Combining Palestinian nationalism with Islamic radicalism, Hamas aims to create an Islamic Palestinian state. Hamas’ objective is the “liberation” of the formerly Palestinian territories, and “establishment of our independent state with its capital in Jerusalem, all over the Palestinian national land.”\textsuperscript{42}

Hamas has showed a willingness to transform itself into a political party,\textsuperscript{43} and as such, it is the strongest political challenger to the current Palestinian Authority.\textsuperscript{44} Hamas also has a branch that deals with improving the social welfare of the Palestinian population.\textsuperscript{45}

Hamas operates in Gaza, the West Bank, and inside Israel. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas conducted 555 armed attacks in 2004, as opposed to 218 in 2003.\textsuperscript{46} A few senior Hamas leaders reportedly live in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf States.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{36} It is not clear from the information we have if the minefields are renewed or if they also could be made out of formerly planted mines.

\textsuperscript{37} Knights, “Algerian Operations Compress Islamist Insurgency.”

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Algeria (GIA and GSPC) 1992-, Latest Military Developments.


\textsuperscript{47} Hamas, Islamic Jihad [Palestinian Islamists].
Sheik Yassin was the group’s political leader until his assassination by Israeli forces in March 2004. He was replaced by Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, who was assassinated a month later. Since then, Hamas has hidden the identities of its senior political leadership and its current leader, Mahmoud al-Zahar, has kept a low profile. Hamas’ executive body, the Political Committee, is believed to comprise 12 to 14 members, based both inside and outside the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Decisions are usually reached by consensus.

Khalid Meshal is the President of the Political Committee and directs the organization from Damascus. Other important political bodies within the group include the Gaza Strip Steering Committee, the West Bank political leadership (today of limited influence) and the prison leadership.

The Military Wing of Hamas, the Qassam Brigades, has a separate infrastructure and leadership. Although in principle autonomous, the Qassam Brigades are considered to be a disciplined outfit whose commanders implement policies devised by the Hamas leadership. Whilst Hamas remains the most disciplined and cohesive of Palestinian organizations, divisions are believed to exist and armed actions, especially since the second Intifada in the West Bank, appear at times to have been instigated by various local cells. The number of armed combatants of the Qassam Brigades has been estimated at more than 1,000. Hamas also has a large number of supporters who are either armed or have access to weapons and militias who act in a civil defense role in areas of Gaza.

Most of its funding and logistical support allegedly comes from sponsor states, including Iran and Syria. In addition, charitable groups in neighboring states (Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) as well as Palestinian expatriates, and individuals in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, also fund Hamas’ activities. Sponsor states such as Iran are believed to deliver weapons, as well as other NSAs in the region, including Hezbollah. Nevertheless, according to observers, the Qassam Brigades have the capacity to produce their own weapons, such as rockets.

Landmine Use Profile

Although Hamas is not a frequent user of landmines, it has claimed responsibility on some occasions for landmine explosions. We are not aware that it has an official landmine policy.

Landmines are not extensively used in Israel; however, improvised AV mines have been used on a few occasions (see below). According to the Landmine Monitor researcher for Palestine Ayed Abueqtash, these devices are handmade rather than factory-made and there is no evidence to indicate the use of AP mines. It has been speculated that AP mines are not employed by armed Palestinian groups for two main reasons: first, AP mines are difficult to access; and secondly, Palestinian NSAs do not traditionally control territory. Previous years saw large-scale deployment of victim-activated IEDs. For example, when the Jenin refugee camp was overrun in 2002, close to 500 victim-activated IEDs were found. It is not clear who was responsible for planting these devices.

In May 2004 an Israeli armored military vehicle was allegedly hit by a landmine in Gaza, killing six soldiers. It is not clear whether the incident was attributed to PIJ or to Hamas, and both groups claimed responsibility for it. However, according to another media source, the incident was the result of a homemade rocket, not a landmine. In February 2003, four Israeli soldiers were killed when their tank drove over an explosive device weighing 100

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55 Though Yassin alone had the authority to impose his personal views, he rarely exercised this power, but was rather searching consensus in the internal discussions. Ibid.
56 Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Palestinian Islamists.
57 Dealing with Hamas, p. 11.
58 Ibid.
60 Dealing with Hamas, p. 11.
62 Ibid.
kilos while on patrol in the Gaza Strip. Hamas claimed responsibility for the incident, which involved an IED used as an AV mine.64

Hamas has used mines primarily in the Gaza Strip. The few incidents reported would suggest that Hamas uses improvised mines in an offensive manner, targeting Israeli tanks. In general, one reason for the lack of use of AP mines by armed Palestinian groups during recent times may be that there are no Israeli soldiers on foot in areas where the groups could target them. The groups instead use AV mines where and when they know Israeli military vehicles are passing.65

Before Israel retreated from the Gaza Strip there were frequent reports in the media of the discovery of tunnels in the Rafah area built in order to smuggle weapons from Egypt into Rafah and on to Palestinian NSAs. The entrances to these tunnels were sometimes found to have been mined, and explosives were also found in the tunnels.66

In the past, the Landmine Monitor has reported that some Palestinian armed groups were using the high explosives in landmines to manufacture other types of explosive devices,67 such as suicide bombs. These reports remain unconfirmed.68

Although reports suggest that the devices currently used by Hamas may be homemade, some sources suggest that this still needs to be confirmed.69 Israel has reported to the Landmine Monitor that in earlier years, there were large-scale efforts by armed Palestinian groups to smuggle factory-made mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices.70 No evidence has been found of the stockpiling of mines by Hamas.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, PIJ) has been particularly active since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000.71 It was founded in 1979-1980 by Palestinian students in Egypt,72 as a splinter group stemming from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. The founders of the PIJ, Fathi Shaqaqi, Abd al-Aziz Odah and Bashir Musa, appeared to have been influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran and by the radicalization and militancy of Egyptian Islamic student organizations.73

The PIJ is leading an armed struggle against the Israeli state with the object of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state.74 It is also motivated by the belief that the “liberation” of Palestine by Islamic movements would trigger the unification of the Arab and Islamic world, and lead to the creation of a greater unified Islamic state.75

The PIJ is allegedly headquartered in Damascus, Syria.76 It is influential in the Gaza Strip,77 particularly in Jenin,78 and in parts of the West Bank.79 The group is also alleged to have several offices in Beirut, Tehran and Khartoum, as well as a significant presence in Lebanon.80

The leader of the PIJ is Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who was appointed Secretary General of the group in October 1995,81 following the death of one of the

64 Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000.
68 Telephone Interview with Ayed Abueqtaish, Landmine Monitor Researcher Palestine, September 2005.
72 Palestinian Militant Groups.
73 Hamas, Islamic Jihad (Palestinian Islamists).
74 Palestinian Militant Groups.
77 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Harakat Al-Jihad Al-Islami Al-Filastini.
79 Balangie and Orange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 93.
80 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Harakat Al-Jihad Al-Islami Al-Filastini.
founders. Other alleged leaders are Bashir Musa Mohammed Nafi and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Odeh. The PIJ’s leadership in Damascus is allegedly responsible for planning attacks, sending orders for attacks to militants in the field and channeling money to them.

The group’s military apparatus, the Jerusalem Brigades (Saraya al-Quds) started carrying out attacks against Israeli soldiers in the mid-1980s. It appears to concentrate its activities in the Gaza Strip and the most radical anti-Israeli towns of the West Bank. Estimates of the number of fighters in the Jerusalem Brigades range from over 500 to 1,000.

According to the IISS, Palestinian groups rely mostly on Arab states, including Libya, Iran, Iraq and Syria, for financial and sometimes military support. Some states purportedly also provide military training. Reports have alleged that the PIJ coordinates its activities with other Palestinian groups, such as Hamas and al-Fatah, as well as the Palestinian Authority security services.

Landmine Use Profile

The PIJ is not known to have made any statements regarding its policy on landmines. It has, however, claimed responsibility for mine attacks on Israeli soldiers.

The PIJ appears to be a very infrequent mine user, instead using suicide bombs targeting public buses, or car bombs. In the few cases where mine attacks have been attributed to the PIJ, it is not known what types of mines were used. For example, in May 2004, six Israeli soldiers were killed when an Israeli armored military vehicle was allegedly hit by a landmine in Gaza. It is not clear whether the incident was attributed to the PIJ or to Hamas, and both groups claimed responsibility for it. However, according to another media source, the incident was the result of a homemade rocket, and not a landmine.

On the rare occasions that mine incidents have occurred, they have been attacks on military vehicles. The group allegedly plants improvised AV mines in locations where it is certain that military vehicles will pass. It allegedly uses IEDs and mines mainly in Israel and also in the Gaza Strip.

Indications that the devices currently used may be homemade have been confirmed by the Landmine Monitor researcher for Palestine. Israel has reported to the Landmine Monitor that in earlier years, there were large-scale efforts by armed Palestinian groups to smuggle mines, booby-traps, and other devices. However, no evidence has been found of stockpiles of mines held by the PIJ.

LEBANON

Mine Ban Treaty: Non-signatory
CCW Amended Protocol II: Non-signatory

Hezbollah

Conflict Summary

Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, ending 22 years of occupation and depriving Hezbollah of its principal raison d’être; namely, resisting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. However, the Israeli withdrawal has not ended

62 Nafi is believed to act as a liaison between fighters in the field and the PIJ’s headquarters in Syria, although he denies involvement with the group. Odeh was a founding member and spiritual leader of the PIJ who supposedly left the group due to disagreements with its leadership. Ibid.
63 Levit, “Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Islamic Jihad,” p. 3.
64 Ibid.
65 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelle, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 93.
67 Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
69 Levit, “Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and Islamic Jihad.”
70 For further information on general landmine use by NSAs in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see the Hamas profile.
72 Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000.
74 Telephone Interview with Ayed Abueqtash, Landmine Monitor Researcher Palestine, September 2005.
76 Telephone Interview with Ayed Abueqtash, Landmine Monitor Researcher Palestine, September 2005.
Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel. According to Hezbollah, the Shebaa Farms (a 25-28 square kilometer area on Syrian territory which is still occupied by Israel) belong to Lebanon. Hezbollah operates in southern Lebanon and in the Shebaa Farms, from where it continues to attack Israeli forces in that area.

Group Profile

Hezbollah was founded in 1982 in response to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel that same year. Hezbollah is a radical Lebanese organization of Islamic Shiite groups. Amongst its stated objectives are the establishment of a Shiite theocracy in Lebanon and the destruction of Israel.

Hezbollah is active on two fronts: in southern Lebanon, from where it launches attacks on Israel (for example, by firing rockets towards Israel), and in the Shebaa Farms, a territory which is controlled by Israel, but is mainly unpopulated.

Hezbollah has an established political wing which holds seats in the Lebanese Parliament and which also conducts welfare programs. Its military wing has reportedly gained popular support as a de facto security force in southern Lebanon. In 2000, its militant core was said to comprise some 600 to 800 well-trained fighters and between 2,000 and 4,000 “armed sympathizers” or reserve fighters. The military wing of the group is known as Al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Resistance.

Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah is the Secretary-General, of both the political and military wings of Hezbollah, while Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah is the group’s spiritual leader. Hezbollah has been described as operating according to a clear chain of command, with control resting with the Secretary-General, who takes the important decisions.

However, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), decisions are reached collectively and, occasionally, through a formal vote.

Hezbollah allegedly has close links to Iran and Syria. The ICG has noted that, especially following the assassination of the former Lebanese President, Mr. Hariri, Hezbollah has tried to show its solidarity with Syria.

Hezbollah has been described by an observer as a “well-armed, sophisticated and organized movement” that has ready access to weapons. During the Israeli-Lebanon conflict, many parties were alleged to have supplied Hezbollah with weapons, of which the group is still believed to possess significant stocks. In addition, weapons are readily available on the black market.

Landmine Use Profile

Some sources have indicated ongoing use of explosive devices targeting vehicles, including so-called “rock mines”, by Hezbollah. It appears that such devices are being employed in the Shebaa Farms.

There are diverging opinions as to whether the devices used by Hezbollah can be considered “mines”; whether they are factory-made or handmade; and whether or not they are Claymore mines. There is insufficient information to answer these questions here, although in press statements, Hezbollah is alleged to have claimed responsibility for incidents involving the use of rock mines.

“Rock mines” or “rock bombs” initially referred to Israeli factory-made mines deployed by Israel in southern Lebanon. The Israeli rock mines were both fragmentation and Claymore, with the mine itself hidden under an artificial rock made of fiberglass. Hezbollah successfully adapted this design, using a somewhat cruder but nevertheless sophisticated handmade mine. Hezbollah would cover the mine

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98 On international maps, the Shebaa Farms are identified as Syrian territory, but Syria has stated that it has ceded it to Lebanon. The UN recognizes the Shebaa Farms as part of the Golan Heights, and thus occupied Syrian (and not Lebanese) territory.
101 Hezbollah in Profile, Research Note No. 42 2002-03.
102 Ibid.
104 Balencie and Grange, Les Nouveaux Mondes Rebelles, Conflits Terrorisme Et Contestations p. 62.
106 Power would thus be concentrated in the hands of the “Decision-making Consultative Council” (Majlis Shura al-Qarar), a seven-member body that is presided over by Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah. The decisions taken would be binding on all of Hezbollah’s constituent bodies. Hezbollah: Rebel without a Cause? Middle East Briefing N°7 (International Crisis Group, 2003).
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
with a rubber-like material, rather than fiberglass, which it spraypaints green or grey, as required.\(^{112}\) These devices are planted on the roadside or in the middle of the road, and detonated electronically, by pressure\(^{113}\) or by mobile telephone.\(^{114}\) It would appear from this information that the strategy behind Hezbollah’s mine use is offensive, and targeted at Israeli soldiers.

Other sources have confirmed that Hezbollah uses rock mines, but have stated that these are factory-made and provided by sponsor states.\(^{115}\) Some observers assert that Hezbollah is not using AP mines.\(^{116}\) Others consider that Hezbollah has also been using booby-traps.\(^{117}\) The use of booby-traps by Hezbollah has also been reported by media, although it is not clear how these devices would have been set up.\(^{118}\)

Hezbollah has the capacity for military demining. There have been cases where deminers have been killed while attempting to cross minefields.\(^{119}\)

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**Fact Box: Iraqi Insurgents**

The U.S.-led operation against Iraq was launched in March 2003. By April 2003, Saddam Hussein’s regime was defeated. However, insurgent attacks against the coalition forces also commenced that very same month. Since early April 2005, there has been a steady increase in the number of insurgent attacks, targeting Iraqi civilians and security forces as well as the coalition forces.

The different groups fighting Iraqi and coalition forces mainly use remote-controlled and command-wired devices. Nevertheless, vehicle-triggered mines\(^{120}\) and booby-traps\(^{121}\) are also used. Most intended victims of mine/IED attacks are military, or linked to the state, but observers have stated that there are also civilian victims. Civilians may be victimized as bystanders, or when triggering victim-activated devices.\(^{122}\) According to the Foresight May report, out of a total of 497 reported violent incidents in April 2005, only six were caused by victim-activated devices, while the number of “generic command initiated IED” incidents numbered 222.\(^{123}\)

IEDs are made from an enormous variety of explosive devices. Some are modified landmines, while others are mortar rounds or artillery pieces rigged to electronic detonators.\(^{124}\) In 2004 it was estimated that most of the reused UXO, AP and AV mines that had been employed in insurgent attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces originated from the storage facilities of the former Iraqi army. During the invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces, large quantities of ammunition were known to have disappeared from these stores.\(^{125}\)

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\(^{112}\) Ibid.

\(^{113}\) Some rock bombs would be vehicle-activated. They could perhaps also be activated by persons, although in the Shebaa Farms area, there would be no soldiers or civilians on foot and no civilian vehicles. Ibid.

\(^{114}\) This is done by placing a mobile telephone in the bomb. When the vehicle is passing, a person calls the mobile telephone in the bomb and thereby detonates it. Between one and three rock mines would be planted in a row, connected to each other and to factory-made AP mines. Ibid.


\(^{120}\) Interview with Moaffak T. Al-Khafaji, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Iraq, June 2005 (2005).


\(^{122}\) Interview with Moaffak T. Al-Khafaji, Landmine Monitor Researcher for Iraq, June 2005.

\(^{123}\) The number of confirmed “command-wired” incidents and “remotely-controlled” incidents was two and 12, respectively. In addition, “vehicle-borne devices” and suicide attacks were also frequently reported. Foresight: The Terrorism Threat Intelligence Report for Business and Commerce, Issue 5, May (Hazard Management Solutions, 2005).

\(^{124}\) Some recovered devices include grenades linked to keyless entry systems and mortars linked to grenades. Remote-controlled fragmentation mines of Claymore type have also been used for the targeting of vehicles. For some of the larger devices, car batteries are used. Kim A Fog, IED – an International Threat (Stockholm: DANDEC [Danish Demining Engineer], 2005). See also “Iraq: Ongoing Insecurity Hampers Landmine Clearance,” IRIN 5 June 2005.

\(^{125}\) Email from Patrick Hirard, Iraq, October 2004 (2004).
Sources Middle East and North Africa


Profiles


### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>ABSDF</td>
<td>All Burma Students’ Democratic Front</td>
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<td>ABMU</td>
<td>All Burma Muslim Union</td>
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<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<td>AP mine</td>
<td>Anti-personnel mine</td>
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<td>Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front</td>
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<td>ARNO</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASNL/GAM</td>
<td>Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front/Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<td>ATTF</td>
<td>All Tripura Tiger Force</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia</td>
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<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Association of Volunteers in International Service</td>
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<td>AV mine</td>
<td>Anti-vehicle mine</td>
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<td>AT mine</td>
<td>Anti-tank mine</td>
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<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Colombian Campaign Against Landmines</td>
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<td>CCW</td>
<td>Convention of Conventional Weapons</td>
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<td>Chin National Front /Chin National Army</td>
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<td>Coce</td>
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<td>Communist Party of Burma</td>
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<td>Communist Party of India-Maoist</td>
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<td>DAB</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance of Burma</td>
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<td>DKB0/DKBA</td>
<td>Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization /Army</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
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<td>ENSCC</td>
<td>Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>Explosive Remnants of War</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
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<td>Front for the Liberation for the Enclave of Cabinda</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td>Swiss Foundation for Mine Action</td>
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<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
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<td>HM</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
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<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute of Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>Mong Tai Army</td>
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<td>NMSP</td>
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<td>Polisario Front</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro</td>
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<td>PSIO</td>
<td>Program for the Study of International Organization[s] of the Graduate Institute of International Studies</td>
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<td>PWG</td>
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<td>RCD-ML</td>
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<td>RAW</td>
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<td>RNA</td>
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<td>Rahawein Resistance Army</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)</td>
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<td>TSZ</td>
<td>Temporary Security Zone</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>UCPMB</td>
<td>Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvedgja and Bujanovac</td>
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<td>ULFA</td>
<td>United Liberation Front of Assam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPO</td>
<td>Un-represented Nations and Peoples Organization (no affiliation to the United Nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Union of Congolese Patriots</td>
</tr>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>UWSP /UWSA</td>
<td>United Wa State Party / Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNO /WNA</td>
<td>Wa National Organization / Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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