MINE ACTION AND ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS

REPORT

Side-event 7th MSP to the Mine Ban Treaty co-organized by
the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and Geneva Call,
19 September 2006, Geneva


The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs organized jointly with Geneva Call a side event in the margins of the 7th Meeting of State Parties (MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) on mine action and armed non-state actors (ANSAs), in particular on the implementation of Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan. The side-event gave the opportunity to Geneva Call to present a study on the Impact of Armed Non-state Actors on the Mine Ban Treaty and the proceedings of the Zagreb Workshop on Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict. Some preliminary findings of a Geneva Call-led research on Mine Action by ANSAs were also given. Thereafter, the Swiss delegation presented a Non Paper on implementing Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan.

The side-event was attended by some 50 participants, most of them from States Parties’ delegations, but as well from States not Parties to the MBT, and representatives of international organizations and NGOs.

Ambassador Jürg Streuli opened the side-event by recalling the reflection process Switzerland initiated in 2005 on how best to support the implementation of Action 46, and then gave the floor to Geneva Call.

I. Presentation by Geneva Call on the Impact of Armed Non-state Actors on the Mine Ban Treaty

For this study, Geneva Call looked at the most recent Article 7 Reports of the States Parties which may be concerned by mine-using ANSAs, as well as at the Landmine Monitor Report for those States that have not yet signed the MBT. These sources were examined for evidence ANSA mine use or the mere presence of ANSAs could affect States’ capacities to meet their MBT obligations.

The two main conclusions of the study are that:

  • If an ANSA lays anti-personnel (AP) landmines (or improvised explosive devices, IEDs, with the same effect) on the territory of a State Party, then this will be to the detriment of the latter’s ability to comply with the MBT commitments.
  • In the case of non signatory States, ANSA mine use may deter from signing the MBT. This may be for different reasons as for instance its wish to retain AP landmines as a counter-insurgency measure, its reluctance to renounce a weapon that is still available to a hostile NSA, or its understanding that it may be difficult to implement the MBT in areas under its jurisdiction but controlled by ANSAs.

The study is available at:

II. Proceedings of the Zagreb Workshop on Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict

Geneva Call briefly presented the conclusion of the workshop underlining that mine action is possible in the midst of armed conflicts. One main conclusion relates to the role of the concerned State: It was explained that a failure to perform mine action in the course of an armed conflict may be deemed as non-respect of the MBT. Although a signatory State might be prevented from implementing the provisions of the MBT in those parts of its territory that are not under its control. The State and the ANSAs operating in that area should nevertheless endeavour to carry out mine action according to the spirit of the MBT. To this end, the State should facilitate, or at least not prevent, any mine action efforts by third parties or the ANSAs themselves. Finally, the workshop showed links between mine action in the course of internal armed conflict and confidence building between the parties to the dispute.

The full report is available at:

III. Preliminary findings of a Global Report on Mine Action by Armed Non-State Actors

The study which will be launched in November 2006 completes a first report dedicated to investigating ANSAs’ involvement in the landmine problem. Examples of mine action by ANSAs were found in the areas of the five mine action pillars. The study, which builds on interviews and correspondence with key experts (principally mine action practitioners), input from ANSAs, field research and various written sources, lists the main lessons learned which include:

  1. the need to understand and adapt to the political and conflict situation;
  2. the need for confidence-building, commitment and cooperation;
  3. the need for transparency and financial control;
  4. issues in relation to the role of local communities;
  5. organizational aspects of mine action and peace-building.

The research found that the primary benefits of ANSA mine action, were the same as for other mine action; i.e. principally humanitarian and developmental. Complementary effects were considered as different, and sometimes even more important, than the primary benefits. They include: employment and stabilization; peace-building; security and disarmament; and openness to discussing other humanitarian norms.

As main preliminary finding, the research states that ANSAs should be considered as potentially positive actors in mine action, since their involvement supports the implementation of the main objective of the MBT: to reduce the humanitarian impact of AP mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) on the civilian population. Many of the ANSAs are involved in “informal” or “spontaneous” mine action which is not part of larger mine action programs and which is also not publicized. As a further finding, the study highlights the importance of third parties’ involvement in mine action in areas under the control of ANSAs in order to bring information about mine action standards, give a more comprehensive coverage of the different aspects of the mine action pillars, and bring resources in terms of equipment for and expertise in demining, MRE, victim assistance, etc.

The document is available at:

IV. Presentation of a Non Paper on Implementing Action 46 of the Nairobi Action Plan

The Swiss delegation started by recalling the first steps of the informal reflection process Switzerland initiated with regard to the implementation of Action 46 in the margins of the Intersessionals of the States Parties to the MBT in June 2005, when discussions were held on the basis of an expert paper entitled “Moving Forward on Action 46”. Switzerland endeavours to contribute thoroughly to the implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan and specifically to the parts relating to ANSAs, which are among the most sensitive issues the Nairobi Action Plan tackles. Switzerland believes that addressing the issue of mine action in areas controlled by ANSAS is of particular importance, as it addresses specifically the plight of mine affected populations in terms of a humanitarian imperative.

After a brief presentation of the structure of the Non Paper, which contains concrete and practical recommendations for concerned States, third party governments, humanitarian organizations and ANSAs regarding the implementation of Action 46, some specific measures for these four types of actors were mentioned and explained to the audience.

V. Discussion

Following the different presentations given by the panellists, the floor was opened for questions and remarks.

- A participant asked about ways to control that ANSAs conform to what they agreed to abide by when signing the Deed of Commitment (DoC).

The panellists stressed the importance, in terms of credibility, of the question of monitoring and explained the following:

  • A focal point within the ANSA serves as permanent interlocutor with regard to the implementation of the DoC;
  • ANSAs have to report on measures taken through the handing in of a compliance report;
  • A collaboration with local NGOs takes place to monitor the respect of the DoC;
  • Workshops are organized with a view to facilitating the implementation of the DoC;
  • In some countries, journalists are trained to identify the type of explosive devices used (victims activated devices or remotely controlled devices, whereby the latter are not covered by the DoC);*
  • In case of allegations of violations of the DoC, verification missions are conducted by independent external actors.

- A participant stated its preoccupation regarding the risk of substituting States Parties by NGOs considering that recommendations in the Non Paper also address the latter. The recommendation addressed to humanitarian organizations on the risk of being instrumentalised was also raised. Furthermore, the issue of contacts by NGOs with ANSAs was mentioned. He reminded the audience in this regard of the sovereign prerogative of States to control such contacts.

The panellists, while acknowledging that the Nairobi Action Plan was drafted in the framework of a governmental process, underlined the fact that States Parties have to work with different actors, including NGOs, in order to comply with obligations under the MBT. The Non Paper is not about substitution of States Parties by NGOs; it looks at ‘who can do what’. Regarding the risk for humanitarian organizations of being instrumentalised by ANSAs, it has been stressed that the rationale behind this recommendation is to insist on the importance for humanitarian organizations to stay neutral, impartial and independent. With regard to the last question, it has been reminded that a government has to be duly informed about the development of contacts with ANSAs operating on his territory.  

- A participant took the floor to welcome the initiative to draft the present Non Paper and to recall the history of the Ottawa process and reminded the audience of the reality of AP mine use by ANSAs already at the time of the drafting of the MBT. He stated the crucial importance of finding ways to include such actors in the ban. The history of the MBT showed as well the importance of the role of humanitarian organisations and of the civil society. He insisted on the fact that no legitimacy is given to ANSAs when a humanitarian approach is adopted. Furthermore, he recalled that the monitoring of mine action in areas under the control of ANSAs is the responsibility of the four types of actors the Non Paper addresses. Finally, he also mentioned the problem of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), as referred to in the definition of mine action stated in the Non Paper. He impressed on the audience the need to introduce this issue in the ongoing reflection on ANSAs and mine action.

VI. Follow-up

Switzerland encouraged all Parties to the MBT to report on the implementation of Action 46 in upcoming Progress Reports of MSPs. The reflection process on how to implement best Action 46 will be pursued with interested governments and experts in the interval of States Parties Meetings.


* The DoC defines prohibited devices as follows:
"(…) By anti-personnel mines, we refer to those devices which effectively explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, including other victim-activated explosive devices and anti-vehicle mines with the same effect whether with or without anti-handling devices. (…)"

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GENEVA CALL